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Professional Issues Essay
Introduction
"The most effective way to restrict democracy is to transfer decision-making 
from the public arena to unaccountable institutions: kings and princes, 
priestly castes, military juntas, party dictatorships, or modern corporations" 
(Chomsky, 2002, p95)
In this essay the White Paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS 
(2010) produced by the Coalition Government 'will be discussed in terms of 
its benefits, risks before looking at the impact of such reform on staff, 
service users and society. This essay will seek to address the ethical and 
philosophical aspects of the health reform. Therefore, other important 
implications of the health reform will not be included or the focus of this 
essay. It will be argue that the ideology that the free-market White Paper is 
based on is flawed. It will be argued that this ideology conceives man as 
solely self-serving. This is contrasted with the optimism of enlightened 
thought and creates a discourse which is unhelpful to society. The 
psychological impact upon this ideology is that it contributes to the 
dominant discourses and perception of life as meaningless with a narrow 
conception of freedom.
Firstly, I will state my own theoretical position and secondly I will outline 
some of the context of the White Paper. Furthermore, the philosophy of the 
NHS reforms will be stated. The reform itself will then be explored. Based 
on the assumptions of its philosophy and its content, the perceived 
advantages will be explored. Subsequently the disadvantages of the reform 
based on enlightened thought will be discussed. This will bring us to the
second part of the essay how psychological theory will help to predict the 
changes on staff, service users and services will be described.
Statement of position
This essay presents several challenges in terms of covering a range of 
ontological and epistemological approaches such as a social constructionist, 
humanist and existentialist and critiquing the ffee-market ideology from 
these perspectives. More specifically providing a balanced and measured 
essay whilst also providing a strong argument in highly contested areas such 
as ethics, philosophy and politics present challenges. In order to provide 
such balance there is a reflective section in keeping with the reflective 
practitioner model (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009) and social constructionist 
approaches.
I have strong views of the health reform and have previously written to 
many politicians and been on protests about its implementation. I consider 
the writing of this essay to be a good opportunity to further reflect and add 
depth to my arguments. I have strong left wing political beliefs and this will 
in part inform the position of this essay. I am a trade union member and 
come from a family who has strong left wing tendencies and are 
predominantly public sector workers. As a psychologist I am interested in 
approaches that are underpinned by philosophical and ethical principles 
such as existential, humanistic and systemic approaches such as Non- 
Violent Resistance. I believe that the same questions of liberty, equality, 
meaningfulness and community penetrate the core of both philosophy and
clinical psychology. I believe understanding these issues is integral to my 
development as an ethical psychologist and citizen.
From my personal experience in health and social services having 
competitive markets where different organisations compete for contracts 
does not benefit the state, the service users or the staff. I have worked for 
many organisations that struggle in under these conditions and also have 
spoken to service users professionally and personally who have been let 
down by this system.
I would like to use this essay to explore a range of different types of 
information. Most essays and assignments written for a clinical psychology 
doctorate use a restricted literature from research publications and journals. 
I see this essay as an opportunity to explore information written by 
journalists, economists, philosophers and other authors. I will include 
references to documentaries and the internet.
Mental Health Services
Mental Health Services in the UK are a diverse range of amenities 
categorised based on the age and intellectual ability of a service user and 
severity of a mental health problem. Services can be community based or 
inpatient and generally are comprised of small multi-disciplinary teams of 
professionals including psychiatrists, nurses, psychologists and other 
therapists.
Figures from the 2009-10 financial year show there were 1.25million 
service users. The NHS website suggests that mental illness accounts for a
third of all illnesses, with one in every six people experiencing anxiety and 
depression and one in four experiencing a mental health problem. The NHS 
website suggests that mental health problems can be life threatening and 
difficulties are listed based on their complexity. It is difficult to get statistics 
on mental health services so the various policies will be outlined in order to 
establish the services role. The National Service Framework for Mental 
Health (1999) suggests key areas of improvement for services over a ten 
year period including early intervention, service close to home, client 
centred care, around the clock accessibility, access to cutting edge 
medication, multi-disciplinary teams and access to psychological therapies. 
New Horizons (2009) was a further programme with additional aims 
including improving general population well-being, increasing 
understanding, ensuring people have appropriate transitions between 
services and improving the cost efficiency.
The White Paper is particularly important for mental health care services as 
they are to be the first to be subject to the new competition agenda. Areas 
such as Improving Access to Psychological Therapies are already run by 
non-NHS providers.
Some context of the NHS health reforms
The White Paper represents a continuation of free-market government 
policy. Since 1988 an ‘internal market’ system was introduced to the NHS 
by the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She employed Enthoven who 
was a scientist and public choice theorist (Curtis, 2007). He re-designed the 
NHS based on mathematical principles which will be discussed
subsequently. This led to a division of the system into commissioners and 
providers.
The constant reform of the health service has been branded by the Socialist 
Health Association as ‘redisorganisation’ as successive governments 
struggle with this expensive and problematic institution (Walshe, Webster & 
Rivett, 2011). The Socialist Health Association states the almost yearly 
changes in NHS policy and bemoans the lack of continuity and crippling 
indecision in government.
Free-market philosophy and ideology
Adam Smith is generally considered to be the father of modem capitalism in 
terms of its political philosophy. He wrote two influential books the first 
being the Theory of Modem Sentiments, which suggests how sympathy is 
important to human behaviour and how a moral conscience guides action. 
His second and arguably more influential work. The Wealth of Nations, 
suggests that man’s selfishness drives behaviour and the economy. Smith’s 
work suggests that an individual that pursues his own self-interest also helps 
the common or societal good. He famously wrote:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages”. (Smith, 1776/2009, p22)
For Smith (1776/2009) it is self-interested competition in free markets that 
serves society by keeping prices down for the general public. This
incentivises and motivates people to produce and sell what the market 
wants. Smith lays the basis for economics of supply and demand and these 
two principles relation to human behaviour.
Smith (1776/2009) suggested that extending markets and expanding the 
division of labour allows for human creativity to flourish and productivity to 
increase. Smith saw this fine balance and growth as essential to human 
progress. This book has had an enormous influence on economics and 
politics, Chomsky (2002) argues that Smith is often misread and states that 
in both his earlier and later work Smith warns of the dire problems of 
unregulated labour conditions and markets. It is argued that this is generally 
ignored by academics and a paraphrased in an inaccurate account of Smith’s 
work is commonly taught.
Game Theory is an area of mathematics that has had an enormous impact on 
our perception of human behaviour, which has been applied to economics, 
politics and psychology (Curtis, 2007). John Nash was an American 
mathematician and pioneer of Game Theory. Game Theory has a clear 
vision of humankind, society and the future. Curtis (2007) explains that a 
philosophy has enveloped our society, which is based on the notion that 
human behaviour can be predicted based on what individuals perceive will 
be the best outcomes for that individual. Game Theory and was developed 
during the Cold War by mathematicians such as John Nash who were 
concerned with the perceived threat from the USSR.
In Game Theory people make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis 
(Davis, 1997). This analysis is a calculation of the perceived rewards and
negative consequences of an action. An individual is suggested to pursue the 
course of action which carries the greatest rewards and the least negative 
consequences. An example of this is the prisoner’s dilemma where one must 
decide whether to betray a friend for one’s own personal interest, Game 
Theory suggests that due to the fact that the other person may betray you the 
best course of action is to betray the other person involved, this is termed 
the Nash Equilibrium. Game Theory is based on the principle that each 
person will maximise their own probability of the most reward and the least 
punishment. In essence. Game Theory assumes that humankind have no 
principles.
Curtis (2007) explains that economists such as James Buchanan used the 
principles of Game Theory and applied them to economics and politics in 
what is termed public choice theory. In this model not only are people seen 
as self-interested agents but their material interests are sacrosanct. Public 
choice theory suggests that government does not represent the will of the 
people but the self-interests of politicians. In this model government self- 
interests make the free-market less efficient and are not beneficial. Thus a 
small government is an efficient market. Moreover, politicians do not work 
towards values they work towards incentives.
Enthoven (1993) and other economists based on the principles of public 
choice theory built models of how large institutions like the NHS worked 
based on maximising productivity based on models of self-interested 
individuals. They believed that liberating the market and freeing the 
incentives for individuals would maximise the efficiency advantaging both 
the individual and the wider group. Adam Curtis (2007) describes how
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based on an objective mathematical calculations Enthoven designed the 
internal market in the NHS.
Excellence and Equity
The Excellence and Equality (2010) White Paper has three key principles; to 
provide a free service to all not based on the ability to pay, increasing health 
spending in real terms and to ensure the NHS achieves among the best 
results in the world. The first two principles are not reform at all, the first 
point merely suggests that the reform will not affect how people currently 
pay for the health care. The second does not concern reform but is a 
spending promise. The first two are only relevant in the context of the third 
and are in essence a defence of the third as they aim to show that health care 
is important to the present government. The White Paper expresses how the 
NHS will achieve among the best outcomes in the world.
Commissioning and privatisation
The White Paper basically suggests that the NHS will become a 
commissioner rather than a provider of services. It will have a smaller more 
strategic role and money will be devolved to smaller organisation that will 
compete for NHS money in a free-market. The commissioners in this new 
system will be groups of GPs who decide which services to fund 
collectively and refer consumers to services in clinic.
The most important elements and changes to the health bill are in the section 
entitled autonomy, accountability and democratic legitimacy. The health bill 
aims to give greater freedom and prevent micromanagement. It will do this
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as the title of this paper suggests by liberating or devolving power from 
larger hierarchical structures to a local level, to people it states that are 
closest to patients. The alternative to government interventions in the NHS 
are practitioners commissioning service namely GPs working in teams 
called consortia. The paper suggests that local authorities will help join up 
health and social organisations. Above this tier of management will be an 
NHS commissioning board which will help to achieve outcomes and 
allocate resources. The aim of this is to de-politicise the NHS and make 
government ministers less important in the day to day management of the 
NHS. The commissioning board rather than the government will be 
responsible for ensuring equality in accessing services. This free-market 
model hopes to simplify and prevent the current duplication of management 
and regulation. Further evidence of the economic model of the NHS is the 
role given to Monitor the new market regulator, to promote competition and 
regulate prices.
This White Paper suggests that any willing provider of health care, this 
includes private companies can compete for the commission of a service. 
This provides a free market and the opportunity for capital to be invested in 
the health service from outside. The White Paper suggests that providers 
will be paid based on their results and payment will reflect outcomes as well 
as activity. Furthermore, these outcomes will be the basis of incentives. The 
White Paper suggests that money will follow the patient through the system 
to increase efficiency and support patient choice.
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‘Choice’ in the market
The bill continues to state that it will put patients first by integrating them 
into decision making processes, to increase control over their own health 
records, person centred care with joint arrangements and local partnerships 
will be strengthened. A new regulator Health Watch England will be a part 
of the Care Quality Commission which will represent patient consumers of 
health care. These changes will be implemented to improve the benefits of 
all regardless of their background. Of more concern are the plans to improve 
consumer ‘choice’. Under these plans the patients will have the ability to 
choose which provider they want to be treated by. Patients will be able to 
give hospitals feedback about their care and hospitals will need to be clear 
about mistakes made.
Regulating the market
The section entitled improving health care outcomes outlines how the 
coalition government see the NHS developing into a world leader in health 
care. The White Paper suggests that the NHS will be held to account against 
clinically credible and evidence based outcome measures. Information will 
be open for use and will allow difficulties to be identified meaning that 
disasters such as in Mid-Staffordshire go undetected. The National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence (NICE) will inform the commissioning of services. 
Inspections will be completed to find if service implement NICE guidelines. 
This part outlines how the government will regulate the market both through 
allowing the free flow of information and by the comparison between 
services and the guidance set out by NICE.
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Possible benefits of the White Paper
Based on the free-market ideology that has been discussed we would expect 
the advantages of the NHS to be that each individual worker in the 
institution labours for their own selfish reasons gives their labour and is 
rewarded by their salary. The free-market system, which is exposed in this 
bill will allow through competition between individuals and groups, the best 
value for money for the consumers.
The idea is that health care workers will be creative and innovative and 
design new systems to increase their services productivity and presumably 
people’s health. The bureaucratic system will be limited to some regulatory 
bodies such as Monitor which will ensure that competition is protected.
Based on Smith’s notions of free-markets and Game Theory we can see the 
advantages as follows. In such a system each person acts in what is 
perceived as a democratic way, making their choices which in turn shape the 
market. So in this health system a consumer can choose to go to a hospital 
that has a good reputation. The idea here is that patients are in control and 
have choices about how they spend their NHS budget by working in their 
own self-interest and filtering through the freely available information to 
make the best choices for their own interest the individual serves both 
themselves and society. Here a consumer of health care can compare the 
NICE guidelines to the reports on services and based on this information 
choose the best service to meet his needs.
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When there are discrepancies in the markets the state will step in and ensure 
that competition, choice and liberty prevails. This is where the health bill 
sees the role of Monitor, which is designed to re-correct the market.
Risks of the White Paper and its ideology
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has written a comprehensive comparison of international health care 
systems. This approach and language is very much in keeping with an 
economic, free-market capitalist ideology. The report states that there is no 
one system that has overall advantages in terms of the costs and benefits in 
health care outcomes (OECD, 2011). Nations with free-market systems such 
as America often spend more per head than countries such as Britain with 
overall less benefit. If the White Paper is based on the evidence that free- 
markets are more efficient then it would suggest that in fact the planned 
health reform is ideologically motivated. Thus it is based on a belief in free- 
markets and an economics based philosophy about man rather than on the 
various cost and benefits of such a system.
In their own terms and their own philosophy and language free-market 
models suffer from consumers not having adequate information. 
Furthermore, the so called supplier induced demand occurs when healthcare 
providers base treatments on an economic rationale. This is the flaw of free- 
markets and will be described in philosophical terms. Thus henceforth the 
ideas and language of economics will be abandoned and the language of 
philosophy and ethics adopted.
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The free-market ideology contrasts two principles of enlightened thought 
categorical morality and the social contract. The use of this free-market 
ideology which aims to liberate the NHS will actually disempower its 
citizens because decisions making will be technocratic rather than 
democratic.
The free-market philosophy is also in contrast to deontological or 
categorical ethics, proponents of which, most prodigiously Kant 
(1781/2007), suggest that it is not the consequences of an action that make 
an action moral or immoral it is the merit of the act itself. Kant suggests that 
human beings are able to make moral decisions and conduct acts which are 
good within themselves. This is in stark contrast to the free-market ideology 
espoused in the White Paper, where the ideology is that the best outcomes 
occur when people make decisions based on not morals but their own self- 
interest. Kant (1781/2007) suggests that people make most decisions based 
on what he calls the categorical imperative. Kant argued that what is right is 
superior to what is good such as an incentive. For Kant pure reason is the 
basis for morality and it is possible from reason to delineate right from 
wrong. For example, a cashier gives a foreign school boy the correct change 
from a purchase not because it is in her interest or because of the feared 
consequences but because she believes it is the right thing to do (Kant 
1781/2007).
A further cornerstone of Western philosophy and society is the social
contract. Embracing the free-market principles of the health reform means
abandoning the notion of a social contract where people govern based on the
will of the majority. Rousseau (1762/1998) suggested that a legitimate
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political order could be maintained under the agreement between citizens to 
abandon their competition for commodities and embrace equal participation 
in democratic decision making. This agreement is the social contract. In 
order for this to occur people have to submit to the authority of the majority 
because together they have the authority to govern. For Rousseau it is the 
surrendering of competition and action for one’s own interest that allows 
collaboration and democracy. This is in contrast to the ideology of free- 
markets and competition espoused by the Equity and Excellence White 
Paper.
Sandel (2009) suggests that these two principles of a moral deontology and 
a social contract contradict what he calls free-market triumphalism. Sandel 
argues that politics since the Reagan, Thatcher years has been conceived as 
having a very rigid role to correct the market where it has failed and to 
liberate the market where it has been previously dominated by state 
institutions. Sandel argues that technocratic government no longer perceives 
its duty as making decisions based on values on ethics but rather as 
weighing up the pros and cons of a certain policy or decision through cost 
benefit analysis. Through this mathematical procedure the values of the 
advantages and disadvantages are calculated and the decision taken. Sandel 
(2009) suggests that this philosophy is a quasi- science. Sandel argues that it 
is not possible to place a monetary value or quantify values of things which 
have inherent or human value, most clearly a human life.
Sandel describes this in the 2008 Reith Lectures where he says that a cost
benefit analysis was calculated for a smoking company. It showed that
smoking actually saved the state money because people died earlier and
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were less of a burden on the state. This misses the crucial element that 
human life has an intangible value not a price.
Sandel (2009) argues that not only do free-market decision making 
principles lead to unhelpful and impractical policies they also take power 
away from the population, away from an arena where moral decisions can 
be discussed weighed up and deliberated based on their ethical merits but to 
a technocratic quasi-scientific method in the hands of elite economists 
whose models fail in the free-market and when allowed also in public 
institutions. It is clear that these principles are relevant to our health service. 
How we spend public money and who is entitled to support from the state 
are decisions for us all and should be based on a discourse rather than a 
mathematical equation. Such engagement in discussion and public decision 
making on moral questions such as is health care a right or privilege could 
help to design systems that work in the interests of the common good.
Sandel (2009) argues that when you introduce a free-market system into an
institution you lose the basic goal or ideal of that organisation is lost. Thus
in the health service where the goal is to provide the relevant citizens with
healthcare, by introducing a free-market ideology and system the greater
common good is lost. Curtis (2007) further explains this in his documentary
series entitled The Trap. He explains how when the Labour government set
up incentivised schemes for hospitals with targets such as seeing patients
more quickly and removing people from corridors the actual events were not
in line with the targets and contrary to the overarching aim to improve
patient care. For example, when hospital managers were asked to see
patients more quickly, they employed a nurse to greet people when they
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arrived; they therefore had been seen and met this target but did not attend 
to the patient’s needs. The government set targets for patients not to be 
placed in corridors on trolleys but to be allocated a bed in a ward. The 
hospital managers then reclassified corridors as wards and removed the 
wheels from trolleys and re-classified those beds. In essence targets do not 
always represent improvements in care and can lead to the overarching aim 
and the task being avoided, in this case meeting client’s needs.
An aspect that Sandel (2009) and Curtis (2007) do not mention is that as 
well as power being transferred from the public to private sector wealth is 
also transferred. McKee and Stuckler (2011) suggest that when economic 
times are tough it has been the policy of free-market governments to sell 
publicly owned assets. It is argued that selling the NHS or commissioning 
the services to non-NHS organisations moves wealth from the public purse 
to the private.
The White Paper undermines the principles of the NHS. The principles of 
public duty, sacrifice, of people being of equal value not price and a 
commitment to a common good. The White Paper does this because of its 
commitment to free-markets and an ideology where humankind is solely 
self-serving.
The impact of the white paper and its ideology on service users, staff 
and services
When the implications of adopting a free-market philosophy are discussed it 
is clear that such policies are likely to have an enormous impact on the well­
being and mental health of the population. In this section, the White Papers
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effects on citizen’s lives will be discussed. It will be argued that a health 
system that serves itself not the public will have the following effects 
disempowering citizens not liberating them, de-humanising and providing 
no solidarity or security.
A free-market model of mental health looks at the cost of mental health in 
terms of human capital and what an individual can contribute to society. 
Efforts have been made to measure the value of people and the effect of 
mental health on this value. This is a commodification of humankind and 
perspectives which suggest this is unhelpful will now be discussed.
Foucault (1972) suggested that present within the discourses in society are 
power differentials. These differences in power maintain the inequalities 
present in society whether it is in terms of political, economic, gender, 
sexuality etc. The free-market philosophy and NHS bill suggest that by 
transferring wealth from public institutions to private companies will lead to 
equality. However, it is clear from twenty years of such policies that in fact 
inequalities increase in a free-market philosophy. Free-market philosophies 
not only give away the public wealth of citizens but also deprive them of 
their democratic rights. As Sandel (2009) suggests the decision making 
platforms are no longer democratic but technocratic.
For Foucault (1972/2006) psychiatric or mental health problems are 
constructed by society and are inherent in the discourses and power 
differentials. In this philosophy reality is constructed by people in the 
language they use. The act of making people commodities serves to 
maintain the power imbalances which in itself is a part of the dominant
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discourse and therefore the creation of ‘mental health problems’. If we take 
a social constructionist perspective on the Equity and Equality White Paper 
we can see that what this paper actually does is to further suggest that 
humankind is only self-interested. Furthermore, this construction serves to 
maintain the inequalities between those who have power and those who do 
not. Those who have the power to make decisions on their health care and to 
consume health care as a product will continue to do so. It is clear from 
looking at the White Paper, without completing a discourse analysis on it, 
that patients or citizens are termed consumers. The NHS is not a public 
institution but a business.
Based on social constructionist theory it is likely that the discourses around 
health care are likely to remain concerned with consumers and markets not 
around responsibilities, ethical decisions, public engagement and equality. 
This has implications for all of our mental health as the areas where people 
are treated as humans and not commodities disappear. As the dominant 
discourses around humankind being self-interested become maintained in 
government policy, it becomes the widely held truth and reality that humans 
are only self-interested. We can think of service users, staff and services as 
struggling against a system where the power is not evenly distributed, the 
White Paper will exacerbate this powerlessness.
From a humanist and existential perspective it is important to ask what
people live for in a system where nothing has meaning only a value.
Existentialist thinkers such as Yalom (1980) argue that having a meaningful
life is a pre-condition for good mental health. For Yalom liberty also is one
of the four existential concerns present in human nature. For Yalom
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however liberty is not constrained to the freedom to choose what one 
consumes freedom is conceived as the ability to create his or her own life. 
Freedom is not about consumption is about creation and Yalom’s view is 
opposed to the narrow view espoused in the free market ideology of man as 
only a consumer. This ideology contrasts the human need for liberty and 
meaningfulness. If people subscribe to a philosophy where there is no 
meaning, where people cannot work for principles only for self-interest 
where does that leave the population existentially in their search to lead 
meaningful lives. This ideology is likely to have adverse implications on 
people’s wellbeing.
In this new system service users, staff and groups of staff will not find what 
Winnicott (1971) terms a safe place to be in a world where the prevalent 
ideology is one where man is solely self-interested and competitive. How do 
people make sense of their relationships and attach meaning to those when 
the prevalent ideology suggest that people are self-serving.
Attachment theorists such as Bowlby (1969) suggest that affective bonds,
relationships between people are central to how they see themselves and
others, regulate affect and ultimately behave. The prevalent ideology of
people being solely self-serving is incongruent with this theory. Based on
this ideology and the plans in Equity and Excellence people will compete
against one another for the commissioning of services and against their
colleagues to ensure that they meet their targets and gain their incentives.
Co-operation is not a concept that is central to this ideology. Building strong
relationships with staff and service users is central to how Rogers (1951)
see’s warm empathie and congruent practitioners. Stedmon and Dallos
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(2009) perceive people and practitioners as beings able to reflect and to re­
examine and to think together about other possibilities.
Practical Implications
It is possible that staff could see an increase in their wages. When a person 
is working in a system based on incentives rather than for a sense of public 
duty they may begin to compare their wages to those in other industries. 
Public sector pay is higher than private sector pay, although 40% of those in 
the public sector are graduates as opposed to 25% of those in the private 
sector (Kollewe, 2011). If the graduates in the private sector are compared 
to those in the public sector they actually earn 5.7% less (Kollewe, 2011). If 
wages increase and assuming health care continues to be funded by taxation, 
the general public could see an increase in this cost.
This essay has taken a deontological perspective on the White Paper, but in 
case you are not convinced and remain a moral consequentialist, we can see 
that the consequence of a free-market ideology is not advantageous. As this 
ideology has become more prevalent over the last twenty to thirty years we 
have seen the deregulation of the financial markets and huge growth in 
profits for those who invest in financial markets. However, the 
consequences of this have been a disastrous economic crash particularly in 
the western world. As the consequences of the ffee-market triumphalist era 
are seen in the free-markets it is ironic that this government chooses to 
pursue this policy in the public and health sector. The first signs of the same 
transfer of debt from private companies to the public that occurred after the 
2008 economic crisis are now occurring in the state sector. Southern Cross a
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large care provider became insolvent in 2011 and the consequences of this 
were felt by tax-payers. In the public sector as well as the financial sector in 
the long term free-markets mean private profit and public debt.
Reflections
Writing this essay has crystallised my beliefs about the NHS reforms. 
Whilst feeling that there were ethical reasons that I strongly disagreed with, 
I had not had the opportunity to research and develop my ideas about the 
implications of this health reform and the ideology that underpins it. I feel 
more strongly that this reform is ethically, philosophically and politically ill- 
conceived having taken the time to critique it. I hope to hold in mind these 
ethics as I practice psychology and to have an awareness of my position on 
policy and if I think critically about whether it is in the interest of the 
common good.
Conclusions
This essay has examined the coalition government’s White Paper Equity 
and Equality. Having fi*amed this act in its political and ideological context 
it has been argued that the expansion of the free-market ideology into health 
care is immoral. From a deontological moral perspective the ideology is 
flawed as the ideology does not take into account humans as anything more 
than self-interested machines. It ignores the enlightenment principles of 
categorical morality, a social contract and the notion of personal sacrifice 
and co-operation. This ideology disempowers people as it moves away 
power from democratic institutions towards unaccountable and unelected 
ones. A social constructionist perspective is helpful in noticing the language
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of the White Paper where people are consumers and the NHS is a business. 
People are dehumanised becoming commodities and decision making does 
not involve them. Its future is not based on the idea that people work for 
values, principles or a common good. That people want to be ethical and 
serve the common good together.
''What is a cynic?-A man who knows the price o f everything and the value 
o f nothing'^ (Wilde, 1892/2000, p359)
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Abstract
Literature using qualitative research methods on self-harm is reviewed in 
relation to psychodynamic theories. Self-harm and psychodynamic theories 
are defined and introduced. The review examines the literature in terms of 
relational themes of self-harm including childhood experiences and current 
relationships, experience of and coping with affect and in terms of 
dissociation and reconnection with the body. Due to this it is argued that a 
psychodynamic perspective helps in understanding the meaning of self- 
harm.
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Declaration of interest
I decided to look at qualitative literature into self-harm from a 
psychodynamic perspective for a number of reasons. I have worked 
previously with psychodynamic models and have found them profoundly 
interesting, effective and ethically congruent. I have had some insight into 
the influence of service user’s development and relationships shape their 
internal and external worlds. In the process of reading the qualitative 
literature I became increasingly aware of how relevant psychodynamic 
models are in understanding the meaning of self-harm and thought this 
would be an interesting avenue to explore. Subsequently reading 
psychodynamic literature on self-harm resonated with me and my own 
experiences greatly.
The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2004) Guidelines on 
Self-Harm in Primary and Secondary Care suggest that future research 
should use qualitative research methods to establish the meaning of self- 
harm and should look specifically at intentionality. Subsequently there have 
been a number of studies using different qualitative methodologies that have 
explored the meaning of self-harm for people who engage in it. It will be 
argued here that understanding themes around the relational aspects of self- 
harm within themes of childhood, relationships, emotions and relationship 
with the body is useful in understanding the meaning and intention of these 
acts.
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Structure of review
The structure of this literature review will be as follows: first, what is meant 
by self-harm and psychodynamic approaches will be defined. The 
qualitative literature will then be discussed around the themes of childhood 
experiences, relationships, emotions and relationship with the body. The 
themes that structure this review are interrelated, for example childhood 
experiences and relationships, therefore it is at times arbitrary which section 
they have been discussed in. Critique of the qualitative methods used by 
researchers will be discussed as each paper is introduced. However, 
comparing and contrasting the specific qualitative methods is not the aim of 
this review. Having discussed the themes in the literature within some of the 
broad concepts of the psychodynamic approach, theoretical and clinical 
implications will be explored and personal reflections will be offered.
Defining Self-harm
Self-harm is defined by the NICE (2004) guidelines as "Self-poisoning, or 
self-injury irrespective o f  the apparent purpose o f the a c f’ (NICE, 2004, 
p i6). Therefore as defined by the guidelines the intentionality of self-harm 
is irrelevant and they examine self-harm both where people have intent to 
kill themselves and where they do not. The problem with this definition is 
that it is so broad that there is a risk that it is meaningless and confusing and 
there are differences between acts of self-harm which will be discussed in 
this review. Thus this review will use the term “self-harm” but will also use 
others such as self-cutting and overdose where necessary.
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Self-harm research
There is extensive quantitative research on self-harm, much of which comes 
from a psychiatric approach. Among the important contributions of this 
research include prevalence rates (Hawton, 2002), anger and familial 
transmission (Hawton, Haw & Houston, 2002) and relationship between 
self-harm and suicide (Harris, Hawton & Zahl, 2005). However the risk 
factor approach has limitations; Solomon and Farrand (1996) argue that the 
medical model trivialises people’s experiences and fails to recognize the 
meaning of the acts of self-harm. Furthermore, subjective testimonies of 
self-harmers may illuminate latent and manifest meanings that are not 
necessarily captured in statistical data analysis.
Qualitative research
In order to examine the meaning of self-harm a qualitative methodology is 
necessary. Qualitative research methods can be defined as “Describing the 
constituent properties of an entity” (Smith, 2003, pi). Elliot, Fischer and 
Rennie (1999) suggest that these methods have the advantages of providing 
rich and thick descriptions of phenomena. This allows understanding of 
subjects that are experienced and cannot be expressed numerically. 
Furthermore, the researchers suggest that they provide freedom of 
expression for the participants and lead to experimenters finding things that 
they may not have previously considered. Elliott (1999) suggests specific 
guidelines in evaluating qualitative research. These include the importance 
of researchers owning their perspective, elaboration on the participants 
context, grounding with examples, using credibility checks. Credibility
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checks involve using another researcher to examine results. It is suggested 
that offering coherent, general and specific research aims is essential. These 
principles will be used to evaluate the research presented in this review.
The words ‘qualitative’ and ‘self-harm’ were entered into the University of 
Surrey’s EBSCO host database in the psychology section. This initial 
EBSCO host search was also compared to a Google Scholar search using 
the same terms. Some studies were not available from the university and 
were therefore excluded, the Solomon and Farrand (1996) study was 
obtained from another university. Due to the aims and limits of this review 
only papers that used qualitative research methods and not case studies or 
any other research method were included. Case studies and other methods 
may have a different focus and need a different type of critique which will 
not be covered in this review. Studies were excluded where the participant 
had not self-harmed themselves, for example where parent or carer was 
interviewed.
Of the seven studies examined in this literature review, two studies: Adams, 
Rodham and Gavin (2005) and Brooke and Horn (2010) used Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), Hermeneutic phrenology was used by 
Russell, Moss and Miller (2010), Narrative Content Analysis was used by 
Lindengren, Wilstrad, Gilje and Olofson (2004), Narrative Thematic 
Analysis used by Walker (2009), Grounded Theory used by Home and 
Csipke (2009). The remaining study Solomon and Farrand (1996) used a 
case study approach and used no standardised approach to analyse the data.
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Psychodynamic theory
Jarvis (2004) defines the psychodynamic approach as “Explaining 
psychological phenomena with reference to unconscious mental processes, 
both intrapersonal and interpersonal” (Jarvis, 2002, p2). The author 
emphasises the importance of four themes: early relationships, subjective 
experiences, affect and unconscious processes. There are a number of 
important theoretical differences between different psychodynamic 
perspectives. It may even be argued that particular approaches, for example 
attachment theory, have evolved to such an extent that they are no longer a 
part of psychodynamic approach. However, the purpose of this literature 
review is not to compare and contrast approaches such as the drive, object 
relations, relational and attachment theories but rather to convey that these 
rich theoretical approaches are helpful in understanding people’s 
experiences of self-harm.
Childhood experiences
Russell et a l (2010) asked four men about their experiences of self-harm in 
two ninety minute interviews. The authors hoped to gain insight into self- 
harm through dialogic interview and reflection. The participants were all 
white British and between thirty-seven and fifty-eight.
One participant discloses the death of both of his parents and his siblings 
when he was very young. His experiences can be related to Freud’s (1917) 
theory that loss is central in suicide, whilst for some mourning is a reaction 
to the loss or bereavement of an ambivalently loved and hated object, for 
others feelings of anger mean that are self-censured and not expressed.
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Freud argues that when anger is felt in the face of bereavement and the 
figure that the anger is directed towards is absent. Thus, strong feelings of 
love and persecution are internalised into the self.
Russell et a l (2010) also discuss sexual abuse and humiliation. Past 
experiences and current problems are linked. Participants describe the 
experience of feeling attacked and attacking in retribution when feeling 
humiliated. Within these four interviews there is a common theme of 
distress in childhood, but also a great variation in the experiences that these 
men have had. The unifying theme appears to be the adverse influence of 
childhood relationships with significant adults and experiencing these 
relationships as traumatic or not meeting their needs. Hale (2008) describes 
how self-harm is a substitute for remembering a traumatic childhood 
experience and unconsciously aims to reverse that early trauma. The author 
describes that the internal conflict is resolved by destructive acts on the 
patient’s body.
Russell et al's (2010) study is unusual in that it looks at only male
participants. The authors own their perspective, often using the personal
pronoun T’. The participants own stories are described in detail which
situates the sample. The examples are certainly grounded and given in great
detail. The focus on a male population is clear and the authors justify their
position. The authors suggest three coherent themes in the interviews.
Hermeneutic phenomenology is more flexible than other methods and this
allows the authors to use reflections in the interviews. The authors mention
discussing emerging themes with colleagues but whether a method for
providing credibility checks was used is unclear. There is a clear sense of
35
the researchers involved in the interviews and this adds to ideas about 
relationships and dynamics between this population and therapists, although 
the ethical dilemmas that interviews having therapeutic as well as scientific 
goals is perhaps an issue that in this paper needs more discussion.
Brooke and Horn (2010) interviewed four women who fulfilled the criteria 
for Borderline Personality Disorder, the authors used IPA to look at three 
key themes, one of which was the context of distress. Childhood 
experiences include parental divorce, the care system, parental prostitution, 
bereavement and sexual abuse.
This paper discusses the impact of trauma and unmet needs. The traumatic
impact of abuse is clear from one participant’s account of rape at the age of
twelve. She describes this experience as haunting her. Another participant
also discusses how she self-injured by self-strangulation in response to
treatment by her foster carers. She describes this as almost an act of
resistance where she feels that confronting them would have led to
punishment. She also describes how through experience she learnt that self-
harming also led to people being concerned about her and giving her
privileges, she suggests that her foster carers were aware of social services’
likely response. Bowlby (1980) explores the relationship between loss
which is not mourned in childhood and later suicides. It is described in this
case that experience of loss in relation to parents and relationships with her
foster carers are linked to her self-harm. Gardner (2001) describes how
experiences and fantasies about their parents become internalised. The
author argues that self-harm is a system of signs about the self. The author
explains that the mother is experienced as a split figure and this leads to
36
feelings of intrusion, engulfment, separation and rejection. The mother fails 
to fulfil the fantasies of the infant leading to the withdrawal and aggression. 
Moreover, a desire to annihilate this object and the absence of this object 
leads to these feelings being projected onto the self.
In terms of methodology and reporting of the data Brooke and Horn (2010) 
cluster the results into themes without losing the rich description of the 
experience for that specific person. The authors ground the experience in 
specific examples and they provide a coherent and credible account of self- 
harm in people diagnosed with BPD. Credibility checks were undertaken by 
the second author.
Solomon and Farrand (1996) interviewed four women who self-harmed. 
The researchers were interested in differences between acts of self-harm 
with intent to kill oneself and acts of cutting or burning. Experiences of 
parental divorce, neglect and sexual abuse also feature. Participants suggest 
that self-harm is a way of dealing with anger. This relates to the 
psychodynamic literature in that Orbach (2008) suggests that unbearable 
pain producing inner constructs combined with external events such as loss, 
hurt and guilt can lead to self-harm. The author suggests that a combination 
of lifelong experiences, orientation to reality and adverse life experiences, 
poor coping mechanisms and self-destructive behaviour contribute to 
someone self-harming. It is suggested that self-harm allows one to escape 
being trapped in pain producing inner constructs.
Solomon and Farrand (1996) published one of the earliest articles using 
qualitative methods to explore self-harm. The authors use no standard
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method and no credibility checks. They detail their own perspective as to 
why it is necessary to understand the meaning of self-harm. They ground 
their research in examples, but perhaps do not let the data speak as much as 
other articles do, having a relatively short section for the data from each 
case study and much more written about previous literature. The 
researchers give little insight into the impact of being gay on childhood and 
relationships with family.
Summary of childhood experiences
In this section childhood experiences, both traumatic and relating to unmet 
needs have been discussed. There is a sense in which the experiences of 
self-harm are relational and include significant adults in children’s lives. In 
the next section accounts of current relationships and their influence on self- 
harm will be explored.
Experience of relationships
Adams, Rodham and Gavin (2005) found that participants felt the need to be 
regulated by others. They found that the people that they interviewed felt 
conflict between an intrinsically valid self and an extrinsically valid self. 
The participants accepted that their denied self needed to be re-affirmed by 
people. Subsequently they felt that they suffer from ‘door mat’ syndrome 
where people take advantage of them due to their need to be re-affirmed.
Adams et a l (2005) suggest that participants felt conflict between their 
normal and abnormal selves. This conflict involves being caught between 
wanting to reveal themselves as self-harmers and wanting to avoid
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invalidation and rejection. The authors suggest that in one sense they want 
to be liberated by disclosing their harm, in the other they are aware of the 
stigma related to self-harm and its associations with insanity. These fears 
over loss and rejection also relate to Bowlby’s (1973) theories about early 
loss and separation and the impact on internal working models.
Adams et al. (2005) used online focus groups and four e-mail interviews to 
gather data. They then used IPA to explore the experiences of this 
population. It is interesting that they used the internet and one of the central 
themes is the self. This method allows anonymity but also means that the 
researcher and person interviewed are disconnected and limits or changes 
the relationship they can have. It is not clear whether there are any possible 
misinterpretations due to this method, particularly when other sources have 
detailed the importance of relationships. The authors suggest that this 
anonymity may mean that more negative affect is disclosed. The study has 
however provided interesting hypotheses regarding the self in self-harm. It 
is grounded in examples and airs the experiences, narratives and voices of 
the participants. The aims are clear but there is little information on 
credibility checks.
Summary of experiences of relationships
There is evidence from accounts of experiences of self-harm in this 
literature that self-harm has a relational quality. Difficulties in relationships 
can lead to an episode of self-harm but also there appears to be an 
ambivalent dynamic in relationships. Perhaps fears of separation and
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engulfment by others, a need to be loved but feeling used. Next research 
discussing relationships with mental health workers will be discussed.
Experience of relationships with professionals
Lindengren et al. (2004) interviewed nine Swedish women who had 
inpatient or outpatient psychiatric care. They were asked about the care they 
desired and the care they received. The authors suggested two prominent 
themes: being validated by staff strengthens the self and being valued by 
staff promotes feeling human. It is suggested that feeling heard involves 
others listening deeply to the emotional distress that a person is 
experiencing. This is fostered by staff treating people with respect and 
dignity. One participant reports that staff were able to look beyond her 
symptoms and diagnoses and see her as a person. This is also suggested to 
include having respect for participants’ autonomy and ability to make 
decisions about their own care; whilst also being willing to come on a 
journey of recovery with a person.
Lindengren et a/.’s (2004) research aims were clear and the four themes 
they interviewed on were related to participant’s narratives on their received 
and desired care. This means that the elaboration of narratives and 
experiences is limited to these themes.
There appears to be an interesting dynamic described in the relationship 
between service users and staff in mental health services. When listening to 
and validating clients strong relationships are built that help foster hope and 
strengthen the self. Strong relationships are often emphasised in 
psychodynamic approaches (Leiper, 2006). Briggs (2008) argues that there
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is little psychological or psychodynamic thinking in mental health services; 
the author suggests that risk of self-harm or suicide is seen as a property of 
the patient rather than of their relationships with others or their 
environments.
Walker (2004) interviewed four women who had experience of mental 
health services. They described their treatment as disrespectful. The 
interviewees were diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder and had a 
history of self-harm. Walker (2004) discusses the divisive nature of 
interactions with professionals and the feeling that service users were not 
being treated with dignity and respect by them.
Generally this article offers little in relation to understanding self-harm. The 
authors perspective is owned, the sample situated and grounded in 
examples. However, the aim of the study is to examine the subjective 
experiences of the participants involved and their perspectives are not 
represented.
Summary of experiences with professionals
Validating the experiences of people who self-harm and being respectful 
and seeing people as people and not “othering” them appears to be 
important to people who self-harm. The discourses in society around self- 
harm may have a disempowering influence. This is not an area that the 
psychodynamic theory is helpful in addressing and is a possible limitation of 
this approach. However, it has been established that relationships have an 
important influence on self-harm. The Review now will look at how affect 
is experienced.
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Experiencing affect
All four of the participants interviewed in Solomon and Farrand’s (1996) 
study describe anger as the central emotion in their acts of self-harm. People 
interviewed discuss taking their anger out on themselves rather than others. 
Emotional and relational aspects of self-harm are linked. Similarly self­
cutting is described as the only way to cope with a severe level of anger.
In Russell et ah (2010), self-harm is described in terms of anger and 
attacking others and oneself. For the men interviewed by the authors; anger 
highlights a wider theme of the wish to annihilate themselves and the 
juxtaposition of their feelings of vulnerability and invulnerability. The 
authors talk about this in terms of fear of fear of engulfment and separation 
and an insufficient sense of self in relationships. The authors describe a 
macho attitude towards pain, epitomised by the feeling of being proud that 
the body can take the pain inflicted on it.
Russell et a l (2010) describe this desire to withstand pain in relation to the 
participant’s vulnerability. The authors describe the juxtaposition that there 
is nothing that can hurt if one is prepared to die, even though the self-harm 
described by the participants includes no cognizant intention to die. 
Maltsberger (2008) describes how overwhelming feelings of rage and self- 
loathing are experienced helplessly as if occurring from the external world. 
The author describes that unneutralised aggression over development leads 
to the breaking up of the self. In this section accounts of self-harm related to 
coping with anger and feeling pain has been discussed. In the next two 
sections we will look at how self-harm might be experienced as helping
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regulate anger and then subsequently how it might help to feel pain and 
reconnect with the body.
Self-harm as regulating affect
Brooke and Horn (2010) describe how coping strategies have patterns and 
different mechanisms that can be used to deal with specific levels of 
distress. Cutting is described as a way of making distressing ruminations 
stop. For one participant there was a progression of coping strategies, 
cutting which works as a quick release, burning a gradual release, a small 
overdose to dull the feeling and an overdose as an attempt to kill oneself.
Solomon and Farrand (1996) discuss self-injury as a means of dealing with 
unbearable anger and pain. They describe how participants see the wrists as 
an effective place to relieve pain and anger. Furthermore blood is seen as 
having a calming effect.
Solomon and Farrand (1996) also describe that self-harm is used as a 
survival strategy that people would engage in self-cutting as opposed to 
committing suicide. This shows perhaps that there is a spectrum of self- 
harming behaviours. The researchers suggest that self-cutting or burning 
have a very different meaning to an overdose or an attempted suicide. The 
authors suggest that the level of intent which one is understood to have by 
mental health professionals has a great bearing on the treatment they 
receive. In that those that are perceived to be undertaking self-harm for 
reasons other than to commit suicide are treated badly because they are seen 
to be doing it for attention.
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If this is combined with the evidence in relation to developmental and 
relational experiences discussed in the previous sections then Goldblatt’s 
(2008) theory appears increasingly relevant. Goldblatt (2008) conceptualises 
self-harm as a way for people to escape a sense of disintegration. This 
escape is necessary due to feelings of intolerable hostility and rage towards 
parents. How these feelings are internalised and externalised will also be 
discussed in the section with reference to the relationship with the body.
Relationship with the body
Horn and Csipke (2009) completed a Grounded Theory study using the 
internet to recruit and e-mail interview thirty-seven participants who had 
experience of self-harm. They coded and compared the data in relation to 
emergent themes and endeavoured to construct a theory that was built from 
the data. They suggest that self-harm is an attempt to reconnect the body 
with emotional experiences. They explore three themes; awareness of 
emotions, sense of self and reality and experiences based in the body. The 
authors describe how people feel dissociated and disconnected from their 
bodies and the external world.
Horn and Csipke (2009) discuss the emotional numbness that precedes self- 
harm. They describe how participants feel that intense emotions do not 
leave any room for anything else. In the psychodynamic literature Orbach 
(2008) suggests that body dissociation is one of the most important 
precipitating processes in self-harming behaviour. The author suggests that 
neglect and negative attitudes towards the body allow an estrangement 
between the body and the self, which make it easier to attack the body. The
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authors describe the lack of influence that the external world has on people 
who self-harm internally. Although, the researchers state in the model that 
sense of other is critical in the experience of self-harm they give little 
discussion of this. In the authors’ theory they fail to integrate ideas around 
sense of other and the body and generally ignore relational aspects of self- 
harm.
Home and Csipke (2009) suggest that body based experience is central to 
understanding self-harm. The authors use a grounded theory method to 
propose that reduced sensation, disembodiment, suspension and threat to 
integrity are central components to a model of understanding self-harm. The 
authors explain that participants feel that the body is unable to express their 
mental lives and is somewhat separate from them. The authors also suggest 
that the feelings inside them were unable to be contained by the body and 
that self-harm helps them to reconnect with the body.
Home and Csipke (2009) also describe that the body gives the person who 
self-harms a concrete object upon which they divert their attention. The 
researchers describe how these feelings are concrete in comparison to 
abstract feelings. There is a clear sense that the self-harm helps restore an 
imbalance between intemal and extemal pain. Gerisch (2008) describes how 
harming the body is a strategy aimed at solving intemal conflicts through 
projection. The author explains that many feelings of loss and inadequacy 
are associated with the body and therefore the body is seen as a worthy 
recipient of self-destmctive behaviour. Subsequently the pain and distress 
experienced through self-harming appears to reconnect people to their 
bodies and the extemal world.
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There is a sense in which Horn and Csipke (2009) do not own their 
perspective; the authors do not detail why they are interested in this area or 
why it resonates with them. One of the negative aspects of this methodology 
is that the reader does not get a sense of any of the participants individually; 
rather they are subsumed by codes and categories. The authors state that 
they coded e-mail interviews independently but had regular meetings to 
assess whether the themes and codes were correct and representative of the 
data. The aim of this study was to create a theory based on the data from 
interviews, the authors have completed this, but have neglected the 
relational or sense of other aspects. The authors do give insight into how 
participants feel that they are removed from their bodies and the external 
world and that the experience of self-harm reconnects them.
Brooke and Horn (2010) describe how Linda leaves the house with a suicide 
note and is found on the middle of the motorway. The researchers suggest 
that Linda feels tom between her wish to keep her suicide attempts private 
and the function of them as eliciting support or communicating distress. 
Perhaps again this is due to anxiety around separation and engulfment 
(Gardner, 2001). There is a relational aspect to Helen’s descriptions of self- 
harm; taking an overdose an hour before visiting her psychiatrist and after 
subsequent overdoses has been found in public places, such as the university 
library. Helen describes that her desire is to end the distress she is 
experiencing rather than her life.
Solomon and Farrand (1996) include an interview with Carol who describes
a suicidal mood where her self-cutting becomes out of control and she no
longer feels herself. The authors suggest that this is a significant difference
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between self-harm with intent and without intent, that when one is self- 
harming as a means of coping one is in control, whereas where one is trying 
to kill oneself there is no control.
Summary
From the papers that have been reviewed here, it is clear that qualitative 
research provides an opportunity for thick and rich accounts of experience 
and phenomena. This literature review has discussed how people’s 
traumatic experiences and unmet needs during childhood and subsequent 
ambivalent relationships influence self-harm. People’s experience of anger 
and distress appears to be related both to these relationships and to self- 
harm, which acts as a coping strategy or as a way of reconnecting the body. 
Relationships both current, in childhood, with professionals, with the body 
and with the self are a central and overarching theme in self-harm. This has 
been discussed in relation to psychodynamic theories which provide a rich 
and flexible framework to understand the meaning of self-harm.
Methodological considerations
A range of qualitative research methods have been used to explore self-harm 
from the perspective of those that experience it. There is still a great 
variation in the methods used and the procedures that are undertaken to 
ensure that the quality of the research is high. There is also a great variation 
in the theoretical perspective taken. However, in this review central themes 
most prevalent in the qualitative research have been discussed, which may 
be evidence that the experiences, narratives and voices of participants have 
been forwarded from these studies. Having suggested the prevalence of
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these themes further research to examine the childhood and relational 
experiences in people who self-harm may be fruitful. How the body and the 
self become vehicles for distress also requires further research.
Meaning and intent
The NICE (2004) guidelines suggest that qualitative literature might help 
elucidate on the meaning of self-harm and particularly on the extent to 
which self-harm relates to intent to kill oneself. In the qualitative literature 
the meaning of self-harm is idiosyncratic, there is evidence that self-harm is 
a way of coping with distress and dissociation, which are present from 
developmental experiences, in current relationships and in people’s 
relationships with their bodies. There is some evidence of a graded use of 
strategies to deal with distress, using for example cutting and burning, 
however when such strategies fail to relieve mental distress then it appears 
behaviours with intent to finally end distress and life are undertaken. The 
possible weakness of looking at self-harm from a psychodynamic 
perspective is that the social and cultural meanings of self-harm can be lost 
depending on how the practitioner positions themselves.
Limitations
This review has a number of important limitations. Qualitative research has 
been discussed in relation to psychodynamic and no other psychological 
approaches. There are still a limited number of published studies and some 
inconsistencies in their methodologies. The diverse methodologies in the 
literature have not been compared and contrasted. Themes around socio­
cultural differences have not been explored in the existing literature.
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Future Research
There are few papers that have used qualitative methods to investigate self- 
harm and even fewer that have used an explicit psychodynamic perspective. 
Studies that take a psychodynamic perspective may find it illuminating. 
Reviews and meta-analytic studies may be ways of exploring the current 
qualitative research and linking this to psychodynamic theory. Methods like 
grounded theory could lead to new psychodynamic theories that further 
understanding of self-harm. The NICE (2004) guidelines suggest future 
research into minority groups and this has not been addressed in the current 
literature. Qualitative research can give an opportunity for silent minorities 
to have a voice and may forward social justice (Chamaz, 2005).
Future research may also look at the experiences of parents and carers in 
relation to their child who have self-harmed and their relationships with 
them. How clinicians and the public understand people who self-harm could 
also be researched. This may lead to ideas about how to illuminate people’s 
understanding of self-harm from a psychodynamic perspective, which it 
would be hoped would lead to greater empathy and understanding of this 
problem.
Clinical implications
Briggs (2008) suggests that the majority of clinicians do not apply 
psychological or psychodynamic thinking when working with people who 
self-harm. In this literature the importance of relationships to service users 
is clear. As a trainee clinical psychologist my role may involve promoting 
such ways of thinking in teams, services and communities. I will also be
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required to develop strong validating relationships with people that may 
help to foster hopefulness and change intrapsychic relationships. Refining 
assessment techniques that help me to gain an understanding of the history 
of relationships may also lead to a richer understanding of self-harm and 
accurate clinical judgements on intent and risk.
Formulating firom a psychodynamic perspective may help me to link theory 
to clinical work. Leiper (2006) suggests that defences, anxiety and hidden 
feelings are reflected in the relationships between the client, therapist and 
the past. Understanding how self-harm relates to childhood, relationships 
and affect may help one to formulate the dynamics present within a client’s 
experiences. Understanding how psychodynamic approaches understand 
self-harm may allow one to listen and relate in a way that allows the client 
to process and gain insight into such experiences.
Reflections
I felt that many of the accounts of self-harm gave a rich insight into these 
phenomena, the combination of these and psychodynamic perspectives 
resonated with my personal experience that the richness of people’s lives is 
in their relationships.
Regarding my own relationship with this review, I felt I have been engaged 
with the research and the theory and have reflected much on how to 
incorporate complex themes. Whilst initially reading the literature on self- 
harm it resonated with what I knew about psychodynamic theory. I felt there 
was a strong relationship between the two. When I read more
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psychodynamic theory on self-harm I could see further parallels and tried to 
explore them in this review.
As my understanding of self-harm and psychodynamic theories has 
increased I have been able to reflect on how people’s relationships shape 
their worlds. I am currently working in an inpatient unit and the theories I 
have explored in this review have helped me to think about how service 
users experience others. I have reflected upon client’s sense of self and their 
developmental histories. I have found it interesting to reflect on how these 
people’s relationships have developed and how their internal worlds have 
been affected by their relationships. I have also reflected that giving 
someone the opportunity for time and space to share these experiences is 
central to being a therapeutic clinician. This principle will ultimately 
underpin how I practice in the future.
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Our task was to complete a presentation entitled ‘relationship to change’ in 
Personal and Professional Development (PPD) groups. This was a Problem 
Based Learning (PBL) task. We were a group of six, all under the age of 
twenty eight and I was the only male. This account will discuss the 
experiences of not feeling heard and being a minority. Subsequently 
reflections after the task and personal and professional development will be 
discussed. The focus of this piece will be how the group decided on the 
topic and the difficulties, process and implications related to this.
Deciding on the topic
In the first session after drawing up ground rules we started to talk about the 
presentation. I talked about a structuralist perspective to change. I spoke 
about Damasio’s (2000) view on homeostasis and emotion and how some of 
the principles could be applied to change. I suggested that we could talk 
about how different levels of explanation could be used to understand 
change (Piaget, 1958). This did not seem to be well received so I spoke 
about how change was relevant to systems theory (Barker, 1998) and again 
this did not seem well received. I gave some other ideas about how 
relationships could be the vehicles of change how I had been inspired to 
change by leaders such as Obama but again there was little feedback. I 
thought these were credible contributions but I felt that no one was listening 
or interested or even challenging them. I was frustrated by this.
In later meetings it was becoming increasingly difficult to decide upon a 
topic for us to present on. One of our group members had a very clear idea 
about wanting to present about the good and bad things about change. This
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person took the lead role and drew up on a white board how she saw the 
positive and negative aspects of change. I tried to introduce some more 
ideas about which direction we could take the presentation in. The group 
seemed non-committal on either the ideas that I suggested or the ideas that 
other members suggested. Someone suggested that we go away and do more 
research. In the following group, the group member who introduced the pros 
and cons idea tried to suggest that we had agreed on this as the topic of the 
presentation, which I thought was odd. I felt frustrated by this struggle to 
agree a topic.
Not feeling heard
I reflected on what not feeling heard meant to me. I reflected on my own 
experiences in my family, my father is a psychotherapist and my mother a 
social worker. They have both thought carefully about the principles by 
which they have parented my brother and I. We share close relationships 
and I rarely feel not heard by either of them. This contrasts their own 
experiences growing up where I understand that they both had some 
experience of not feeling heard. Therefore, although there have obviously 
been times in education and work where I have experienced not feeling 
heard, I think I found the experience frustrating. Patrick Casement (1985) 
describes the importance of listening carefully and fully to clients. He 
describes not hearing what his clients are communicating and the adverse 
effects of this.
I feel that my family are also able to have debates and disagreements and we 
enjoy talking about politics, philosophy and psychology. Subsequently,
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some of my friendship groups also involve close bonds and debates. I felt 
this group was very constrained and reticent. They did not share their ideas 
and opinions or engage in others ideas. I thought that maybe I should have 
been more in touch with where the rest of the group were at in terms of their 
own individual development rather than assuming they were in a similar 
place to me. I wondered about how other people’s experiences in their own 
families and systems might have been different to mine.
During my work in an inpatient unit I have noticed that patients often feel 
unheard. The people on the unit often describe feeling isolated and there is 
often hostility and violence at home. I also thought about how Foucault 
(1967) would describe the system around service users controlling and 
oppressing individuals, leading them to feel helpless and powerless.
After this session I tried to open up the space for others to share their own 
ideas. I thought that if I felt unheard perhaps others did to. You could 
consider this thinking in terms of transference and counter transference 
(Freud, 1917). I also found it difficult not to withdraw in one way or another 
from the group. Perhaps I was feeling somewhat hurt and discouraged. I 
found myself saying less, but this did not seem to help the group members 
put forward their own ideas. At the end of one group the group facilitator, 
seeing that I was somewhat quieter, suggested to me that I should keep 
talking and I felt this was encouraging and I felt a little less isolated.
I wondered if being in a family which was male dominated, also affected 
my expectations of the group and how I might be more used to a male 
dominated environment. Although, saying this I think that my own and my
58
families conception of masculinity is different from the majority of British 
families. I think my father, brother and I are quite gentle and sensitive. I was 
curious as to whether this was strange for the other group members who 
might have had very different experiences of men.
Minoritv influence
When I went away I thought about which direction we could take the 
presentation in. I thought about my position in the group and thought that I 
was a minority. I started to think about how minorities could effectively 
challenge a majority and influence change.
Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux’s (1969) seminal experiment examining 
minority influence involved participants in a group judging the colour of a 
series of slides, some of which were an ambiguous shade of blue and green. 
Two pseudo participants judged the ambiguous slides consistently or 
inconsistently. The results showed that participants in the consistent 
condition were significantly influenced compared to the inconsistent 
condition.
In the social and political sphere Gandhi lead a rebellion against the British 
occupation of India using the principle of minority influence. Gandhi voiced 
a consistent and persistent voice of resistance to British oppression, which 
led to the non-violent liberation of India. As a psychology assistant I had 
worked with a psychologist who was developing an approach to working 
with families called Non-Violent Resistance (NVR). This was based on 
Gandhi’s principles of taking action, de-escalation, mobilising support and 
reconciliation (Omer, 2004). I had previously in two roles used these
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principles to help families. For example, by protesting using sit-ins where 
children were violent, by helping families hold open meetings for adults to 
gain support, by helping parents and carers to complete reconciliation 
gestures.
In the next meeting we had I suggested that we present on NVR and spoke 
about how change was facilitated by protest and a consistent and persistent 
minority. I seemed to win over a few people, one of whom had some 
experience using NVR, but there were some that were less enthusiastic 
about this topic. I then tried to get behind someone else’s idea about doing a 
presentation about the therapeutic alliance. This seemed to be a good idea 
but again it seemed the group was divided on this topic.
When I previously worked with families and was struggling to find a way 
forward my supervisor used to emphasise the importance of reconciliation. I 
wondered how I could reconcile the difference in my group and find a way 
forward. I thought that a reconciliation gesture might help with this. So the 
next time we met I brought a box of cakes and said that I knew things had 
been difficult but hoped we could move forward.
Compromise
We decided as a group to each go and explore our own avenues of research. 
One group member had the idea of using a case study approach whereby we 
could unite all of our different avenues of research into a single 
presentation. I was disappointed that we could not settle on a single topic to 
present on, but this seemed like a pragmatic compromise. I was pleased that 
I would have some input into the content of the presentation and felt that I
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could present something meaningful on NVR in a few minutes. I did 
however stand firm on one group members suggestion that I dress up as a 
gang member, as the case study we were using was with a young man in a 
gang. It appeared as though some of the group members had discussed this 
as a possibility before the group’s next meeting. I reflected on this and 
thought that it was a very strange idea. I had no intention of this being the 
course team’s initial impression of me. No one else was asked or 
volunteered to dress up. I felt a little amused and perplexed by this entire 
discussion and wondered what this was about, but I de-escalated this 
situation and simply and calmly said that I was not prepared to do this.
The presentation’s content was then focused around a case study around a 
violent young man. We all spoke for a few minutes and I spoke about the 
principles of NVR and how they would be used by a clinical psychologist 
working with the systems around the service user to facilitate change. In 
some ways I considered presenting on this subject as a small act of 
resistance in its self.
Reflections after the task
I was pleased to have completed the presentation and it seemed to go 
relatively well. We all presented our individual segments well and ticked all 
the observer’s boxes. I felt relieved by this but also I still felt a little 
disappointed our presentation was so fragmented.
I thought subsequently and in preparation for writing this piece that it was 
interesting to see how a system or group responds to anxiety which is 
fostered in it by an external agency. I reflected on the task as really being
61
about the choices of the subject. It does not take long to research and 
produce a presentation of twenty minutes, where each group member is only 
required to speak for a few minutes. However it was difficult for a young 
group barely beginning to form, to make a decision with the pressures of 
presenting and being assessed for the first time in a clinical doctorate.
I thought about how others are able to influence groups. We had some time 
in a PPD group to reflect on the task. I suggested that I felt a minority in the 
group and one of the group members was somewhat dismissive of this and 
said that we all felt it was difficult. I thought that this was unhelpful and not 
validating, but made no comment. Other group members seemed pleased 
with the results of the presentation and tried to praise our work. There was 
some discussion by a brave group member about how finstrating it had 
been, particularly choosing a topic. I mentioned that perhaps the 
presentation represented where we were as a group.
Personal development
I used my social support, particularly conversations with my fidends and 
family to think about this task. I came to think that the difficulties in making 
a decision might be a good reflection of where the group was. I came to 
think of the fi*agmented presentation which we gave to be a good 
representation of where the group was, as a not fully formed entity.
I reflected about feeling frustrated and I wondered if perhaps I had been 
over sensitive. I thought about this for some time, but found a creative way 
of thinking about this in some writing by the psychotherapist Irvin Yalom 
(2001). I find reading Yalom very therapeutic, I admire the humble and
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humanistic nature. I like to think that perhaps in the future I may base my 
own approach as a psychologist on a similar perspective. In his book the 
Gift of Therapy, he discusses an incident where a friend writes what he 
perceives as a harsh review of one of his books. When he confronts the 
critic he replies that Yalom’s sensitivity is what makes him such a good 
therapist. I hope equally that being sensitive might be necessary to me being 
a good therapist, but that like Yalom sometimes it may also mean that I 
might take things personally.
Professional development
As a clinical psychologist I think it is important to be sensitive to clients’ 
needs but also to be aware of clients’ projections and identifications. 
Casement (1985) suggests that internal supervision can be an effective way 
of managing this. This involves reflection on the therapeutic relationship 
and the patient’s needs. In my future practice I am interested in learning 
more about psychodynamic approaches. The task has helped me whilst on 
placement in an adult inpatient unit to think about how I could listen more 
intently to client’s needs and their communications. I think it has also 
helped me to think about opening up the therapeutic space between myself 
and clients and trying to manage my own needs as a clinician. It has also led 
to some reflections about how as a psychologist I might represent the needs 
of service users in teams and organisations and how I might influence 
groups of people to ensure they listen to service user’s needs. Subsequently, 
I have been working on ways to promote service user participation at the 
inpatient unit.
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Summary and future directions
The PPD task was very challenging and negotiating a group where there 
were clearly different expectations and anxieties was difficult. However, we 
were able to compromise and complete a presentation regardless. I 
wondered about how I could listen to the needs of others and influence 
groups. I think that this was something that would be very important in 
working with individuals and groups as a clinical psychologist. I also expect 
that this will take a very long time to perfect and that also perhaps patience 
is necessary, perhaps also this is something that myself and group members 
lacked.
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Introduction
In our second year of clinical psychology training, we were asked to 
complete a Problem Based Learning (PBL) task and present our findings to 
our colleagues. This reflective account will discuss my experiences during 
this task and relate these to my personal and professional development. This 
account will discuss my experiences and thoughts about the group process. 
On reflection I think that we missed important perspectives in our 
discussions and presentation and I will suggest why I think this may have 
occurred. However, first I will introduce the task and our progress and 
strengths.
The task
We were presented with fictional information on the Stride family 
comprising of two twin three year old children Sally and Sarah. They are the 
children of Mr and Mrs Stride who are the subject of a child protection plan 
with concerns of emotional abuse and neglect. Mr Stride is known to have 
physically assaulted Mrs Stride in the presence of the children, she 
minimises this behaviour. Mrs Stride is reported to have a mild learning 
disability and Mr Stride attended a special educational needs school. Mr 
Stride grew up in the care system. Mr Stride’s parents live locally and want 
to look after the children, although they have health problems. The family 
are suggested to live in deep poverty. Our role is to complete a risk 
assessment and if appropriate a rehabilitation plan. We were also given a list 
of issues to consider including the range of professionals in the network, 
parenting and learning disabilities, class and poverty and violence.
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Through a series of group discussions and meetings we decided to present 
using a number of role plays. The first was a meeting between a social 
worker and a guardian, the second a meeting between Mrs Stride and a 
nurse practitioner and the third between two psychologists in supervision. I 
role played the psychologist who was supervised. The presentation went 
well and we received good feedback from our fellow trainees and from the 
staff assessing us. Having explained the task and briefly outlining our 
approach I will now discuss the themes relevant to my experience and the 
group process.
Strengths of our approach
We were able to complete a presentation quickly and efficiently. We all had 
a fairly equal contribution to the presentation. There were few 
disagreements and we were able to decide on a way of presenting the 
information we felt important swiftly. Group members took responsibility 
for different tasks such as research and ensured tasks were completed. We 
were able to identify each other’s strengths and play to those strengths. In 
the group people were able to talk about their anxiety about the presentation 
and we were able to discuss this and reflect on it. We considered many of 
the important themes of the presentation. We presented from a number of 
professional perspectives and spoke about the need to hold in mind Mr 
Stride’s Parents, Mrs Stride and some of the professionals in the network 
that we represented in role play.
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Losing the child’s perspective
On reflection after the task, it was interesting that we had in our role plays 
lost somewhat the perspective of the child. We had discussed this sometime 
before the presentation and talked about how we might represent the 
children through the role play. However, I still felt that our presentation 
lacked a child centred approach to the family. This is an interesting dilemma 
I had come across when I worked in children’s service, often working with 
parents and carers there was much discussion about whether a service can 
be child centred as well as family centred.
On reflection perhaps we could have used a more creative way of 
representing the child’s voice, like a painting or sculpture.
I also felt that we had become entrenched in thinking about the different 
professional’s needs and perspective rather than thinking about the child’s 
perspective. It struck me that this could often be the case in child protection 
cases, where the politics between professionals; the conflict and co­
operation between adults takes centre stage and the system which is 
designed to protect children fails.
It was interesting that our role plays played quite idealised roles of the 
different professionals. It seemed to me that all these professionals were 
very much like psychologists. In the first role play the social worker was 
very psychologically minded and the guardian receptive to this. In the 
second the nurse was counselling Mrs Stride and the third of course had two 
psychologists discussing the case. I wondered if we over identified with the
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professionals in the role play and had lacked sufficient advanced empathy 
with the service users. Perhaps it was more difficult to put ourselves in the 
shoes of the service users who inhabit a very different environment to us. 
Alternatively perhaps it was our needs to present ourselves as psychologists 
to our colleagues and assessors. It was also interesting to consider that we 
had shown much communication between the professionals involved. The 
current system which has been rigorously criticised for having too little 
communication, for example, in the Children Act (2004) following the case 
of Victoria Climbié and also more recently in responses to the Baby P case. 
I thought that it was interesting that we had presented quite an idealised 
version of what might happen in such a case. I wondered if there was some 
defensiveness around how difficult and complex such a case would be and 
also whether our own potential powerlessness in the face of violence, 
poverty and learning disabilities was neatly avoided in a role play where 
there was little conflict and professionals very united in their perspective 
and philosophy.
It was interesting to reflect upon my own relationship to some of these 
issues. Both my parents were social workers. From my experience talking to 
them and working within services there is an enormous amount of stress on 
social workers. There are also inadequate resources to support and protect 
our children and this was itself neglected in our presentation. Much like our 
discourses in society, in our group discussions we somewhat neglected our 
social workers and the important role they play. We did not discuss the 
likelihood that they would not have time to hold the children or family in
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mind as they attempt to hold so many cases, so many families together. 
Instead I felt that they held the perhaps more privileged position that we as 
psychologists hold.
I reflected on how our group had avoided some difficult areas and avenues 
of discussion. I wondered if we had defended against some of the distress 
that such issues could cause by avoidance. This made me think about 
defence mechanisms. Freud argued that psychological defences help us 
manage different types of anxiety (Jarvis, 2004). Here anxiety is 
conceptualised as the energy present in a conflict between parts of the 
psyche which represent different drives. For Yalom (1980) conflicts around 
feeling powerless, meaningless, a fear of death or existential loneliness are 
defended against. These defences lead to distress and symptoms analogous 
to mental health problems. I think that perhaps we might have avoided 
exploring the real difficulties and conflicts in our group. This activity may 
help me in my clinical work to think about defences and avoidance when 
working with service users to think about the underlying existential conflicts 
that we defend against. I wondered how our group had so successfully 
avoided some of the difficult issues inherent in the presentation and how I 
could facilitate reflection on defences and conflict, if it was appropriate in 
the reflective space of the PPD group.
I also reflected on how the group’s avoidance of difficult issues could be 
similar to Group Think. Group Think is a term coined by Janis (1972) to 
describe when group harmony is valued above realistic alternatives where
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there is a collective optimism and avoidance. It occurred to me that a similar 
process may be occurring in our group. In my previous account I spoke 
about how I positioned myself as a minority and struggled against the group. 
It is interesting to consider how that might have been an important role in 
the initial developing group but how now as we had become more cohesive 
that role was neglected.
Losing Mr Stride’s perspective
As well as avoiding representing the child’s position and a realistic portrayal 
of social services we also left out Mr Stride’s perspective fi*om the 
presentation. As the perpetrator of violence and the father of the children Mr 
Stride had an integral role in the family situation. I did not seek to represent 
him in the role play as the only male in our group. I think that on a group 
level this was probably due for a wish for him not to be present. I wondered 
if this dynamic of ignoring or avoiding violent offenders is also something 
that is present in our discourses and wider culture. I subsequently reflected 
on my own prejudices about violent men and how I might wish to avoid 
them or their destructive behaviour. This led me to think about my own 
conception of masculinity.
In a previous reflective account I wrote about being the only male in the 
group and being a minority. Personally I feel as though my conception of 
masculinity is very different from most other men. This is certainly true of 
my time when growing up in quite a tough school in a deprived town. I was 
certainly down the pecking order in terms of the implicit hierarchy of who
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was the strongest and toughest to the extent to which I would say that I 
almost opted out. There were some very violent fights and confrontations 
during my time there both at school and in the wider community and a 
constant sense of threat out in the streets. I think that what I hold as 
important as a man is different from some of the men that inhabited the 
community I grew up in, in a sense it is a reaction to the violent and 
prejudice males I encountered that has formulated some important beliefs 
about the roles of men.
Group and individual processes
I have struggled during our PPD groups to deal with the lack of reflection. 
In previous reflective groups members have been very open and honest and 
a great deal of interesting work has been undertaken. I feel that in our 
current group that this is not really possible and I have struggled with this. 
There have been times where due to very stressful situations people have 
been able to discuss what seems to be important to them but for much of the 
time it seems that people avoid discussing their own reflections in terms of 
their work and life. At times I feel quite frustrated with this and I feel 
impatient to get people thinking and talking. In the first year I tried both 
holding back and being more vocal and I think the later was more 
successful. I think that in our cohort there is a general desire to get through 
the course without having too much trouble. I feel that people avoid 
engaging with ideas, being critical and playing with different perspectives is 
what makes being a psychologist so interesting and engaging. This is very 
clear to me when people do not ask questions in lectures dismiss things out
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of hand or avoid discussions or debates. I feel that an open, challenging 
atmosphere was certainly absent from our discussions and I feel we could 
have engaged much more readily with the material. I feel that this is perhaps 
due to the bureaucratic nature of the course. It feels at times that one is 
simply required to jump through hoops and to evidence that they have 
completed an action. It seems at times that as long as this is complete the 
quality of one’s thinking or the way one makes sense of the situation is 
irrelevant and I feel that we can be compliant with this at times. It is curious 
that it seems like the system designed to ensure we evidence our work 
actually functions to restrict the real learning experiences as we spend our 
time ticking boxes not engaging with ideas.
This presentation occurred at a difficult time in my career. Around a year 
ago soon after I finished my first placement where there were a series of 
suicides, some of the people that died were people I had worked with 
closely. It has taken some time for me to feel confident in my clinical work 
and I have had doubts about my own abilities. This has contrasted how I feel 
when at the university where I feel more confident. In my last reflective 
account I stated how reading Yalom’s (1980) work helped me to think and 
process ideas around death and liberty. Having some distance between these 
difficult events has allowed me to think about my own defences and 
conflicts particularly in very stressful times. It has certainly been a stressful 
and frustrating year for me and perhaps this is where my feelings of 
frustration towards the course and the group come from. This leads me to 
think about the difference between the systemic and psychodynamic
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approaches. Systemic approaches often suggest that is the structure or 
patterns of interaction within groups or institutions that contribute to human 
distress. Whereas psychodynamic approaches often suggest that it is internal 
psychic conflict that is responsible for human distress. Therefore, as I reflect 
from different perspectives I wonder how my feelings of frustration relate to 
the system and my own sense of self.
Relating the PBL experiences to clinical practice
This PBL exercise has helped me to think about competing needs in 
complex systems that are designed for important society concerns such as 
child protection. It made me aware of the need to ensure professionals are 
focused on the important parts of the system such as the service users and 
carers. It has made me think about how groups of people can defend against 
uncomfortable ideas and people can avoid them because of this. In clinical 
practice I hope to always hold the client’s needs in mind, as well as the 
needs of the people in the wider system and my own ethical principles. In 
my clinical work whilst on the course I think that I have shown both my 
ability to relate with clients and to represent their needs and wishes to other 
professionals. As I continue to develop as a psychologist I hope to continue 
to acquire skills and abilities that further help me to do this.
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Summary of First Year Personal Professional Development (PPD) 
Group process account
The following process account describes the first year of PPD groups during 
Clinical Psychology training. The account describes difficulties during the 
Problem Based Learning presentation task. Initially the group appeared 
anxious and there were difficulties making a decision about the content of 
the presentation. I then failed an assignment but did not feel that the group 
was a safe enough place to discuss this. I reflected on the difficultly of 
failing this assignment and feeling disappointed and powerless within an 
institution. The group however developed through time to be a more 
containing environment. Discussing our personal and family histories and 
creating our own genograms was helpful in learning about others and I felt 
helped people to feel safe and learn and trust one another. I reflect on my 
own personal history in relation to this and how people may experience me 
in the group. Subsequently there were two times where people discussed 
very difficult experiences. A group member spoke about a family 
bereavement and I spoke about the death of clients on placement. I reflect 
on these difficult experiences and the impact on my personal and 
professional development. It seemed that these times where group members 
allowed themselves to be vulnerable helped the group to use the space and 
develop personally and professionally.
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Summary of Second Year Personal Professional Development (PPD) 
group process account
This reflective account summarises the process of the second year of 
Personal Professional Development (PPD) groups. It describes how in my 
opinion the group was not a safe place for members to be open and honest 
about their experiences. The group’s context is discussed in terms of losing 
a group member to illness and the impact of having a new facilitator. The 
group facilitator’s dual role as a clinical tutor and group member seemed to 
have an impact on how much group members were willing to share. This 
affected the content and structure of the groups. I relate this to my own 
personal context and some of the difficulties I have encountered and how I 
have dealt with these difficulties. I then reflect on the wider culture in the 
PPD group and larger cohort and relate this to the changes in the NHS. The 
clinical implications of my learning experiences are discussed. I suggest 
some important principles might be relevant to fostering more open and 
accepting groups. I also discuss how my experiences this year have had 
impact on my personal values and how I develop therapeutic relationships 
with clients in the future.
/ Ô
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79
Summary of Clinical Placements 
Adult Mental Health Placement
I worked for a year in adult mental health services in Surrey. I worked in 
both an inpatient unit and a community service. This involved working 
collaboratively with adults with high levels of distress. I worked with people 
who had diagnoses of psychosis, borderline personality disorder, depression, 
bi-polar affective disorder and anxiety disorders. I was involved in 
assessment, formulation and intervention. I used Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) models to work 
with this client group. I also ran a series of groups in the inpatient unit using 
CBT approaches and a mindfulness for psychosis group in the community. I 
completed several cognitive assessments. I completed an audit examining 
the extent to which the inpatient unit was adhering to the National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence Guidelines for Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Schizophrenia. I presented my findings to the staff at the inpatient unit.
Older Adults Mental Health Placement
I completed a 6 month placement working in an older adult service in 
Tolworth near Kingston. I worked with people who had diagnoses of 
depression, anxiety and borderline personality disorder. I also used CBT and 
DBT models in this placement. I used systemic and psychodynamic models 
in case formulations during supervision. I also worked with closely with 
carers whose relatives had mental health problems or dementia. I undertook 
dementia assessments, which involved a large battery of psychometric 
assessments and writing complex psychological reports. I was involved in 
organising and facilitating cognitive stimulation groups.
People with Learning Disabilities Placement
I completed a 6 month placement in a service for people with learning 
disabilities in Croydon. This involved working directly with people with 
learning disabilities in therapeutic interventions and working with carers and 
families where individuals exhibited challenging behaviour. I used adapted 
cognitive behavioural and behavioural models on this placement. I also used 
consultation models with carers and staff of people to help them to manage 
challenging behaviour. I completed a presentation on case formulation to a 
group of local psychologists.
Child and Adolescent and Specialist Placement
I worked for a year in a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
(CAMHS) and the Assessment and Treatment Service for children who 
exhibit harmful sexual behaviour in Horsham. This placement involved a 
wide range of skills working with children, adolescents and families.
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Whilst on placement with the CAMHS team I worked with children and 
young people who had diagnoses of depression, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, anxiety disorders and autistic spectrum disorders. This has 
included working with young people who self-harm and have suicidal 
ideation. I gave a presentation on obsessions and compulsions and case 
formulation to the CAMHS team.
I have completed a number of neurodevelopmental and cognitive 
assessments for children and young people who have a range of presenting 
problems. These assessments have included working with children, young 
people and their families who have developmental difficulties. I have 
consulted staff teams and families in how to best support children, young 
people and families.
During my work with the Assessment and Treatment Service I have used 
sophisticated assessments for children and young people who exhibit 
sexually harmful behaviour. The majority of these children have 
experienced high levels of abuse and neglect are often in foster care. I have 
used narrative and systemic therapy models in interventions with children 
and young people. A large part of this work is working with other 
professionals such as social workers, teachers, foster carers and mental 
health nurses. I also gave a presentation on autism and attachment disorders, 
to the ATS staff.
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Service Related Research Project
To what extent are the NICE guidelines on Schizophrenia and BPD 
implemented in a psychiatric unit
2, 971 words
July 2011
I confirm that in accordance with the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct and 
Professional Practice Guidelines, certain details within this report have been 
changed to preserve anonymity and maintain confidentiality.
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Abstract
An audit was completed to assess the demographics, diagnoses and contact 
with psychology services in an acute adult mental health unit. The aim was 
to examine the extent to which the NICE guidelines for the psychological 
treatment of people with a diagnosis of either schizophrenia and Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) were implemented. NICE recommends that all 
people with schizophrenia are offered psychological intervention in the way 
of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and family interventions. It was 
found that 2 out of 15 (13%) of service users with schizophrenia accessed 
individual CBT. No service users accessed family interventions. NICE 
(2009) recommends that DBT is offered to people with BPD. Six out of 7 
(86%) of service users with a diagnosis of BPD accessed DBT. Therefore 
the NICE guidelines for schizophrenia (2009) were implemented to a very 
limited extent, whilst the guidelines for BPD were implemented to a greater 
extent.
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Introduction
Mental health hospitals are changing rapidly during an era of 
deinstitutionalisation across the developed world (Botha et a l 2010). Botha 
et a l (2010) suggests that the closing of large institutions has led to a lower 
number of beds in acute mental health hospitals. The researchers suggest 
that a change in policy to community care has been reported as generally 
successful with interventions seen to be generally more effective and less 
expensive.
The smaller and constrained role of inpatient mental health services is seen 
as being a part of a continuous care framework (Horsfall, Cleary and Hunt, 
2010). In a review for the reasons for admissions to inpatient units, it was 
found that they occur most commonly when there are fears of self-harm or 
neglect, positive psychotic symptoms or for respite for carers or from 
unsupportive environments (Bowers, 2005).
However, for a small sample of service users with the most acute illnesses 
these policies seem to have led to a recurring pattern where they neither stay 
in hospital or in the community for long periods of time (Durbin, Lin, Layna 
& Teed, 2007). Durbin et a l (2007) suggest that a significant number of 
service users are readmitted to hospital after less than a year in the 
community. The researchers suggest that the first thirty days after discharge 
are also a time where a large number of service users are readmitted to 
hospital. In a review of the literature on the reasons for hospital admissions 
Klinkenberg and Calsyn (1998) suggest that only previous psychiatric
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admissions and poor compliance to medication consistently predict 
readmission to hospital. Doerfler, Moran and Hannigan (2010) suggest that 
suicide risk and interpersonal events are the two largest triggers for a 
hospital re-admission.
Botha et a l (2010) suggest that both the type and severity of illness affect 
the frequency of service utilisation. The study showed that people with 
psychotic illnesses and longer stays in hospital were found to be more likely 
to become ‘revolving door patients’. The implementation of the NICE 
guidelines may represent the best way of reducing the human distress, 
hospital admissions and economic cost of service users who are frequently 
re-admitted.
Schizophrenia is characterised in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) as including 
delusions, hallucinations, disordered speech, disorganised behaviour and 
negative symptoms, the later representing lower levels of emotional 
responses, speech and motivation. This may be accompanied by functional 
and occupational difficulties and all symptoms must last for a minimum of 
six months for a diagnosis to be obtained.
Schizophrenia is suggested to be the most expensive psychiatric disorder to 
treat (Svanum et a l 2010). Svanum et a l (2010) suggest that relapse 
accounts for the majority of the spending on the treatment of this disorder. 
The authors suggest that previous relapse is the most important factor in 
predicting subsequent relapse regardless of the dramatic changes in the use 
of inpatient units.
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There is a large amount of research which suggests that Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is an effective treatment for schizophrenia 
particularly during a first psychotic episode (Jackson et a l, 2007; Lewis et 
al, 2002). NICE (2009) guidelines on Schizophrenia suggest that all service 
users should be offered CBT and family interventions. The guidelines 
stipulate that this should include offering these psychological interventions 
in inpatient settings. Alvarez-Jimenez et a l (2009) found that key factors in 
service user non adherence to CBT were when service users had lengthy 
periods where the illness was untreated and poor levels of insight into their 
difficulties.
Service users with a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) are 
suggested to make up 20% of the admissions into psychiatric hospitals 
(Wong & Tye, 2005). BPD is a psychological illness characterised in DSM- 
IV TR as including recurrent suicide attempts, problems in forming and 
sustaining relationships and impulsivity (APA, 2000). This diagnosis is 
thought to be more prevalent in women than men (NICE, 2009).
The NICE guidelines (2009) on Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
recommend Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) specifically for women 
with this diagnosis. Linehan (1991) has provided evidence of the 
effectiveness of Dialectical Behavour Therapy (DBT) for people with BPD. 
There is also evidence that a mentalisation based therapy approach may lead 
to good outcomes for this population (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999, 2001). The 
NICE (2009) guidelines suggest that giving access to psychological 
therapies in inpatient units may lead to improved outcomes for people with 
this diagnosis.
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This audit was completed on an inpatient unit in the South of England. The 
unit is staffed by psychiatrists and nurses, there is a small therapeutic team 
which comprises an occupational therapist, support worker, a full-time 
clinical psychologist, a trainee psychologist who is on placement two and a 
half days a week and two assistant psychologists posts, one of which is 
shared between two staff members. The therapy team is therefore staffed at 
five and a half whole time equivalent posts.
The therapy and psychology team are due to move from their current 
premises, which are separate from the unit, to run ward based activities. 
This may be an opportunity to develop how different group and individual 
interventions are planned. An understanding of the type of problems that 
service users have been diagnosed with may help clinicians to guide 
interventions and develop treatment programmes. Furthermore, identifying 
which populations are currently accessing psychology services and any 
populations that are not may also help to guide efforts to further develop the 
services.
It was decided to look specifically at schizophrenia and BPD due to 
anecdotal information that these are the two main groups that the unit caters 
for. Furthermore, it was thought that comparing the extent to which the 
NICE guidelines were followed in respect to the treatment of service users 
who have these two diagnoses would provide valuable information for 
clinicians developing services.
There were four aims for this audit. 1) To examine which diagnoses are 
most prevalent in a sample of service users who were discharged over a two
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month period. 2) To examine the number of people who have accessed 
psychology input. 3) To examine the number of service users who are have 
multiple previous admissions. 4) To examine to what extent the NICE 
guidelines are implemented for schizophrenia and BPD.
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Method
The records of 45 service users who were discharged over a two month 
period in 2011 from the unit served by the psychology team were examined. 
Only the records of those who had been discharged were examined because 
at any time during people’s admission they may have accessed psychology 
services. The records were found on the online database system used by the 
trust. Demographic, diagnostic and referral information were collected and 
collated.
A proposal was submitted to the University of Surrey, Clinical Psychology 
Department and to the local NHS trust where the ward was situated. Due to 
the study being an audit ethical approval was not required by the trust. All 
data was anonymised to preserve client confidentiality. All data was entered 
into an Excel spreadsheet without any personal identifiable information
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Results
Of the 45 people who were discharged from the unit in the two month 
period there were 26 female and 19 male. Table 4 shows the number of 
males and females with particular diagnoses. The mean average age of the 
45 service users was 44 with a range of 18-67. The average age of males 
was 46 and for females it was 42. The mean average length of stay at the 
unit was 44 days, it ranged from one to 230 days. Table 5 shows the length 
of stay for service users with different diagnoses.
Psychology contact and diagnoses
The number of service users and the specific diagnoses they received are 
shown in Table A. There were 30 service users out of 45, representing 67% 
of the sample, which accessed some form of individual or group psychology 
input during their time on the ward. There were 18 service users that 
accessed individual psychology input, this represents 40% of the sample. Of 
this number nine of the 45 (20%) were seen by the psychology team 
attached to the unit and nine of the 45 (20%) were seen by psychologists 
from the community. The nine people who were seen by community 
psychologists were already in contact with the psychologist when they were 
admitted to the unit. There were a total of 11 out of 45 (24%) referrals to the 
unit’s psychology team. Of these service users two were not seen by the 
psychology team on the ward and the details around this will be established 
in the discussion section.
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Previous admissions and length of admission
For 18 of the 41 (44%) the most recent admission represented their first 
admission to a psychiatric unit. All data on number of previous admissions 
and length of admission is shown in Tables 5 and 6. Data for four service 
users was not available. The four service users that we did not have data for: 
two had diagnoses of bi-polar, one did not have a diagnosis and one had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. The groups of people with diagnoses with 
schizophrenia and BPD had on the average the highest number of previous 
admissions and on average the longest stays on the ward.
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Table 1
Unit, Community and Group Psychology Input for Service Users with
Psychology input No Psychology Input
Diagnosis Unit Com. Group 
Psych. psych.
Psych.
only
Referred No
but no psych,
psych.
Schizophrenia 1 1
BPD 2 4
Alcohol
Anxiety 1
(GAD)
Anxiety (OCD) I
Binge Eating
Bi-polar 1 1
Depression 4 2
PTSD
Unknown
Different Diagnoses
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Interventions for service users with schizophrenia
Of the 15 people who had a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 2 out of 15 (13%) 
accessed individual psychology input, one from the unit psychology team
and one from a community psychologist All psychology input is shown in 
Table 1 and the type of input is shown in Table 2. The two service users 
who accessed psychology services completed CBT interventions. There 
were seven service users who accessed groups run by psychology staff on 
the unit but not individual psychological interventions. There were 6 service 
users with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who did not access any 
psychological services.
Interventions for service users with BPD
Of the 45 service users 7 (16%) had a diagnosis of BPD and six of these 
seven (86%) accessed individual psychology interventions, as shown in 
Table 1. There were four service users who continued to access their 
community psychologist, whilst two service users were seen by the 
psychology team attached to the unit. Of these six service users who 
accessed individual work, two also accessed groups run by psychology unit 
staff, these groups are shown in Table 3. DBT work was undertaken with all 
6 service users and two people also accessed coping skills and recovery 
groups run on the ward this is detailed in Table 3.
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Discussion
Schizophrenia, depression and BPD were the most prevalent diagnoses 
given in the sample. This information slightly contrasts the anecdotal 
information that schizophrenia and BPD were most prevalent. Service users 
with BPD and Schizophrenia appear to spend the longest amount of time in 
hospital and have the most previous admissions. These two populations may 
benefit from services designed specifically to meet their needs and with this 
in mind next the extent that the NICE guidelines have been implemented for 
two such groups will now be discussed.
Schizophrenia
The results showing the large average length of stay and multiple 
attendances concurs with Svanum et a/.’s (2010) findings that schizophrenia 
is an expensive illness to treat. However, service users with this diagnosis 
were generally not receiving the psychological interventions recommended 
by NICE. These service users were not referred to the psychology team for 
assessment or treatment. The small number of service users that did access 
individual interventions used CBT, which is the method of choice in the 
NICE guidelines. However no service users accessed family interventions, 
art therapy or counselling services as proposed by the NICE guidelines.
The small number of people who accessed individual psychological 
interventions shows clearly that the NICE guidelines are generally not being 
implemented. Psychologists are implementing CBT as suggested in the 
guidelines when service users are referred but no family interventions were
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undertaken. Thus the NICE guidelines for schizophrenia are being 
implemented to a very limited extent.
There were a larger number of service users who were accessing group 
work, which included coping skills, recovery and relaxation groups. One 
possible but speculative hypothesis for people accessing group work rather 
than individual work may be the limited psychological staff resources 
available, where more people can be seen in a group setting rather than time 
intensive individual work. One possible negative implication of this might 
be that the open nature of the groups means that the groups are not 
specialised to people with psychotic illnesses. This may limit the 
effectiveness of these group interventions for this population. Future 
research could examine if people with schizophrenia are reluctant to engage 
in psychological interventions and the reasons for this.
An alternative view of the findings that a small number of people with 
schizophrenia accessed psychology services might be that those that were in 
hospital may not be able to access these interventions. Alvarez-Jimenez et 
a l (2009) suggest that CBT is least effective for those who have not had 
access to psychological interventions for a long period of time and who do 
not have a good level of insight into their condition. From the data showing 
this groups large average number of previous admissions and their length of 
stay in hospital it is possible that these are characteristics these service users 
share. Future research may be able to establish if the non-referral of this 
group for psychological intervention is warranted.
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BPD
The sample of service users with a diagnosis of BPD had the longest 
average stay and the second most average previous admissions. In contrast 
to the findings in the group with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, the vast 
majority of service users with a diagnosis of BPD accessed individual 
psychological interventions. This is in line with the NICE guidelines. People 
with BPD were also accessing group work. Thus, the NICE guidelines, in 
this small sample, are largely being implemented.
It is yet to be seen whether new policies such as Payment by Results will be 
instrumental in ensuring that service users have access to the most effective 
treatments, outlined in the NICE guidelines. Implementing effective 
treatment for those who are regularly admitted to hospital may be one way 
to reduce the human and economic cost of acute mental illness.
Limitations
This audit has examined characteristics of the service users that were 
discharged in a two month period. One possible limitation with this audit 
was that people who have not been discharged from the unit for extended 
periods of time may not be as numerous in the sample as those with short 
admissions. This was a small sample of service users recording data for a 
larger sample may allow comparisons to be made between groups. Looking 
at longitudinal outcomes for service users may also provide valuable 
information for services.
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Future research may establish whether psychological interventions for 
people in acute hospitals for schizophrenia and BPD mean that service users 
do not have multiple admissions. Future research and specifically larger 
scale projects may be able to compare different diagnostic groups, 
particularly depression which has been somewhat neglected here. Involving 
service users in research may also be beneficial as establishing their needs is 
of paramount importance.
This has included looking at whether people accessed psychological 
interventions or not. However, why these groups have not accessed specific 
services is unclear and future work to examine this will be essential to 
helping the service to develop and provide the services outlined in the NICE 
guidelines. The knowledge of where services may be lacking may not be 
enough for problems to be resolved if there are insufficient resources.
Conclusions
This audit has examined the extent to which the NICE guidelines for 
Schizophrenia and BPD have been implemented in an inpatient unit. 
Although, the psychology team on the unit engages, with people with a 
range of diagnoses, people with schizophrenia are rarely accessing 
psychological interventions. Therefore, in this sense the NICE guidelines for 
schizophrenia were met to a very limited extent. This is in contrast to the 
large proportion of people with BPD who are accessing psychological 
treatments recommended in the guidelines. Sharing these finding with the
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staff from the unit may help to provide services for people with 
schizophrenia and help to target referrals effectively. Offering 
recommended services and evaluating outcomes may lead to less service 
users having multiple admissions.
Feeding the findings back to the unit
Tragic unexpected events on the unit have meant that the sharing of the 
findings of this audit have been delayed. The author is due to present the 
findings of this report on the 2"  ^of August 2011.
Reflections
Evaluating a service that I have until recently been working in and this puts 
one in a difficult position of being both a role of evaluating and being 
evaluated. Furthermore, evaluating the service that my colleagues provide is 
also a position that could be seen as threatening. This could be particularly 
important as the team, including myself, have had to cope with several 
tragic events in the unit. However, I feel that this has been negotiated well 
and I am confident that my colleagues will see this project as providing an 
opportunity to look at ways in which the service may be improved for the 
service users.
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Appendices 
Table 4
The Average Age of Male and Female Service Users with Different Diagnoses
Male Female
Diagnosis M N M N
Schizophrenia 47 5 48 10
BPD 34 2 32 5
Anxiety 55 3 42 2
Depression 45 6 47 5
All other 
diagnoses
45 3 37 4
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Table 5
The Average Length of Stay and Average Previous Admissions for Service Users 
with Different Diagnoses
Diagnosis
Average length of stay 
to nearest day
Average previous admissions
M N M N
Schizophrenia 51 15 2 14
BPD 71 7 1.7 7
Anxiety 27 5 0.8 5
Depression 37 11 0.2 11
All other diagnoses 16 7 0.5 4
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Table 6
The Frequency of Previous Admissions
Number of 
previous 
admissions
Frequency
0 18
1 3
2 4
3 8
4 7
5 0
6 1
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Abstract 
Background
In order to explain the individual differences in obsessions and compulsions 
theorists have turned to models of the self. There is some initial evidence 
that self-ambivalence, or having contradictory self-concepts, relates to the 
occurrence of maladaptive appraisal and, hence, obsessive-compulsiveness. 
There is preliminary evidence that attachment insecurity, shame and self­
compassion are related to levels of obsessive-compulsiveness.
Objectives
This study was developed to examine the relationships between specific 
self-concept factors and obsessive-compulsiveness. It was hypothesised that 
self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, shame and self-compassion would 
predict degree of obsessive-compulsiveness. It was expected that self­
ambivalence would mediate the relationship between attachment insecurity 
and obsessive-compulsiveness.
Method
A cross sectional online survey design was used with a sample of 
participants recruited fi-om the general population and from charities for 
people with obsessive-compulsive problems. The study included a sample 
of 245 participants with varying degrees of obsessive-compulsive severity. 
The variables measured were obsessive-compulsiveness, self-ambivalence, 
attachment insecurity, shame, self-compassion and depression.
Results
The results showed that self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity and shame 
were positively and highly correlated to obsessive-compulsiveness. Self­
compassion was negatively correlated with obsessive-compulsiveness. A 
regression analysis, controlling for level of depression, showed that self­
ambivalence was the strongest predictor of obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Shame and self-compassion were not significant predictors. A mediation
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analysis showed that self-ambivalence partially mediated the relationship 
between attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness.
Conclusion
Self-ambivalence is the self-concept factor that most predicts obsessions and 
compulsions in this study. Theoretically, attachment insecurity may play a 
role in the development of self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsiveness 
although due to the design of the study causal interpretations cannot be 
made. Shame may be an aspect of self-ambivalence. Both self-ambivalence 
and shame contrast to self-compassion which appears to represent a 
healthier relationship with self. Directions for further research and the 
clinical implications of these findings are discussed.
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1.0 Introduction
An obsession is defined as “An idea or thought that continually preoccupies 
or intrudes on a person’s mind” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010 
pp. 1214). A compulsion is defined as “An irresistible urge to behave in a 
certain way” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, pp. 356). Clark (2004) 
has argued that all people experience some level of obsessions and 
compulsions. It is suggested that common obsessions include having a song 
stuck in one’s head or the sudden urge to jump in fi*ont of a train. Examples 
of everyday compulsions include wearing a lucky item of clothing for a job 
interview or crossing one’s figures whilst watching a football match. 
However, for a number of people obsessions and compulsions have an 
adverse impact on their daily lives. Psychological models of obsessions and 
compulsions have been created to provide ways of understanding how they 
work and how they can be overcome.
Cognitive-behavioural models attempt to provide a unifying theory of 
obsessions and compulsions. However, these models tend not to focus on 
the individual differences that might explain why some people experience 
obsessions and others do not. Yet cognitive-behavioural approaches include 
a diverse and broad range of models of mental processes and behaviour. 
Some cognitive-behaviour researchers have used the concept of schemas to 
examine how early experiences impact upon beliefs (Kempke & Luyten, 
2007). Furthermore, both theorists fi*om cognitive-behavioural and 
psychodynamic orientations have turned to models of the self to explore 
whether these factors might explain the variation in obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena. In this literature review, the potential role of self-ambivalence, 
attachment insecurity, shame and self-compassion in obsessive- 
compulsiveness are examined.
In this literature review, the potential role of self-ambivalence, attachment 
insecurity, shame and self-compassion in obsessive-compulsiveness are 
examined.
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This literature review is structured in six sections. Firstly obsessive- 
compulsiveness will be defined, before cognitive behavioural models will 
be discussed to further explain these phenomena and introduce some 
important concepts. The subsequent section examines the role of self­
ambivalence in obsessive-compulsiveness. Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) 
theory of obsessive-compulsiveness will be described and the empirical 
evidence supporting this theory will be outlined. Furthermore, the role of 
attachment insecurity in the development and maintenance of self­
ambivalence and, consequently obsessive-compulsiveness will be examined. 
Shame and self-compassion will then be introduced as psychological 
processes involved in obsessive-compulsiveness. Gilbert’s (2009) theory 
explaining how these two concepts are related will be explored. The 
empirical evidence for links between attachment insecurity and obsessive- 
compulsiveness will be discussed. The final section will outline the 
hypotheses based on this literature.
1.1 Obsessions and compulsions
In the psychiatric literature people who experience high levels of obsessions 
and compulsions, which adversely affect their day to day lives are referred 
to as having Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The American 
Psychiatric Association (APA, 2004) states that OCD affects between one 
and three per cent of the population. It is defined by the APA (2004) in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition-Text 
Revision (DSM-IV-TR) as a mental health problem characterised by 
intrusive distressing thoughts, images or urges (obsessions) and or repetitive 
compelling mental or behavioural acts (compulsions). The manual states 
that an individual must present with the following six symptoms, the first 
four of which relate to obsessions and the last two relate to compulsions: 1) 
recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses or images; 2) Such thoughts are 
not real life concerns or excessive worries; 3) the person attempts to 
neutralise the thoughts with another thought or an action; 4) The person is 
able to recognize that these thoughts are a product of their own mind; 5) the 
performance of a repetitive behaviour in response to an obsession according
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to a set of rigid rules and; 6) The compulsive behaviour is aimed at reducing 
the perceived threat posed by the intrusion, although this course of action is 
not likely to reduce the perceived threat. Furthermore, according to these 
criteria, OCD may or may not be related to another Axis I mental health 
condition. DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004) states that as opposed to obsessions 
and compulsions in the general population, people with a diagnosis of OCD 
are compelled to act in response to a perceived threat, negative outcome or 
to alleviate their own distress.
There is evidence that all people experience some level of obsessive- 
compulsive experience, which will be explored in the next section. The 
difficultly with mental health diagnostic systems is deciding at which point 
obsessive-compulsive experiences are pathological is purely subjective 
despite the inherent assumption in classification systems that disorder may 
be objectively recognised and categorised. Thus, diagnostic systems are 
based on a false dichotomy between normal and abnormal experiences, 
when no objective demarcation is possible. Therefore, obsessive- 
compulsiveness has been proposed to be a psychological trait common in 
the general population, which like many human characteristics operates on a 
spectrum with people experiencing varying levels of these phenomena 
(McElroy, Phillips & Keck, 1994). This does not mean that there not are a 
group of people who have high levels of obsessive-compulsive experiences 
and develop difficulties in their daily lives. However, making subjective 
distinctions between normal and abnormal behaviour can be pathologising 
and disempowering for people (Johnstone, 2000). Therefore, people who 
experience problematic levels of obsessions and compulsions will be 
referred here to as people who have high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness.
Psychiatric treatments for obsessions and compulsions rest on the 
assumption that underlying biological problems cause observable 
psychological difficulties. These approaches emphasise the importance of 
genetic mutations, underdeveloped or damaged brain structures or 
neurotransmitters on predisposing and maintaining people’s obsessive-
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compulsive experiences (Murphy, Frazier, Kim, 2008). However, there is 
limited evidence for these biological substrates.Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) medication is included in the NICE(2006) 
guidelines for adults with mild and moderate functional impairments 
although there is also evidence that these drugs have a limited impact on 
OCD symptoms (Foa et a l, 2005). Therefore, psychological models are 
necessary to explain obsessive-compulsive phenomena and provide the 
basis for psychological interventions. This thesis will examine some of the 
psychological factors involved in obsessions and compulsions. There is 
evidence that psychological explanations of human distress can be less 
stigmatizing and more empowering for people who experience them (Lam, 
Salkovskis & Warwick, 2005).
1.2 Cognitive-Behavioural models of obsessions and compulsions
The central assertion of cognitive-behavioural models is that appraisals of 
common intrusive thoughts produce clinically significant levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness. Therefore, it is the interpretation of intrusive 
thoughts rather than the presence of such thoughts that decides if people 
have problematic levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. Furthermore, these 
maladaptive appraisals occur due to underlying dysfunctional beliefs.
Cognitive behavioural models suggest that obsessions are viewed as 
unwanted intrusive thoughts which originate from and repeatedly enter an 
individual’s mind (Veale, 2004). These intrusive thoughts are repugnant and 
inconsistent with a person’s self-concept leading to people trying to resist 
these thoughts (Veale, 2002). However, for some people these intrusive 
thoughts become obsessions because of the way they misattribute 
significance to them and, therefore, perseverate on them.
Rachman and De Silva (1978) were the first to present evidence that 
intrusive thoughts are common experiences for most individuals. They 
found that the content of these intrusions did not differ between people with 
a diagnosis of OCD and those in a community sample. The results of this 
research showed that eighty per cent of participants without a diagnosis
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experienced intrusive thoughts. However, the clinical group’s intrusive 
thoughts caused more distress and were more intense, frequent and 
enduring. A number of studies have subsequently confirmed Rachman and 
De Silva’s hypothesis that the majority of people experience intrusive 
thoughts (Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibobodeau & Gagon, 1991; Julien, 
O’Connor & Aardema, 2009; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). These findings 
have led to cognitive behavioural theorists suggesting that it is the 
interpretation of intrusive thoughts that decides if they become obsessions 
(Salkvoskis, 1985; Rachman, 1998). These maladaptive appraisals have 
been linked to underlying dysfunctional beliefs. These beliefs are suggested 
to develop in childhood when children are given too much or too little 
responsibility by their parents and perceive themselves to be responsible for 
harmful events (Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman and Freeston, 1999). In this 
model, compulsions function to reduce the distress caused by obsessive 
thoughts and their subsequent appraisal and are successful in doing this in 
the short-term. However in the long-term, compulsions reinforce the 
perceived threat of intrusive thoughts and the dysfiinctional beliefs which 
underpin them.
The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997) 
was a large multi-national group of researchers examining the beliefs that 
are associated with obsessions and compulsions. They proposed six types 
of beliefs that underpin the maladaptive appraisals typical in obsessions and 
compulsions. These include 1) inflated responsibility; 2) the over estimation 
of threat; 3) the importance of thoughts; 4) the importance of controlling 
thoughts; 5) the intolerance of uncertainty and; 6) perfectionism (OCCWG, 
1997). These belief domains have been consistently shown to have a 
relationship with obsessive-compulsiveness. However, they have also been 
shown to have significant correlations with one another (OCCWG, 2003). 
This means that there may be other higher order factors which may underpin 
these belief domains.
Cognitive behavioural models do not explain why some people make 
maladaptive appraisals and hold dysfunctional beliefs whilst other people do
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not. Therefore it is important to explore other factors which may underpin 
these belief domains and further explain obsessive-compulsive phenomena. 
Kempke and Luyten (2007) propose that the reason for people making 
obsessive-compulsive related appraisals and holding obsessive-compulsive 
related dysfunctional beliefs is that they lack the ability “to integrate 
contradictory aspects of a single self’ (Kempke and Luyten, 2007, pp293). 
However, following this hypothesis means departing from cognitive- 
behavioural models and a simplistic model of the mind. This is because 
theorising about self-ambivalence means that it is necessary to include 
multiple motivational and affective structures which can be in conflict, thus 
drawing on a more dynamic model of the self (Kempke & Luyten, 2007). 
Kempke and Luyten (2007) state that cognitive-behavioural models with a 
simple model of the human mind are effective at explaining the micro 
psychological processes involved in obsessions and compulsions. They 
allow clinicians to work on specific micro-psychological goals, although 
they do not offer a unified understanding of the processes involved in these 
phenomena. They suggest that it is necessary to include concepts such as 
self-ambivalence and attachment insecurity within a more complex model of 
the mind, in order to understand the meta-psychological processes in 
obsessions and compulsions.
1.3 Self-ambivalence and obsessions and compulsions
Guidano and Liotti (1983) described self-ambivalence as a person’s 
contradictory representations of themselves which lead to doubts about their 
morality, lovability and worth. In their model of obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena, Guidano and Liotti (1983) proposed that people with high 
levels of obsessions and compulsions hold views about themselves that are 
opposites, seeing themselves as moral, worthy and lovable as well as 
immoral, unworthy and unlovable. What is important in this model is not 
that self-ambivalence is just about the existence of contradictory self-states 
however, as this is likely a common experience, but that people with high 
levels of obsessive-compulsiveness find it difficult to tolerate contradictory 
self-states. Therefore, it is proposed that this self-ambivalence is central to
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explaining how people develop obsessions. High levels of self-ambivalence 
lead to individuals appraising ego-dystonic intrusive thoughts as threats to a 
valued sense of self. These thoughts then activate an individual’s 
ambivalence regarding their morality and social acceptance and motivate 
them to do something to resolve it.
Guidano and Liotti (1983) stated that intrusive thoughts that contradict 
strongly held values become obsessions because they activate pre-existing 
self-ambivalent beliefs. The core idea of this theory is that people with high 
levels of obsessive-compulsiveness encode beliefs in a split form in which 
the actual self (who the person thinks they are) is perceived as the opposite 
of the ideal self (who they would like to be). On one hand, the future is seen 
with the possibilities of perfection, whilst on the other hand the self is 
denigrated by extreme, persecutory and rigid attitudes. For example, an 
intrusive image of hurting a loved one activates the negative side of 
ambivalence (I am a hurtful person).
Guidano and Liotti (1983) argued that the function of compulsions is to 
resolve self-ambivalence, reassert moral and social worth and restore the 
perception of an ideal self. Continuing the example above, the person who 
neutralises the idea of hurting a loved one with a compulsive ritual restores 
the idea that they are a kind and loving person. Thus, a compulsive 
checking behaviour helps a person who is concerned that they are careless 
or irresponsible to feel beyond doubt that they are not. Therefore, the 
obsessive and compulsive pattern functions to help people manage their 
emotional distress or regulate affect. However, the individual’s attempts to 
control the environment are futile as their ambivalence is in relation to 
themselves. Therefore, compulsions are “failed solutions to imaginary 
problems” (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, pp255) because there is no problem 
other than the conflict between contradictory self- perceptions.
Guidano and Liotti (1983) proposed that high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness are related to strongly held beliefs regarding the necessity 
to find certainty, the right ways to behave and truth in the world. These
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beliefs are rigid and polarised and do not reflect the spectrum of experiences 
and possibilities inherent in the world. This theory has been largely 
neglected over the last twenty years by researchers interested in obsessions 
and compulsions but has come to the fore in recent years following 
criticisms of prominent cognitive-behavioural models of these phenomena.
Evidence from experimental studies supports the idea that self-ambivalence 
has a role in obsessive-compulsive appraisal style. Rowa and Purdon (2003) 
tested the hypothesis that intrusive thoughts that contradict valued aspects of 
an individual’s character would be related to the amount of distress they 
cause. The researchers compared one group of students who wrote their 
most distressing intrusive thoughts, with another group who wrote down 
their least distressing intrusive thoughts. As hypothesised the most 
distressing intrusive thoughts were rated as those that contradicted valued 
aspects of self. Rowa, Purdon, Summerfeldt and Anthony (2005) found the 
same pattern of results in a clinical population. These studies suggest that an 
individual’s sense of self appears to be an important factor in how intrusions 
are appraised.
The development of the Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM; Bhar & Kyrios 
2007) has meant that correlational studies can examine the relationship 
between this concept and its relationships with other obsessive-compulsive 
related factors. The Self-ambivalence Measure (SAM) is a 19 item 
instrument with a single underlying factor. Using this measure, Bhar and 
Kyrios (2007) tested the hypothesis that self-ambivalence underpins the six 
appraisal domains suggested by the OCCWG. The authors looked at four 
groups: a group diagnosed with OCD, a group with a diagnosis of another 
anxiety disorder, a student and a community sample. Measures of self­
ambivalence, depression, anxiety, self-esteem and obsessive-compulsive 
related beliefs and symptoms were taken. Analyses revealed that levels of 
self-ambivalence were greater in the high obsessive-compulsiveness and 
anxiety disorder groups than in the two non-anxious groups. The researchers 
also found that self-ambivalence was positively associated with severity of 
obsessive-compulsive difficulties and obsessive-compulsive related
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dysfunctional beliefs, after controlling for anxiety and depression. This 
provides further evidence that high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness are 
associated with uncertainty and doubts concerning one’s own morality. 
However, this study did not find differences between the OCD and other 
anxiety disorder groups suggesting that se lf ambivalence may not be 
specific to OCD and might be related to anxiety more generally. The authors 
suggested that the sample of participants with anxiety disorders also had 
high levels of obsessive-compulsive related beliefs and therefore did not 
constitute a good comparison group. However, if people with high anxiety 
but low levels of obsessive-compulsiveness also have high levels of self­
ambivalence then it is clear that other concepts are necessary to explain 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena. More research is needed to assess 
whether se lf ambivalence is present in non-obsessive-compulsive anxiety 
problems.
Bhar and Kyrios’ (2007) study used a cross-sectional design, which means 
that causal relationships between the variables and the direction of these 
relationships cannot be assumed. Moreover, other variables could be 
responsible for the relationships between the variables. Rachman (2001) 
suggests that there is evidence that negative views about oneself are 
consistently observed in a range of psychological problems including 
obsessive-compulsive difficulties. It is argued that there is a strong 
relationship between depression and obsessive-compulsiveness which may 
account for the relationship between negative views of oneself and levels of 
obsessions and compulsions. It is suggested that the effects of factors such 
as self-ambivalence may not be independent of depression and that studies 
examining the relationship between sense of self factors and obsessive- 
compulsiveness should control for depression.
In summary, self-ambivalence is a potentially helpful concept in 
understanding obsessions and compulsions that has received a modest 
amount of empirical research. The model offers an explanation for 
individual differences by proposing that intrusive thoughts are appraised as 
threatening because they contradict valued aspects of the self and activate
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underlying ambivalent self-beliefs. It describes how the belief domains 
outlined in the OCCWG (1997) are underpinned by this overarching 
contradictory view of the self. Essentially the model proposes that 
obsessions occur because intrusive thoughts challenge the self and lead to 
the individual feeling they are fundamentally flawed, whilst compulsions 
help to restore the ideal self. The links between self-ambivalence and 
obsessive-compulsiveness are evidenced by a small body of literature. 
Therefore, replication of their findings from other sources is necessary. It is 
also unclear from Bhar and Kyrios (2007) research whether self­
ambivalence is a factor involved in obsessive-compulsiveness or general 
anxiety. Therefore, further research is necessary to provide support for this 
theory.
1.4 Attachment insecurity and obsessions and compulsions
In considering the developmental origins of self-ambivalence, Guidano and 
Liotti (1983) proposed that attachment insecurity leads to an ambivalent 
sense of self. They postulated that parents with strict and inflexible rules 
lead to children experiencing higher levels of anxiety and neuroticism. 
Furthermore, they argue that a specific type of parental relationship is 
responsible for predisposing children to self-ambivalence and higher levels 
of obsessive-compulsiveness. A parent who is present but not emotionally 
available is suggested to lead the child to develop a split, or ambivalent, 
attachment. The child is thought to experience their parent’s presence as 
evidence that they are loved, whilst their parent’s unavailability and possible 
hostility lead to the child feeling that that they are not loved. These two 
competing hypotheses are internalised by the child and become an 
unsolvable dilemma leading to them having mixed feelings towards 
themselves. The child is predisposed, perhaps due to increased anxiety or 
neuroticism, to search for evidence that supports one of these two 
hypotheses. This means that they monitor the environment in search of a 
definitive answer. In summary, a person’s attachment insecurity leads to 
self-ambivalence and, subsequently, the propensity to develop high levels of 
obsessions and compulsions.
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Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) model is based on attachment theory which 
Bowlby (1969) established. Bowlby (1969) proposed that attachments are 
affectional bonds between people that shape mental processes and 
behaviour. Slade (1999) summarises Bowlby’s contributions in four points: 
1) A child is predisposed to become attached to their caregivers; 2) The 
child’s survival is dependent on the continuation of these relationships and 
they will think and behave in ways to maintain these attachment 
relationships; 3) The child will sacrifice their own functioning in order to 
maintain these relationships; 4) A failure to meet the infant’s needs leads to 
trauma, which occurs when an infant is abandoned or experiences 
significant losses, abuse or emotionally unavailable adults. Moreover, 
neglect or rejection lead to distorted thinking, maladaptive behaviour and 
potentially to psychopathology.
Bowlby (1988) proposed that trusted caregivers provide the individual with 
a secure base from which they can explore the world. Furthermore, he 
described how the affectional bonds that the individual experiences are 
internalised into working models of relationships. These working models 
help people to organise experiences, regulate affect and manage distress. 
These internal working models of self and others serve as templates for 
future relationships and operate throughout life (Bowlby, 1973; 1988). 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggested that people with high levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness have developed a sense of insecurity and have 
internalised maladaptive models of the self and others. Such people, they 
argue, use obsessions and compulsions to regulate their affect.
Ainsworth developed Bowlby’s theory and tested it in the strange situation 
paradigm. During observations of various separations and reunions, children 
were observed to fit into four categories of attachment behaviour: secure, 
avoidant, ambivalent and disorganised (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 
1978). Infants with secure attachment styles are associated with using stable 
caregivers to explore their environment; they visibly protest caregiver 
departures. The caregivers of securely attached infants respond to them 
appropriately and consistently. Infants with avoidant or dismissive
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attachments share less affect, show little distress when their caregivers 
depart, make little effort to sustain contact and treat their caregivers and 
others similarly. Caregivers of infants who have avoidant attachment styles 
show little or no response to their child when they show distress, they 
discourage distress and promote independence. Infants with ambivalent or 
resistant attachment styles are unable to use the caregiver as a secure base; 
they seek closeness before a separation from them. They become distressed 
when separated but display anger and reluctance to interact with them on 
their return. The caregivers of infants who have this attachment style are 
inconsistent, displaying both appropriate and neglectful responses to the 
infant. They often only respond after an increase in the child’s attachment 
behaviours. Infants with disorganised or unresolved attachment styles lack 
a coherent attachment strategy. Their behaviour is often characterised by 
freezing or rocking, they appear disoriented and show contradictory 
attachment behaviours such as approaching the caregiver with their back 
turned. The caregivers of disorganised infants exhibit frightened or 
frightening behaviour, they may be intrusive, be confused about their role 
and withdraw. They may have acted in abusive or neglectful ways towards 
the child.
Milkulincer, Shaver and Pereg (2003) argued that attachment theory 
provides the most useful explanatory framework for understanding 
individual differences in affect regulation. They argue that in childhood 
ways of regulating affect develop from being reliant on others to being able 
to self-regulate. This self-regulation is dependent on a person having 
developed a stable sense of their self-worth. If people have had positive 
attachment experiences and affect has been regulated by a caregiver then a 
stable sense of self-worth is internalised. Therefore, such individuals have 
greater positive beliefs about themselves and more confidence managing 
distress independently. These theorists propose therefore that attachment 
styles and affect regulation are interrelated in that, when people are in 
threatening situations, they seek proximity to trusted others in order to lower 
their anxiety. These behaviours occur throughout the life cycle with the role
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of a childhood caregiver being replaced by intimate partners in adulthood. 
When people do not experience comfort and security from these 
relationships they seek other ways to regulate their affect. Initially when 
experiencing distress they are likely to continue to pursue people for 
security and support so they can manage their emotions. However, if this is 
frustrated they tend to withdraw from threatening situations and people.
There is evidence in support of the idea that attachment insecurity relates to 
how people perceive and manage threatening situations through the 
development of schemas. Ein-Dor, Mikulincer and Shaver (2011) suggested 
that attachment related schemas guide the perception of potentially 
threatening stimuli. In a series of studies they examined the relationships 
between fight or flight schemas and levels of attachment avoidance and 
anxiety. They found that participants who had high levels of attachment 
anxiety were more sensitive to potentially threatening information in 
contrast to participants who had high levels of attachment avoidance who 
used self-protective strategies in potentially threatening situations. Higher 
levels of obsessive-compulsiveness have been associated with interpreting 
situations as threatening; therefore it appears possible that attachment styles 
which shape how a person responds in a threatening situation could relate to 
obsessive-compulsive experiences.
Doron and Kyrios (2005) reviewed the research on attachment insecurity 
and levels of obsessions and compulsions. They found few studies which 
examined the relationship between these variables. They point to evidence 
showing that people with a diagnosis of OCD report that their parents are 
more rejecting, less emotionally warm and over-protective than people 
without a diagnosis of OCD (Ehiobuche, 1988; Cavedo & Parker, 1994). 
Doron and Kyrios (2005) state that these studies have methodological 
weaknesses such as retrospective and recall biases and suggest that further 
empirical research is necessary. They propose that enduring cognitive 
affective schemas develop in childhood and predispose people to higher 
levels of obsessive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive experiences, arguing 
that Beck’s (1976) emphasis on perceptions of self, world and others is
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crucial but has been abandoned by later cognitive theorists. Doron and 
Kyrios (2005) integrate this cognitive-affective model with Guidano and 
Liotti’s (1983) self-ambivalence theory and propose that inconsistent 
attachment experiences and rigid parenting produce cognitive-affective 
structures in which the self-concept is sensitive and vulnerable and yet the 
world is viewed as controllable. They propose that this leads to a higher 
likelihood of obsessive-compulsive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena.
Doron, Moulding, Kyrios, Nedeljkovic and Mikulincer. (2009) provide 
compelling evidence for the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive-compulsiveness. This study used structural equation modelling to 
explore the relationships between attachment insecurity (operationalized as 
degree of attachment avoidance and anxiety), levels of obsessions and 
compulsions and obsessive-compulsive related cognitions whilst controlling 
for depression. Four hundred and forty six students completed measures of 
attachment (Experience of Close Relationships Scale, Brennan, Clark and 
Shaver, 1998), obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Padua Inventory, Bums et 
a l, 1996), obsessive and compulsive related beliefs (Obsessional Beliefs 
Questionnaire, OCCWG, 2005) and depression (Beck Depression Inventory; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). The relationship between attachment anxiety 
and avoidance and obsessive-compulsiveness was fully mediated by 
obsessive and compulsive related beliefs, these relationships were present 
when controlling for depression. High levels of attachment anxiety were 
suggested to relate to increased vigilance for signs of threat, vulnerability to 
ego-dystonic thoughts and increasing the need to act in response to stimuli 
perceived as threatening. Attachment avoidance was suggested to be related 
to self-criticism, maladaptive perfectionism, intolerance for uncertainty, 
ambiguity and personal weaknesses. The researchers suggested that people 
with high levels of attachment avoidance over-emphasised the control of 
thoughts, the suppression of personal inadequacies or self-reliant beliefs.
Doron et aï. (2009) argued that attachment insecurity underpins a person’s 
obsessive-compulsive related beliefs, which influences the maladaptive
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appraisals of intrusive thoughts. Doron et a/.’s (2009) study provides 
evidence for a link between attachment insecurity and obsessive compulsive 
related beliefs and phenomena. However, this study did not measure self­
ambivalence even though attachment insecurity and self-ambivalence 
appear to be related. As noted earlier, Guidano and Liotti’s theory proposes 
that maladaptive appraisals are a consequence of self-ambivalence and, 
whilst it is theoretically important to show the link between attachment 
insecurity and maladaptive appraisals, research also needs to confirm the 
idea that attachment and obsessive-compulsiveness are linked by way of 
self-ambivalence. The researchers collected data on adult attachment 
insecurities rather than childhood attachments, due to the methodological 
difficulties collecting this data and the time necessary to follow up 
childhood experiences and the onset of obsessive-compulsiveness later in 
life. There is however, evidence that attachment orientations are stable over 
time (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).
Further evidence of the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive-compulsiveness is shown in a study by Mhyr, Sookman and 
Pinard (2004). The researchers compared relatively small groups of people 
with a diagnosis of OCD (N=36), depression (N=16) and a control group 
(N=26) with their scores on the Revised Adult Attachment Scale (Collins & 
Read, 1990). They found higher levels of attachment insecurity in the OCD 
and depression groups. More specifically they found that people with 
diagnoses of OCD and depression had higher levels of relationship anxiety 
and discomfort with dependence. This study found greater levels of 
attachment insecurity in a sample of participants with a diagnosis of OCD 
compared to a control group. The small sample size may have led to 
difficulties examining the subtle differences in attachment insecurity 
between these groups. However, these findings support the idea that 
attachment insecurity might underlie the maladaptive appraisal style and 
profile of beliefs associated with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Although, the observation of attachment insecurity in the group with 
depression indicates that future studies must measure this factor if the
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relationship between attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness is 
to be clarified.
Cooper, Shaver and Collins (1998) completed a large study examining the 
relationships between adolescence attachment insecurity and a range of 
social and psychological difficulties. They measured obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and other difficulties using the Brief Symptom Index (Derogatis 
& Melissaratos, 1983). The researchers completed multivariate analyses and 
found that attachment insecurities predicted mental health symptoms. 
Participants with higher levels of attachment insecurity reported higher 
levels of obsessive-compulsive difficulties. However, this finding was not 
exclusive to obsessive-compulsive symptoms as a similar pattern of results 
was evident with a number of mental health difficulties. On average 
participants who were securely attached reported the lowest levels of mental 
health difficulties. Participants with avoidant attachments showed increased 
levels of these difficulties. Participants with anxious attachments scored the 
highest levels of mental health symptoms. Therefore, this provides some 
evidence that attachment insecurity has a role in levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness but that attachment insecurity may be a factor which is 
generally associated with higher levels of mental health problems. This 
finding is to be expected given the implications of attachment insecurity for 
affect regulation and interpersonal relationships.
Vogel, Stiles and Nordahl (2000) compared participants with a diagnosis of 
OCD, participants with a diagnosis of depression and community 
participants without mental health diagnoses on measures of dysfunctional 
attitudes, depression and sociotropy. Sociotropy is defined as an excessive 
interest in interpersonal relationships and is often characterised by a strong 
and unhelpful need for social acceptance. They found that the group with a 
diagnosis of OCD had higher levels of attachment and separation concerns 
even when controlling for demographic and diagnostic variables. The OCD 
group also had higher levels of fear of disapproval, which were elements of 
the sociotropy scale. This research supports Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) 
assertion that people with clinical levels of obsessive-compulsiveness have
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difficulties with attachment insecurity. The higher levels of fear of 
disapproval could also relate to attachment and childhood experiences as 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggested that parents of children who go to 
develop high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness have rigid moral codes.
In summary, there is some evidence for a relationship between levels of 
attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness. This research has been 
largely completed by the same small group of researchers and requires 
replication by others. Furthermore, an important part of future research is 
likely to involve identifying variables that mediate the relationship between 
attachment insecurity and levels of obsessions and compulsions. As 
discussed, self-ambivalence is one factor which may help to explain the link 
between attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness. However, 
the evidence reviewed above indicates that depression should be measured 
and taken into account in the analysis.
In addition to providing support for the link between self-ambivalence and 
obsessive-compulsiveness, including testing the hypothesis that self­
ambivalence is related to attachment insecurity, it is important to assess the 
contribution of other self-concept factors given their conceptual overlap 
with self-ambivalence. Thus, do other self-concept factors add to our 
understanding of obsessive-compulsive phenomena or might these be 
subsumed within the self-ambivalence model of Guidano and Liotti (1983). 
These other potentially important factors include shame and self­
compassion.
1.5 Shame, self-compassion and obsessions and compulsions
In their model of self-ambivalence, Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggested 
that people who have high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness perceive 
themselves as fundamentally flawed but that there are perfect solutions to 
life’s problems. Shame is a concept which describes the “painful and ugly 
feeling” (Tangney and Bearing, 2002, p3) when a person feels they have not 
lived up to their own or others’ standards and, therefore, has conceptual 
similarity with self-ambivalence. Tangney and Dearing (2002) proposed that
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shame is a self-conscious emotion, the primary role of which is to impose 
sanctions on socially and morally unacceptable behaviour. When a person 
transgresses their own internalised moral codes or perceived social 
standards they experience shame. It appears likely that people who see 
themselves as being flawed but who pursue rigid ideals may as a 
consequence experience shame. Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) theory suggests 
that ambivalent feelings are temporarily resolved by compulsions. Another 
possibility is that shame is temporarily resolved by compulsions, which 
allows the ideal self-concept to be temporarily restored.
Schore (1994) described how shame develops within the context of 
attachment relationships. The child’s neuropsychological circuitry which 
represents the self and other people develops during micro interactions 
between caregivers and children. These circuits become the basis of the 
child’s sense of self and their ability to regulate affect. Caregivers have been 
observed to break off reciprocal interactions with their children when they 
do not approve of their behaviour. This is a way of the parent regulating the 
child’s behaviour. This works because the child experiences shame when an 
interaction is broken off abruptly. However, problems arise if reciprocal 
interactions are consistently broken off in this way, leading to the infant 
feeling worthless and internalising shame. This leads to a negative sense of 
self and maladaptive ways of regulating affect. Shame appears to be another 
self-concept factor which appears to have similarities with attachment 
insecurity and self-ambivalence.
Shame is experienced throughout the lifecycle and is experienced not only 
when there is a perception that caregivers do not approve of behaviour, but 
when a person is concerned with what people generally think of them 
(Gilbert & Andrews, 1999). Therefore, its purpose remains the same -to 
regulate behaviour which is not approved of by others. The experience of 
shame is described as occurring when an individual feels they are not who 
they want to be. Therefore, it could be observed that shame has a 
conceptual similarity with self-ambivalence, as both of these concepts 
involve guarding against becoming the anti-ideal.
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Lewis (1971) described that shame is not only experienced when one feels 
they would be disapproved of by others but when an individual’s flaws are 
exposed before an internalised other, which leads to an individual wanting 
to escape or disappear. Lewis (1971) notes that the differences between 
shame and guilt are important since both emotions can occur following the 
same event. Shame involves the person condemning themselves, whereas 
guilt is experienced when the behaviour is condemned. When shame is 
experienced the self is the evaluator and the evaluated. Lewis described that 
after an act or thought that transgresses moral rules, the evaluating-self 
denigrates the focal-self which leads to shame and a wish to escape the 
situation. Similarly, Gilbert (2009) suggests that shame relates to the 
disparity between the ideal, actual and undesired self. A psychological 
model which incorporates shame must, therefore, also include multiple 
motivational and affective structures or selves. Shame experiences appear 
to be similar to the role of self-ambivalence in obsessive-compulsiveness, 
where the self is denigrated and perceived to be flawed.
There is evidence that shame is a major component in various mental health 
problems (Gilbert, 1998; Gilligan, 2003; Tangney & Dearing 2002). Gilbert 
and Procter (2006) argued that shame affects how experiences are 
perceived. It also affects the ability of people to share painful experiences 
with others and contributes to people using defence mechanisms to deny, 
avoid or dissociate from shame experiences. These defence mechanisms 
appear similar to those discussed by Mikulincer, Shaver and Pereg (2003) 
who suggested that avoidant attachment strategies lead to people feeling 
more cut off from their emotional experiences. Attachment avoidance was 
related to levels of obsessive-compulsiveness, therefore it is interesting to 
consider what role shame might have in these phenomena.
There is evidence that negative inferences about the self which are 
associated with shame are also more likely to become obsessive thoughts. 
Perrier and Brewin (2005) proposed that it is the degree to which an 
intrusive thought leads to negative inferences about the self that decides 
whether it becomes an obsession. Perrier and Brewin (2005) tested the
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hypothesis that people with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness believe 
that their intrusive thoughts reveal undesirable aspects of their character. 
They examined the difference between groups of participants with a 
diagnosis of OCD, participants with a diagnosis of another anxiety disorder 
and participants without a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder. They used a 
number of instruments including the Selves Questionnaire (Carver, 
Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999) which taps multiple self domains (ideal, ought, 
actual and feared self) and created the Intrusion Related Self-Inference 
Scale. Comparing the results of the Intrusion Related Self-inference Scale 
between the groups showed that the OCD diagnosis group differed from the 
other groups on the measure of negative inferences about the self. 
Furthermore, comparing the results of the Selves Questionnaire between the 
groups showed that people in the OCD group were more likely to perceive 
their feared self as bad or immoral. If shame can be construed as a negative 
evaluation of the self then it appears that these researchers are describing 
something that is related to the experience of shame. Intrusive thoughts 
which tend be unpleasant in content might activate negative self-inferences 
and are the type of self-inferences that shame is associated with. For 
example, according to these findings the thought that “I am defective” is 
likely to become an obsessional thought because it produces shame and an 
attempt to restore a more positive self-concept through restorative action, 
such as compulsions.
There is evidence that shame proneness is related to obsessive- 
compulsiveness. Valentiner and Smith (2008) found that individuals who 
perceive thinking as being equal to acting (i.e. who display thought action 
fusion) and who are shame prone are more likely to experience obsessions. 
This occurs because intrusive thoughts are more likely to be appraised as 
having implications for an individual’s own moral character if they are more 
likely to experience negative affective states. The researchers also stated 
that the link between obsessions and compulsions are also affected by an 
individual’s shame proneness. They explain that shame prone individuals 
may be motivated to counteract their obsessions by completing a
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compulsion. Valentiner and Smith (2008) surveyed a non-clinical sample of 
six hundred and ninety participants. Results showed that shame-proneness, 
thought action fusion, morality beliefs and obsessions predicted 
compulsions. This supports the hypothesis that higher levels of shame- 
proneness lead to higher levels of obsessions because intrusive thoughts 
activate negative affect and compulsions, which temporarily alleviate this 
distress.
Fergus, Valentiner, McGrath, and Jencius (2010) examined the relationships 
between shame and guilt proneness in a number of anxiety disorders. They 
have suggested that experiences of shame may relate to fears of humiliation, 
levels of rumination and appraisals of bodily sensations and therefore, 
predispose people to high levels of anxiety. Consequently, they asked 
participants to complete a range of measures before and after interventions 
including measures of shame and guilt (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner & 
Gramzow, 1989), obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCI-R, Foa et a l,
2002) and a range of other measures related to other forms of anxiety. Data 
for 124 participants diagnosed with high levels of anxiety was collected. 
The researchers calculated pre and post treatment change scores and found 
that changes in OCD symptoms before and after intervention were 
significantly related to changes in shame-proneness. This is evidence that an 
individual’s global evaluation of self might pre-dispose them to higher 
levels of obsessions and compulsions.
There is evidence that experiences of shame in childhood are related to 
higher levels of obsessive-compulsive experiences. Noie, Farid, Fata, and 
Ashoori (2010) propose that these experiences are encoded in schemas 
which are cognitive frameworks of information, which develop in childhood 
and help organise thoughts and beliefs. Young’s Maladaptive Schema 
Questionnaire (Young, Schmidt, Joiner, & Telch, 1995) was completed by 
forty five participants, including fifteen with a diagnosis of OCD, fifteen 
with a diagnosis of OCPD and fifteen non-clinical controls. The results 
showed that the OCD and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder groups 
had early maladaptive schemas around shame. It is possible that these
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shame schemas are important in how thoughts are appraised. These shame 
schemas could be important in understanding why intrusive thoughts 
become obsessive thoughts, how the self is evaluated in people with high 
levels of obsessive-compulsiveness and how compulsive behaviour acts to 
decrease the experience of shame. Therefore, the experience of shame is a 
concept which has the potential to explain why some people experience 
intrusive thoughts as obsessions whilst others do not. One of the aims of 
this study is to further explore the relationship between shame and 
obsessive-compulsiveness.
Shame and self-compassion are central concepts in compassionate mind or 
compassion focused therapies (Gilbert, 2009). Gilbert (2009) proposes that 
people’s relationship with themselves can be restored through fostering self­
compassion. Shame represents a critical and attacking relationship with the 
self. In contrast, self-compassion is defined as inner kindness and caring 
toward oneself during times of adversity or perceived inadequacy (Gilbert, 
2009). Gilbert (2009) suggests that higher levels of self-compassion and 
mindfulness allow the individual to break a pattern of avoiding or holding 
on to experiences. Gilbert proposed that interventions which foster self­
compassion change an individual’s sense of self and relieve mental health 
problem symptoms. The approach is based on mindfulness, which is a deep 
awareness of the transient nature of thoughts, emotions and experiences that 
can allow a person to more easily shift away from threat focused modes 
(Gilbert, 2009). There are three polarities which constitute self-compassion: 
self-kindness versus self-judgement, common humanity versus isolation, 
and mindfulness versus over-identification (Neff, Rude & Kirkpatrick, 
2007). Compassion focused therapies (Gilbert, 2009) aim at changing the 
relationship that people have with thoughts by seeing thoughts as transient 
phenomena rather than absolute truths. This decreases thought action fusion 
and fosters self-compassion, leading to changes in the way that thoughts are 
appraised. Obsessions and compulsions involve engaging with negative 
automatic thoughts, which is counterproductive and it seems likely that 
interventions which involve developing a different relationship with one’s
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thoughts will be of value to people who experience high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness.
The development of the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS) (Neff, 2003) has 
enabled empirical research studies to test hypotheses about self-compassion. 
Neff et al. (2007) examined the relationship between self-compassion and 
psychological health in two studies. In the first study they explored whether 
self-compassion acted as a buffer against anxiety when faced with an ego 
threatening situation in an experiment. In the second study they examined if 
self-compassion was related to psychological well-being over time. They 
asked participants to answer questions as if they were in a job interview and 
asked them to identify their greatest weakness, which was a situation that 
aimed to elicit an ego-threat. The participants then completed measures 
levels of anxiety and self-compassion. The researchers found that higher 
levels of self-compassion were associated with lower levels of anxiety. The 
researchers suggested that these findings are important because they showed 
that self-compassion is an important variable in understanding how the 
relationship a person has with their thoughts affects how they manage 
distress when their self-concept is challenged. Therefore, people who have 
high levels of shame and self-ambivalence appear likely to appraise 
intrusive thoughts as threatening, whereas people with high levels of self­
compassion are less likely to do so. Therefore, people who have high levels 
of shame and self-ambivalence are more likely to experience obsessions and 
compulsions. In contrast, self-compassion is likely to act as a protective 
factor. Although, there is much interest in how compassion focused 
therapies can be applied to obsessive-compulsiveness clinically, there has 
been little published research examining how self-compassion and 
obsessive-compulsiveness are related.
Wattemeck et al. (unpublished manuscript) found that in a sample of 83 
participants with high levels of obsessions and compulsions, self-criticism 
and self-judgement were related to obsessive-compulsive symptom severity. 
The researchers found that scores on the Obsessive and Compulsive 
Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) were significantly negatively correlated with
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scores on the self-compassion scale (-0.29). This research supports the 
notion that self-criticism, self-judgement and self-compassion are related to 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, given the cross-sectional design 
of the study it is not possible to establish a causal relationship. Furthermore 
a third variable could be responsible for these relationships.
Self-compassion is an under researched area but mindfulness based 
treatments for obsessive-compulsiveness are “evidenced by a small but 
growing body of literature” (Steketee, 2012, pp.379). Therefore, despite 
mindfulness based treatments being early in their development there is 
increasing interest and research to support their efficacy. This is based on 
the idea that changing an individual’s perception and relationships with their 
thoughts changes the way in which intrusive thoughts are appraised.
In summary, shame and self-compassion appear to be two concepts that 
have the potential to help explain obsessive compulsive phenomena in terms 
of the affect experienced and the self-concept that underpins these problems. 
Theorists such as Gilbert (2009) have posited links between these concepts 
but little empirical research has followed these claims. There are a small 
number of studies which show a relationship between obsessive- 
compulsiveness and shame. Furthermore, the studies that have been 
completed are generally correlational studies on large university student 
samples. It would be helpful to have some further empirical evidence on the 
levels of shame and self-compassion in people with higher levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness, where these problems have an effect on their 
everyday life.
1.6 Summary and hypotheses
Various theorists have suggested that self-ambivalence, shame, self­
compassion and attachment insecurity are related to high levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness. However, overall there is limited empirical 
evidence to support these claims and these potentially interrelated factors 
have not been combined in a single study.
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This study will examine whether there are significant relationships between 
these variables and obsessive-compulsiveness. A sample which includes a 
broad range of people with different levels of obsessive-compulsiveness is 
used to show how different variables involved in a person’s sense of self 
may be associated with varying levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. From 
the literature reviewed it is hypothesised that self-ambivalence, shame and 
attachment insecurity will be significantly and positively related to 
obsessive-compulsiveness. Furthermore, self-compassion will be negatively 
correlated with obsessive-compulsiveness. Additionally, the analysis will 
assess whether self-ambivalence, shame and self-compassion each 
contribute unique variance to the prediction of obsessive-compulsiveness. It 
is also hypothesised that self-ambivalence will mediate the relationship 
between attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness.
Doron et al. (2009) found evidence for both high levels of attachment 
anxiety and avoidance predicting levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that in this sample both attachment anxiety and 
attachment avoidance will predict the level of obsessions and compulsions.
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2.0 Method
2.1 Design
This study used a cross sectional survey design. The variables measured 
were obsessive-compulsiveness, self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, 
shame and self-compassion. The questionnaires were administered online 
and accessed remotely by participants.
2.2 Participants
A total of 459 people accessed the survey at the website, with 214 people 
closing the survey webpage before completing all of the questionnaires. 
Therefore, the total sample consisted of 245 participants. They had an age 
range of 18-64. The mean age of the sample was 30.8 years (SD=10.41). 
The sample included 53 males (21.6) and 192 (78.4%) females. The 
following frequencies of ethnicities were reported by the participants: 172 
White British (70.2%); 48 White other (19.6%); 9 White Irish (3.7%); 5 
Mixed other (2%); 2 Asian other (0.8%); 2 White and Black Caribbean 
(0.8%); 2 Other (0.8%), 1 White and Black African (0.4%); 1 Indian (0.4%); 
1 Pakistani (0.4%); 1 Black or Black British Caribbean (0.4%) and 1 
Chinese (0.4%).
The sample included 85 students (34.75%), 40 of whom were psychology 
students (47%). Participants’ highest levels of formal education were: 17 
reported no formal qualifications (6.9%), 25 GCSE/O-levels/NVQ 
equivalent (10.2%), 39 A-levels or equivalent (15.9%), 79 undergraduate 
degrees (32.2%) and 85 postgraduate degree (34.7%).
The sample included 107 people (43.7%) who reported having a diagnosis 
of a mental health problem. Participants were asked at the start of the online 
survey if they considered themselves to have OCD and if they had a 
diagnosis of OCD. 130 people (53.1%) considered themselves to have OCD 
and 95 people (38.8%) reported having a diagnosis of OCD.
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2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Padua Inventory- Washington State University Revision
(PI-WSUR)
Levels of obsessive-compulsiveness were measured using the Padua- 
Inventory Washington State University Revision (PI-WSUR; Bums et al. 
1996). This is a 39 item questionnaire with responses given on a 5 point 
scale from 0 “Not a lot” to 4 “Very much”. It consists of 5 subscales: 1) 
obsessional thoughts of harm to self and others, consisting of 7 items (e.g.” I 
imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent mindedness or 
minor errors that I make”); 2) obsessional impulses to harm self or others, 
consisting of 9 items (e.g. “while driving I sometimes feel an impulse to 
drive the car into someone or something”); 3) contamination obsessions and 
washing compulsions consisting of 10 items (e.g. “I find it difficult to touch 
an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or certain people”); 
4) checking compulsions consisting of 10 items (e.g. “I tend to keep on 
checking things more often than necessary”); 5) dressing rituals consisting 
of 3 items (e.g. “Before going to sleep I have to do things in certain order”). 
The total scores have been used in the analyses and can range from 0-156 
with higher scores denoting greater levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. The 
scale is reported to have good internal consistency (a=0.94), test-retest 
reliability over a seven month interval (a=0.77-0.88) and discriminant 
validity (Bums et al. 1996). The measure showed high internal consistency 
(a =0.95) in this sample.
2.3.2 Self-ambivalence Measure (SAM)
Self-ambivalence was measured with the Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM, 
Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). It is a 21 item questionnaire with responses rated on 
a scale of from 0 “Not at all” to 4 “Agree totally”. The total scores will be 
used in the analyses, and these can range from 0-84 with higher scores 
denoting greater levels of self-ambivalence. The measure consists of two 
subscales: self-worth ambivalence consisting of 13 items (e.g. “I have 
mixed feeling about my self-worth”) and morality self-ambivalence
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consisting of 6 items (e.g. “I question whether I am a moral person”). 
Reliability and convergent validity were acceptable (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). 
Internal consistency were high in both non-clinical (a=0.88) and clinical (a 
=0.88) samples (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007). The measure showed high internal 
consistency (a =0.95) in this sample.
2.3.3 Experience of Close Relationships Scale -Revised (ECR-R)
Attachment insecurity was measured using the Experience of Close 
Relationships Scale-Revised (ECR-R; Fraley, Waller and Brennnan, 2000). 
This is a 36 item questionnaire with items scored on a scale of 1 “Strongly 
Disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree” depending on how accurately the 
statements described participant’s experiences in intimate relationships. The 
total score was calculated by taking the mean of the 36 items. Therefore, the 
total score can range from 1-7 with higher scores denoting greater levels of 
attachment insecurity. The subscales include attachment anxiety consisting 
of 18 items (e.g. “I’m afraid that I will lose my partner’s love”) and 
attachment avoidance consisting of 18 items (e.g. “I prefer not to show a 
partner how I feel deep down”). Both subscales scores can also range from 
1-7. The scales showed adequate test-retest reliability (a=0.7) and good 
internal reliability for both attachment anxiety (a =0.9) and attachment 
avoidance (a =0.93) (Fraley et ah, 2000). The measure showed high internal 
consistency for the overall attachment insecurity scale (a =0.96) and 
attachment avoidance (a =0.93) and attachment anxiety (a =0.95) in this 
sample.
The instructions of the ECR-R explain that if you do not have an intimate 
partner that you should answer in relation to how you think you would feel. 
Therefore, the scale can still be used by people who are currently not in a 
relationship. It is possible to edit the questions to say close relationships 
instead of partner. However this change was felt to be unnecessary given 
that both people with and without partners can complete the questionnaire.
Previous studies have shown that attachment anxiety and avoidance are 
highly correlated (Fraley et ah, 2000). Therefore, it was decided that an
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overall measure of attachment insecurity would be used in the current study. 
This is in keeping with Kazan and Shaver’s (1990) model of adult 
attachment insecurity being the combination of these two dimensions. The 
attachment avoidance and anxiety scales of the ECR-R can be combined to 
give reliable and valid overall attachment insecurity score (Fraley, Personal 
Communication, 9th April 2013). However, in order for the results to be 
compared to other similar studies, such as Doron et a l (2009) who 
presented attachment avoidance and anxiety separately, it was also decided 
that further analyses would be completed to examine if different 
relationships existed between attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety 
and obsessive-compulsiveness.
2.3.4 Experience of Shame Scale (ESS)
Shame was measured using the Experience of Shame Scale (ESS, Andrews, 
Qian and Valentine, 2002). It is a 25 item questionnaire scored on a 4 point 
scale from 1 “Not at all” to 4 “Very much”. The total shame score was used 
in the analyses. It can range from 25-100 with higher scores denoting 
greater levels of shame. It includes measures of bodily shame consisting of 
4 items (e.g. “Have you felt ashamed of your body or any part of it?”), 
characterological shame consisting of 13 items (e.g. “Have you felt ashamed 
of the sort of person you are?”) and behavioural shame consisting of 9 items 
(e.g. “Do you feel ashamed when you do something wrong?”). The scale 
showed high internal consistency (a=0.92) and test-retest reliability 
(a=0.83). There is also evidence of good discriminant and construct validity 
(Andrews, Qian and Valentine, 2002). The measure showed high internal 
consistency (a =0.97) in this sample.
2.3.5 Self-Compassion Scale (SCS)
Self-compassion was measured using the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff,
2003). It is a 26 item questionnaire scored on a 5 point scale from 1 “almost 
never” to 5 “almost always”. The total is calculated by adding together the 
subscale means. Therefore, the total score can range from 6-30 with higher 
scores denoting higher levels of self-compassion. The subscales include
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over identification consisting of 4 items (e.g. “When I’m feeling down I 
tend to obsess and fixate on everything that’s wrong”); Mindfulness which 
consists of 4 items (e.g. “When something painful happens I try to take a 
balanced view of the situation”); Isolation which consists of 4 items (e.g. 
“When I think about my inadequacies it tends to make me feel more 
separate and cut off fi*om the rest of the word”); Common Humanity which 
consists of 4 items (e.g. I try to see my failings as part of the human 
condition”); Self Judgement which consists of 5 items (e.g. “I ’m 
disapproving and judgemental about my own flaws and inadequacies”); and 
Self-Kindness which consists of 5 items (e.g. I try to be understanding and 
patient towards the aspects of my personality that I don’t like”). The scale 
has good internal consistency (a =0.92) and test-retest reliability (a=0.93) 
over a three week interval (Neff, 2003). This measure showed high internal 
consistency (a =0.95) in this sample.
2.3.6 Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21)
Depression was measured with the 7 depression specific items fi*om the 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS: Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). This measure was selected specifically due to its ability to 
discriminate between depression, anxiety and stress, as opposed to other 
measures which do not have this quality. We initially planned to examine 
the levels of depression, anxiety and stress but we subsequently decided that 
this would only complicate the analyses.Participants are asked to what 
extent each item applies to them over the past week. It is measured on a 4 
point scale, 0 “Did not apply to me at all” to 3 “Applied to me very much, or 
most of the time” for each of the items (e.g. “I couldn't seem to experience 
any positive feeling at all”). The scores are multiplied by 2 to make them 
equal to the original DASS 42 instrument. The scores can range from 0 to 
42, with higher scores denoting greater levels of depression. The scale has 
very good internal reliability (a =0.96; Page, Hooke and Morrison, 2007) 
and test-retest reliability (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch and Barlow, 1997). 
The measure showed high internal consistency (a=0.94) in this sample.
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2.4 Ethical considerations and Procedure
This study was approved by the University of Surrey’s Faculty of Arts and 
Human Science Ethics Committee.
A range of recruitment sources were utilised in order to attain maximum 
variability in the obsessive-compulsiveness measure. Participants were 
recruited online using adverts on OCD charity and support group websites 
and the social networking website Twitter. Information about the study and 
a link to the website was also posted on the University’s student research 
participation programme website. The charity OCD-Today agreed to have 
some information and a link to the questionnaire on their website. A Twitter 
account, @OCDResearch2012 was set up with the sole purpose of 
recruiting participants. Tweets were sent out regularly with a link to the 
online survey website hosted by the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at 
the University of Surrey. It is unclear how many participants accessed the 
questionnaire through the different recruitment sources.
Tweets included several variations of “Interested in psychology? Please 
complete this online questionnaire” and “Do you have OCD? Please 
complete this online questionnaire.” Twitter users who re-tweeted the link 
were thanked. Twitter users were ‘followed’ in order to increase the profile 
of the account and the account was ‘followed’ by in excess of 1,800 Twitter 
users at the peak of participant recruitment. A Facebook profile and 
webpage was also set up, in order to increase the profile of the research. 
This had limited success in recruiting participants.
The online survey began with an information screen which explained the 
study. The participants were then asked to give their fully informed consent 
to participate. They were asked to give their initials and DOB so that their 
records could be removed if they subsequently requested within one month. 
They were then asked if they were a student and a psychology student. They 
were also asked if they had a mental health problem, a diagnosis of OCD, 
concerns they might have OCD. They then completed the above measures.
147
After they had completed the study they were given the details of a range of 
supportive charities and organisations, such as The Samaritans.
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3.0 Results
3.1 Data checking, outliers and normality
The online survey was set up to alert participants to unanswered questions; 
therefore there was no missing data.
Histograms were visually inspected to examine whether the data was 
normally distributed. This showed that the distributions were not markedly 
skewed and it was decided that parametric statistics were appropriate. In 
order to complete regression analyses the predictor variables do not need to 
be normally distributed (Field, 2009); instead, distributions of the residuals 
of the outcome variable were checked during that analysis. This showed that 
the residuals were normally distributed.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables. The mean 
obsessive compulsive score (35.99) is higher than the mean in the large non- 
clinical sample from Bums et a l (1996) (21.78) but lower than the mean 
score for the OCD group (54.93) from the same study. This could be due to 
a little over a half of the sample in this study self-rating as having OCD and 
the other half not considering themselves to have OCD . The self­
ambivalence mean score (38.15) was almost double that recorded in Bhar 
and Kyrios’ (2007) non-clinical sample (22.66). Again, the higher estimate 
in this sample is likely due to the combination of people considering 
themselves to have OCD and those not. The items mean scores were used in 
all ECR-R scales, so that the results could be compared to previous studies 
that had used this method. The attachment anxiety mean in this study (3.67) 
was slightly higher than that of the mean from a sample of over 17,000 
people who had completed the ECR-R online (3.54). The attachment 
avoidance mean was higher in the current sample (M=3.42) than it was 
compared with the same online sample (2.92). The average attachment 
insecurity score from the same large online study was 3.24. The current 
sample had a mean score of 3.54 which is slightly higher than the normative 
sample. The mean shame score was higher in this sample (67.51) compared
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to the mean of the student sample student (55.58) in Andrews et a l (2002). 
The mean of the Self-compassion Scale (12.38) was lower than the mean in 
the student sample (18.25) in Neff (2003). The score for depression from the 
DASS (16.74) was higher than the mean (5.55) in the large community 
sample reported in Crawford and Henry (2003), although lower than the 
mean of the OCD diagnostic group (17.57) in Tully, Zajac, and Venning 
(1998). Again, this pattern of differences is likely due to the sample in the 
current study being comprised of participants with a wide range of 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena and who were recruited from general 
population and obsessive-compulsive specific sources.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Predictor and Outcome 
Variables (N=245)
Variable Range Mean (SD)
Obsessive- compulsiveness 0-145 35.99 (28.73)
Self-ambivalence 0-80 38.15 (20.91)
Attachment insecurity 1-6.64* 3.54(1.34)
Attachment anxiety 1-6.83* 3.67(1.48)
Attachment avoidance 1-7* 3.42(1.53)
Shame 25-100 67.64 (20.34)
Self-compassion 4.80-22.50* 12.38 (3.78)
Depression 0-42 16.74 (12.18)
* The item mean is used to calculate these scales
3.3 Correlations
Prior to running regression analyses to test the hypotheses, bivariate 
Pearson’s correlations were calculated between the predictor variables self­
ambivalence, attachment insecurity, shame and self-compassion and the 
outcome variable obsessive-compulsiveness.
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All of the predictor variables self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity 
(including attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance separately), shame, 
self-compassion and depression were highly and significantly correlated 
with obsessive-compulsiveness. These correlations are presented in Table 2. 
The correlations between predictor variables and the dependent variables 
were all highly significant and show moderate (0.3) to large (0.5) effect 
sizes. As expected the self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, shame, 
depression, attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety were all positively 
correlated with obsessive-compulsiveness whilst self-compassion was 
negatively correlated with obsessive-compulsiveness. The variable with the 
strongest correlation to obsessive-compulsiveness is self-ambivalence. As 
expected the effect size between attachment avoidance and obsessive- 
compulsiveness and attachment anxiety and obsessive-compulsiveness is 
similar. These data support the first hypothesis that attachment insecurity, 
self ambivalence and shame will be positively correlated with obsessive- 
compulsiveness and that self-compassion will be negatively correlated with 
obsessive-compulsiveness.
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Table 2: Correlations of Predictor Variables and Obsessive- 
Compulsiveness (N=245)
Variable Correlation with Obsessive-
_________________ compulsiveness_________
Self-ambivalence 0.68**
Total Attachment Insecurity 0.48**
Attachment anxiety 0.48**
Attachment avoidance 0.38**
Shame 0.63**
Self-compassion -0.54**
Depression 0.64**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).
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Table 3 shows the correlations between the potential predictors of 
obsessive-compulsiveness. As expected there are significant correlations 
between the predictor variables (self-ambivalence, total attachment 
insecurity, shame and self-compassion) with large (0.5) effect sizes. Self­
ambivalence and shame were particularly highly correlated. As predicted 
attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety were also particularly highly 
correlated.
3.4 Regression analysis
It is important to ensure that predictor variables are not inter-correlated to 
the extent that it biases the regression model. Multicollinearity diagnostics 
were examined and compared to the criteria for concern as suggested by 
Field (2009). No predictor variables showed variance inflation factor (VIF) 
scores above 5, no tolerance statistics were below 0.2 and therefore, despite 
high correlations between predictor variables there was no evidence of 
multicollineraity.
Multiple regression analysis was undertaken to assess whether self­
ambivalence, shame, and self-compassion each contribute unique variance 
to the prediction of obsessive-compulsiveness. It was important to establish 
if these factors explained a significant amount of the variation in obsessive 
and compulsiveness independent of depression and regardless of how 
depression and the other variables may be linked conceptually. Therefore at 
step 1, depression was entered as a predictor and obsessive-compulsiveness 
total score as an outcome variable. Depression had a statistically significant 
relationship with obsessive-compulsiveness accounting for 34.7% of the 
variance (R^^ 0.347, F(l,239)=127.027 p<0.001).
At step 2, self-ambivalence, shame and self-compassion were entered as 
predictors into the model. The predictors had a statistically significant 
relationship with the outcome variable. The overall model accounted for 
50.1% of the variance in obsessive-compulsiveness (R^= 0.501, 
F(3,236)=59.195. p<0.001). The full regression model is outlined in Table 
*4. It is of note that the effect of depression reduces in step 2 but remains 
statistically significant. The results of these regression analyses show that
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self-ambivalence adds significantly to the prediction of obsessive- 
compulsiveness beyond depression and that it is the strongest predictor of 
obsessive-compulsiveness scores. Shame was marginally significant 
predictor (p=0.08), whereas self-compassion was not a significant predictor 
(p=0.78).
As hypothesised, the model containing scores in self-ambivalence, shame 
and self-compassion predicted scores in obsessive-compulsiveness. Self­
ambivalence was a significant predictor once controlling for depression and 
it was the strongest predictor of obsessive-compulsiveness. Shame failed to 
attain significance at the 0.05 level. Self-compassion was also not a 
significant predictor. There is therefore no evidence that self-compassion 
adds to the model above other factors. The high correlation between self­
ambivalence and shame in combination with the results of the multiple 
regression analysis, suggest that self-ambivalence may be a factor which 
encompasses shame. Furthermore, this could also have occurred in the case 
of self-compassion, where se lf ambivalence and shame scores explain a 
higher proportion of the variance in obsessive-compulsiveness scores than 
self-compassion scores. Self ambivalence explains the variance self­
compassion would add.
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Table 4: Results for Steps 1 and 2 of the regression model 
predicting obsessions and compulsions from depression, self­
ambivalence, shame and self-compassion (N=245)
B (SB B) P P
Step 1
Constant 10.53 (2.40) 0.001
Depression 3.04 (0.23) 0.64 0.001
Step 2
Constant -6.65 (11.64) 0.57
Depression 1.238 (0.36) 0.26 0.001
Self ambivalence 0.49 (0.12) 0.36 0.001
Shame 0.20 (0.12) 0.14 0.09
Self-compassion -0.01 (0.54) -0.01 0.99
Note: Stepl: =0.42 p=0.001, Step 2: R^ change=0.09 p=0.001
3.5 Mediation analysis
A mediation analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that self­
ambivalence mediates the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive-compulsiveness. Mediation occurs when a predictor variable has 
an effect on an outcome variable through a mediating variable. Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) four steps approach was completed in order to establish 
whether there was a statistically significant mediation relationship. The first 
three steps involve establishing linear relationships between the predictor,
mediator and outcome variables. In the fourth step, whether the mediator
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leads to a decrease in the relationship with the predictor and outcome 
variables is assessed. If this occurs to the extent that there is no relationship 
between the predictor and outcome when the mediator is included then a full 
mediation has occurred. If there is a significant decrease in this relationship 
but the predictor variable is still related to the outcome variable then a 
partial mediation is said to have occurred.
The results of these four steps are shown in Diagram 1. Step 1 involved 
completing a simple regression analysis with total attachment insecurity as 
the predictor and obsessive-compulsiveness as the outcome variable 
(R2=0.23, F(l,243)=73.22, p<0.001). This showed that attachment 
insecurity predicts obsessive-compulsiveness.
Step 2 involved completing a simple regression analysis with attachment 
insecurity as a predictor and self-ambivalence as the proposed mediator. 
This showed that attachment insecurity predicts self-ambivalence (R^=0.37, 
F(l,243)=141.17p<0.001).
Step 3 involved completing a simple regression analysis with self­
ambivalence as the predictor and obsessive-compulsiveness as the outcome 
variable. This showed that Self ambivalence predicts obsessive and 
compulsives (R^=0.47, F(l,243)=213.76 p<0.001).
Step 4 involved completing a multiple regression analysis with attachment 
insecurity and self-ambivalence as the predictor variables and obsessive- 
compulsiveness as the outcome variable. Overall the model was significant 
(R2=0.46, F(2,242)=105.73 p<0.001). As can be seen in Diagram 1, the B 
coefficient decreases significantly in step 4 as compared to step 1 and has
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become non-significant. However, the B is not zero and the p-value of 0.06 
is close to the 0.05 significance level. This means that self-ambivalence 
partially mediated the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive compulsive. These results show that as hypothesised, self­
ambivalence mediated the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive-compulsiveness, but not fully.
Diagram 1: Four Steps Mediation Model: Self-ambivalence
mediating the relationship between attachment insecurity and 
obsessive-compulsiveness
Step 1: P =0.48 p=0.001
Step 4: P =0.11 p=0.06
Step 3: p =0.68
p=0.001
Step 2: p =0.61
p=0.001
Attachment
Insecurity
Obsessive-
compulsiveness
Self­
ambivalence
159
Year 1 6154080
3.6 Attachment anxiety and avoidance regression analysis
It is important to ensure that predictor variables are not correlated to such an 
extent that it biases the regression model. Attachment anxiety and avoidance 
were highly correlated (0.59), which supports the decision to use total 
attachment insecurity scores in the initial multiple regression analysis and in 
the mediation analysis. However, multicollinearity diagnostics were 
examined and compared to the criteria for concern as suggested by Field 
(2009). Neither predictor variables showed variance inflation factor (VIF) 
scores above 5, no tolerance statistics were below 0.2 and therefore, there 
was no further evidence of multicollineraity.
A regression analysis was conducted to examine whether the two different 
types of attachment insecurity: attachment avoidance and attachment 
anxiety, varied in the extent to which they predicted obsessive- 
compulsiveness. A regression model predicting obsessive-compulsiveness 
from attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety showed R^=0.247, F (2, 
242)=38.74 p<0.001. Attachment anxiety and avoidance both predict 
obsessive-compulsiveness, although attachment avoidance was a stronger 
predictor as shown in Table 5. Therefore, attachment anxiety and 
attachment avoidance emerge as unique and significant predictors of 
obsessive-compulsiveness. This suggests that both of these facets of 
attachment insecurity add predictive value to obsessive-compulsiveness.
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Table 5: Results of regression analysis predicting obsessions and 
compulsions from attachment anxiety and avoidance (N=245)
B (SB B) P P
Constant -1.39 (4.56) 0.761
Attachment anxiety 7.39(1.34) 0.38 0.001
Attachment avoidance 3.00(1.30) 0.16 0.01
Note: R2=0.247 p<0.001
3.7 Summary of results
The results showed strong relationships between the self-ambivalence, 
shame, self-compassion, attachment insecurity and depression and 
obsessive-compulsiveness. Regression models showed that self­
ambivalence was the strongest predictor of obsessive-compulsiveness. As 
hypothesised, mediation analysis showed that self-ambivalence partially 
mediated the relationship between attachment insecurity and obsessive- 
compulsiveness.
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4.0 Discussion 
4.1 Theoretical implications of the results
This section will discuss the theoretical implications of the research 
findings. This will be followed by the clinical implications of the research 
findings.
4.1.1 Self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsiveness
The results of this study support the hypothesis that self-ambivalence and 
obsessive-compulsiveness were related. Firstly, the variable with the highest 
positive correlation with obsessive-compulsiveness was self-ambivalence. 
Secondly, the regression analysis showed that self-ambivalence predicted a 
greater amount of the variance in obsessive-compulsiveness even after 
controlling for depression. The results support Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) 
theory of obsessions and compulsions, which suggests that having 
contradictory views of the self is in important factor in predisposing and 
maintaining high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. The theory proposes 
that threatening intrusive thoughts activate contradictory feelings about the 
self which must be resolved. As such, the focus on these intrusions is what 
leads them to become obsessions. This results in the individual experiencing 
distress and internal conflict. Moreover, completing compulsive behaviour 
is suggested to function to restore the ideal self-concept and demonstrates 
the individual’s ability to control the environment.
The results support Bhar and Kyrios’s (2007) findings that self-ambivalence 
is an important factor in obsessive-compulsiveness. The researchers 
suggested that self-ambivalence is a meta-factor that relates to levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness through obsessive-compulsive related beliefs. 
However, the current study cannot confirm Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) 
proposal that self-ambivalence produces obsessive-compulsiveness due to 
the cross-sectional correlational nature of the design: having high levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness might produce an ambivalent sense of self. This 
is particularly likely given that people with high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness find their obsessions ego-alien and are, therefore, likely to
162
Year 1 6154080
feel tom between different parts of themselves. Nevertheless, the current 
study supports the relevance of self-ambivalence to obsessive- 
compulsiveness and indicates that further work on the nature and role of 
self-ambivalence is justified.
4.1.2 Attachment insecurity, self-ambivalence and obsessive-
compulsiveness
The current results of this study support the hypothesis that attachment 
insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness are related. Attachment insecurity 
had a strong positive correlation with obsessive-compulsiveness. These 
findings support Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) theory that attachment 
experiences relate to levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. The theorists 
argued that children who develop a sense that their parents are present but 
unavailable develop high levels of attachment insecurity. They suggested 
that these parents foster a sense of pervasive uncertainty which is 
internalised by their children. The strong relationship between attachment 
insecurity and self-ambivalence supports this theory.
The findings that attachment insecurity is positively correlated with levels 
of obsessive-compulsiveness also supports the results of Mhyr et al. (2004), 
who found higher levels of attachment insecurity in a group of participants 
who had a diagnosis of OCD compared to a control group. Similarly the 
results of this study support Cooper, Shaver and Collins’ (1998) findings 
that attachment insecurity was related to higher levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness. Furthermore, the results of this study are in line with the 
findings of Vogel et al. (2000) who found that a group of participants with a 
diagnosis of OCD had higher levels of attachment insecurity.
The findings of this study support Doron and Kyrios’ (2005) proposal that 
early attachment experiences are related to levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness. The results of this study also support the findings of Doron 
et al. (2009) who found that attachment avoidance and anxiety both had 
strong positive relationships with obsessive-compulsive related beliefs and 
obsessive -compulsiveness in a student sample. This supports the theory that
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an individual’s attachment style relates to how they cognitively appraise 
intrusive thoughts.
Doron et a l (2009) suggested that attachment avoidance and anxiety were 
related to specific obsessive-compulsive related beliefs. They made links 
between these beliefs and Guidano and Liotti’s self-ambivalence theory, 
although they did not measure attachment insecurity. This study examined if 
self-ambivalence mediated the relationship between attachment insecurity 
and obsessive-compulsiveness. The results support the proposal that self­
ambivalence was found to partially mediate the relationship between 
attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness. The results of this 
research build upon Doron et aVs, (2009) findings that attachment insecurity 
is related to obsessive-compulsive beliefs and the level of obsessions and 
compulsions people experienced. The researchers suggested that attachment 
insecurity related to increased vigilance to potentially threatening stimuli, 
vulnerability to ego-dystonic thoughts and increasing the need to act in 
response to threatening stimuli. They also suggested that attachment 
avoidance was related to perfectionistic beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and personal weaknesses. The researchers suggested that these 
two types of attachment insecurity may relate to the ideal and flawed self­
perceptions associated with obsessive-compulsiveness. The evidence from 
this study that self-ambivalence mediates the relationship between 
attachment insecurity combined with Doron et a/.’s (2009) findings suggest 
a potential developmental pathway fi*om attachment insecurity to self­
ambivalence to high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness.
However, this proposal needs to be seen in the context of methodological 
limitations of both the current study and the study by Doron et a l (2009). 
Similarly to Doron et a l (2009), this study used an index of adult 
experience of close relationships. This has been shown to be related to 
childhood attachments, but nevertheless it is not an index of childhood 
attachments. Therefore, there is a possibility that obsessive-compulsiveness 
relates to adult perceptions of attachment insecurity. It is plausible that 
people with higher levels of obsessive-compulsiveness and psychological 
distress could experience greater feelings of insecurity in their relationships.
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Therefore, this highlights a notable weakness inherent in the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) method: that confounding factors which were not measured 
could be responsible for the mediation (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). 
Additionally, as Hankins (2006) observes, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
‘causal steps’ approach cannot demonstrate causal relationships within a 
cross-sectional correlational design. Therefore, whilst the pathway between 
attachment insecurity, self-ambivalence and obsessive-compulsiveness is 
theoretically plausible and is not disconfirmed in this study, further 
experimental research is required to validate the causal sequence. However, 
these findings provide further support for the findings of Doron et a l (2009) 
in that attachment insecurity and avoidance predicted levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness. The current study extends Doron et a l (2009) by showing 
that this relationship was mediated by self ambivalence. The current study 
did not measure obsessive-compulsive beliefs due to concerns about 
participant burden. Further research might examine the relationships 
between attachment insecurity, self-ambivalence, obsessive-compulsive 
related beliefs and obsessive-compulsiveness.
Doron et a l (2009) entered attachment anxiety and avoidance as separate 
factors in the structural equation model they created. The current study, in 
addition to using a total score for attachment insecurity, examined whether 
there was a difference between the extent to which attachment anxiety and 
avoidance predicted obsessive-compulsiveness. The findings showed that 
both attachment anxiety and avoidance predicted obsessive-compulsiveness 
independently. This shows that both of these facets of attachment insecurity 
have a role in obsessive-compulsiveness. This supports Doron et a/.’s 
(2009) hypothesis that attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance 
separately predict specific obsessive-compulsive related beliefs. Further 
research could examine if self-ambivalence mediates the role between 
attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsive related beliefs. This would 
provide evidence for the links between attachment insecurity, self­
ambivalence and obsessions and compulsions and would further show the 
relationships between these factors and appraisal styles, which have been 
assumed in this study.
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4.1.3 Shame, self-compassion and obsessive-compulsiveness
The results support the hypothesis that shame and self-compassion are 
related to obsessive-compulsiveness. The variable with the second highest 
positive correlation with obsessive-compulsiveness was shame. Self­
compassion was negatively correlated with obsessive-compulsiveness.
The results support the findings of a number of empirical studies such as 
Valentiner and Smith (2008) who proposed that shame prone individuals 
may be motivated to respond to obsessional thoughts which activate shame 
experiences by completing compulsive behaviour. It also supports the 
findings of Fergus et a l (2010) who found that shame-proneness was linked 
to levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. These results also support Noie et 
aVs  (2010) finding that shame schemas are related to higher levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness.
The strong negative correlation between self-compassion and obsessive- 
compulsiveness supports Gilbert’s (2009) theory that self-compassion has a 
role in the ability to accept and let go of unpleasant experiences. When a 
person experiences high levels of obsessions and compulsions they are 
troubled by persisted intrusive thoughts and complete compulsions in order 
to neutralise their distress. However, compulsions lead to short-term relief 
but also maintain the obsessional thoughts. By accepting and letting go of 
intrusive thoughts this cycle of obsessions and compulsions should reduce. 
Shame and self-compassion were also negatively correlated which also 
supports Gilbert’s (2009) theory that shame and self-compassion represent 
polar opposite experiences and relationship with the self. Within this theory, 
high levels of shame make it more difficult to make adaptive appraisals of 
intrusive thoughts which, in turn leads to them being perceived as 
threatening. Furthermore, a disparity develops between individual’s self- 
concept, or their perceptions of their undesired self and their idealised self. 
This difference between what people feel they are and what they want to be 
leads to higher levels of shame. As discussed previously this theory is 
similar to Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) in that it suggests that the difference
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between denigratory and ideal self-concepts underpins obsessive- 
compulsiveness.
It is perhaps not surprising therefore, that there was a strong positive 
correlation between self-ambivalence and shame. Furthermore, the results 
from the regression analysis showed that self-ambivalence had a stronger 
relationship with obsessive-compulsiveness than shame and self­
compassion. When this is combined with the evidence that shame is highly 
correlated with self-ambivalence and that it was only a marginally 
significant predictor of obsessive-compulsiveness beyond self-ambivalence, 
it suggests that shame is one aspect of self-ambivalence. This further 
supports Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) theory that people with high levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness, believe that they are fundamentally flawed but 
that there are perfect solutions to life’s problems, which leads to strong 
contradictory beliefs about the self. In this theory shame is represented by 
the belief that the self is fundamentally flawed. It would follow that in 
contrast to shame, self-compassion which represents the polar opposite 
relationship with the self, would be negatively correlated with obsessive- 
compulsiveness, self-ambivalence and shame. Therefore much of the 
variance in this model is accounted for by self-ambivalence, which can be 
seen as a concept which underpins obsessive-compulsiveness and 
incorporates shame both of which represent the opposite self-concept to 
self-compassion. Self-compassion requires an integrated sense of self and 
the ability to accept and let go of experiences such as intrusive thoughts 
(Gilbert, 2009).
The results of the regression analysis do not support the proposal of 
Rachman (2001) that depression mediates the relationship between negative 
views about oneself and obsessive-compulsiveness. The results showed that 
self-ambivalence had a significant relationship and large effect on 
obsessive-compulsiveness even when controlling for depression. This is an 
important finding because it suggests that self-ambivalence has an important 
relationship with obsessive-compulsiveness and is not merely the bi-product 
of the relationship between depression and obsessive-compulsiveness.
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4.1.4 Towards an integrated psychological model of obsessions
and compulsions
There were moderate to large correlations between all of the self-concept 
predictor variables. The strong relationships between the self-concept 
factors measured in this study are further evidence of the convergence of 
theories from different psychological perspectives that indicate high levels 
of obsessive-compulsiveness are characterised by an ambivalent and 
morally sensitive sense of self. Kempke and Luyten (2007) suggested that 
there is converging opinion between cognitive behavioural and object 
relations approaches regarding the role of self-ambivalence in obsessive- 
compulsiveness They point out that both these perspectives propose that 
maladaptive representations of self and other predispose people to high 
levels of obsessive-compulsiveness.
Based on Bowlby’s (1988) work, Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) argued that 
attachment theory is a framework not only for understanding peoples’ 
relational bonds and sense of security but also for understanding affect 
regulation. They proposed a link between attachment insecurity, self- 
concept and affect regulation. They have suggested that a person’s 
attachment experiences determine if they activate or deactivate attachment 
behaviour; that is, whether they search for support (attachment anxiety) or 
withdraw from others (attachment avoidance) when they experience 
distress. These experiences are proposed to be fundamental to the 
development of an individual’s self-concept (e.g. as someone who is 
worthwhile), how they perceive significant others (e.g. whether others are 
available) and whether they feel confident in their ability to manage distress. 
In support of these proposals, the current study has provided evidence of a 
relationship between attachment insecurity and self-ambivalence. More 
specifically, it has been shown that higher levels attachment insecurity are 
associated with higher levels of self-ambivalence although the causal 
direction between these variables cannot be demonstrated. Furthermore, in 
this study, self-ambivalence has been shown to partially mediate the 
relationship between attachment insecurity and obsessive-compulsiveness.
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Despite the various limitations of this study, this research provides support 
for a potential developmental path for obsessive-compulsiveness. People 
who develop high levels of attachment insecurity, including high levels of 
attachment anxiety and avoidance, may develop contradictory beliefs about 
themselves and low levels of self-compassion. Therefore, when intrusive 
thoughts occur, the individual’s self-concept system predisposes them to 
respond to intrusive thoughts in a threatening way. Doron et a l (2009) give 
the example that an anxiously attached person might perceive their moral 
transgressions to mean that other people will not love them. Therefore, 
people who have high attachment anxiety are likely to appraise intrusive 
thoughts about their own morality as more threatening and will be highly 
motivated to neutralise these thoughts by using compulsions.
The results of the current study have shown that several measures of self- 
concept are related to levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. In order to 
integrate theoretical concepts such as self-ambivalence, attachment 
insecurity, shame and self-compassion into models of obsessive- 
compulsiveness it is necessary to have a model of the human mind which 
includes multiple motivational and affective structures. Guidano and Liotti’s 
(1983) theory suggests that it is the contradictory feelings between different 
self-concepts which leads to high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Therefore, inherent in this theory is the notion that multiple self-concepts, 
exist simultaneously. Gilbert’s (2009) model suggests that the disparity 
between ideal and non-ideal self-states is responsible for experiences of 
shame. Integrating these models into our understanding of obsessive- 
compulsiveness may mean a departure from cognitive behavioural models 
which describe how thoughts, appraisals and beliefs function on a micro- 
psychological level but do not make inferences about the underpinning 
macro-psychological processes.
4.2 Clinical implications
The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (Now known as National 
Institute for Health and Care, 2005) guidelines suggest that Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is the psychological intervention of choice for
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OCD. There is evidence that cognitive elements of this approach contribute 
less to successful recovery than behavioural elements, specifically Exposure 
Response Prevention (ERF) programmes (Clark, 2005). Some have argued 
that behavioural elements are important because they lead to people with 
high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness changing their beliefs in response 
to exposure and habituation (Clark, 2005). Nonetheless, it appears that the 
current cognitive aspects of CBT may contribute little to the success of 
these interventions for some people. Therefore, more effective 
psychological interventions need to be developed. Moreover, it has also 
been found that thirty per cent of people who have a diagnosis of OCD 
refuse behavioural therapy (Emmelkamp & Foa, 1983) and forty per cent of 
those who start behavioural therapy do not complete the intervention 
(Kozak, Liebowitz, & Foa, 2000). Therefore, other forms of psychological 
intervention need to be developed for those people who do not access ERR 
or CBT. A large proportion of people experience high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness relapse after psychological interventions (Baer & 
Minichiello, 1998; Cottraux, Bouvard & Milliery, 2005), which suggests 
that there may be some psychological phenomena that are not being 
addressed by CBT approaches. This again means that it is important that 
psychological approaches to obsessive-compulsive phenomena need to be 
further developed. Furthermore, people who complete ERR based 
interventions often experience residual symptoms (Abramowitz, 1998). 
Therefore, there appear to be some aspects of the obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena which are not addressed by ERR approaches. This research has 
provided evidence of the other psychological concepts involved in 
obsessions and compulsions. These concepts could provide the basis for 
future interventions.
Guidano and Liotti (1983) state that behavioural interventions lead only to 
superficial change and that substantive change is only possible by 
interventions which challenge the deeper cognitive affective structures 
related to obsessive-compulsive phenomena. However, the authors suggest 
few therapeutic strategies which deliver this change. Further developing our 
understanding of the psychological processes involved in obsessions and
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compulsions would appear to be a good first step in developing therapeutic 
interventions. Cognitive approaches explore the micro psychological 
processes: the intrusions, appraisals and beliefs but do not take into account 
broader, unifying macro psychological sense of self dynamics. This 
research suggests that there are some self-concept factors such as self­
ambivalence, attachment insecurity, shame and self-compassion which have 
strong relationships with obsessive-compulsiveness and may underpin these 
phenomena. Developing and delivering interventions which lower levels of 
self-ambivalence, insecure attachment, shame and increase levels of self­
compassion may lead to more effective interventions. Intervening at this 
level beyond the surface level of beliefs and appraisals may lead to more 
accessible and effective interventions which could lead to less residual 
symptoms and distress.
Sookman and Steketee (2007) have developed approaches specifically for 
individuals who do not access ERP or CBT. These interventions are 
informed by the work of Guidano and Liotti (1983), the OCCWG (2007), 
and Bowlby (1988), and include a focus on schema, obsessive-compulsive 
related beliefs and behavioural experiments to test these beliefs. Sookman 
and Steketee (2007) propose that early attachment experiences lead to the 
development of obsessive-compulsive related schema which predispose 
individuals to make excessive threat appraisals. The authors present two 
case illustrations of how this new intervention worked. Further research 
showing the efficacy of these newly developed treatments for obsessions 
and compulsions is necessary. Interestingly, Sookman and Steketee (2007) 
recommend that tailored formulations for each individual’s emotional 
experiences are essential to ensure successful interventions. These 
formulations could take into account both the micro (appraisals) and macro 
(self-concept) psychological processes. Making these interventions more 
widely available could lead to lower rates of relapse, although further 
research would be necessary to establish this. It is unclear whether self­
ambivalence decreases using Sookman and Steketee’s (2007) interventions 
and future research might focus on this. A limitation of the current study is 
that the role of obsessive-compulsive related beliefs in obsessive­
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compulsiveness has not been examined. Further research into the 
relationships between belief domains, self-concept factors and levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness would provide further evidence for Sookman and 
Steketee’s (2007) theory.
The high correlation between self-ambivalence and self-compassion may 
suggest that mindfulness or self-compassion based interventions may 
decrease self-ambivalence. This would involve facilitating people’s 
development of a kinder, mindful and forgiving sense of self, which could 
help people with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. However, this is 
correlational data in a cross sectional study and further evidence is 
necessary to support this hypothesis. Gilbert (2009) suggests that 
developing a compassionate mind and changing the relationships that people 
have with their thoughts can achieve higher levels of psychological well­
being. Compassionate Mind therapy involves cultivating mindfulness, 
compassionate thinking and self-soothing strategies with the aim of 
developing self-compassion and reducing self-criticism. There is some 
evidence that similar mindfulness based approaches such as Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (Luoma, Hayes and Walser, 2007) are effective in 
treating people with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness (Twohig et a l, 
2010). Further research into the effectiveness of Compassionate Mind and 
other mindfulness based cognitive therapies for obsessions and compulsions 
is necessary.
Attachment insecurity is also not a factor which CBT directly addresses. 
Helping people with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness to develop 
secure attachments with therapists and other people in their lives is likely to 
decrease levels of these phenomena. Mikulincer et a l (2003) suggested that 
the main aim of therapy should be to facilitate a greater sense of attachment 
security and more effective emotional regulation strategies. They suggested 
that therapeutic interventions should be tailored to people’s attachment 
orientations. They argue that people with anxious or hyper-activating 
attachment strategies should be helped to improve self-regulation of their 
emotions and address fears of helplessness and isolation. They argue that 
people with avoidant or de-activating attachment styles should be
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encouraged to activate attachment relationships to help them manage 
distress and help them to experience their emotions. They have suggested 
that such therapies are likely to increase hope, improve coping skills and 
help people to have meaningful relationships. Understanding people’s 
attachment orientations might be important for people who seek help for 
high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness. Both anxious and avoidant 
attachment styles appear to have a relationship with obsessive- 
compulsiveness. Clinicians who assess and make formulations about how 
these concepts are related to people’s self-concepts and affect regulation 
could be more successful than those clinicians who do not take these 
concepts into consideration.
Norcross (2002) suggests that the therapeutic relationship is the most 
important factor in predicting the success of psychological therapies. In a 
review of the literature examining the impact of the therapeutic relationship 
in psychological therapies, he concludes that there is overwhelming 
evidence that measures of the therapeutic relationship consistently correlate 
with client outcome above the effects of therapeutic techniques. Therefore, 
therapists who are able to understand and adapt to their client’s attachment 
orientations may be more able to provide a more effective therapeutic 
relationship. Norcross suggests that Rogers’ (1951) emphasis on warmth, 
congruence and empathy are vital to the development of the therapeutic 
relationship and should be utilised in all forms of psychological therapy. 
Therefore, providing clients with a secure base and attachment relationship 
may be the factor which ultimately helps them to manage their 
psychological distress.
Gilbert and Leahy (2007) suggested that the therapeutic relationship is 
integral to the success of CBT. They propose a more integrated approach to 
therapy and a focus on the therapeutic relationship. The authors refer to 
Schore’s (2001) work showing the impact of attachment experiences and 
trauma on psychological problems. The authors suggested that cognitive- 
behavioural therapists should develop micro skills to improve attentiveness 
and the empathie connection between therapist and client so a shared 
understanding of the client’s difficulties is possible.
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4.3 Limitations and further research
This study used self-report questionnaires to measure psychological 
concepts. There are inherent weaknesses to this approach as well as specific 
limitations to particular measures. Self-report questionnaires can be affected 
by social desirability biases where people respond in ways which they 
perceive are more socially acceptable. Furthermore, the participants were 
volunteers and it is unclear whether there were sections of the community 
that could not or chose not to complete this study. For example, this was an 
internet based survey and people without access to the internet would not 
have been able to access it. Moreover, most of the participants accessed the 
online survey fi*om a Twitter account which encouraged people to complete 
the questionnaire. People who do not use Twitter, or who did not access the 
other websites the survey was advertised on were unlikely to be aware of it. 
There were a large number of participants who accessed the research who 
were not from the UK. It is unclear if and how this might have affected the 
results. There is evidence that twenty two per cent of twitter users have a 
degree and that twenty five per cent earn more than fifty thousand pounds 
(Ball, 2011), which suggests that people of a higher social-economic status 
are more likely to engage in this media. The sample fi*om the current study 
includes a large proportion of people whose highest level of formal 
education was an undergraduate degree (32.2%) or postgraduate degree 
(34.7%). This shows that people who were highly educated were over 
represented in this sample.
This study aimed to collect data with a broad range of obsessive- 
compulsiveness. Whilst people with self-defined problematic levels of 
obsessions and compulsions were enthusiastic to be involved in this 
research, it was relatively difficult to recruit participants with low levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness. It was expected that there would be the exact 
opposite problem; that people with high levels of obsessive-compulsiveness 
would be difficult to recruit. Therefore, compared with the general 
population where between one to three per cent of people have high levels 
of obsessive-compulsiveness, this sample had a much larger proportion of 
people with these difficulties. This could have implications on the findings.
174
Year 1 6154080
However, significant and strong relationships between the predictor and 
outcome variables were consistently found.
This study used a cross sectional design and, as with all cross-sectional 
studies, it is not possible to make distinctions about causal relationships 
between variables. Therefore, it is possible that other factors which have not 
been measured could be responsible for the relationships between the 
variables that were measured. Further research into the role of self-concept 
in obsessive-compulsiveness using experimental designs would further 
clarify the relationships between these factors. Experimental research in 
this area would help support these theoretical hypotheses. These studies can 
be designed so variables can be manipulated and cause and effect can be 
established. This requires the difficult task of operationalizing variables 
such as obsessive-compulsiveness, self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, 
shame and self-compassion. Further challenges include manipulating self- 
concept variables to examine their effect on obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena and doing this in an ecologically valid yet ethical way.
Further research examining how self-concept factors change before, during 
and after psychological interventions would be beneficial. It would be 
important to establish if these factors change due to such interventions 
before further suggesting that they are implemented more widely. Based on 
the results of this study, interventions which specifically target self­
ambivalence may have an impact on obsessive-compulsiveness. However, 
there is limited empirical support for this hypothesis and further research is 
necessary to support these predictions.
The measurement of attachment insecurity using the Experience in Close 
Relationships-Revised Scale is dependent on some important assumptions. 
For example, that people have an accurate interpretation of their 
relationships and how they utilise them when distressed. Although it could 
be argued that people’s perception of their relationships is as important as 
their actual relationships. A further assumption is that attachment insecurity 
is generally stable from childhood to adulthood. Therefore, it would be 
advantageous to have evidence that attachment insecurity and obsessive­
175
Year 1 6154080
compulsiveness are related from other research methods not solely self- 
report questionnaires. Hesse (1999) suggests that the Adult Attachment 
Interview (George, Kaplan & Main, 1984) is the gold standard tool for 
assessing attachment insecurity, however this lengthy interview is not well 
suited to large empirical studies. A large group of researchers with ample 
resources would be necessary to complete such a study. It would also need 
to be adapted for online questionnaires.
Integrating psychological theories of attachment, self-concept and cognition 
is likely to be beneficial for numerous psychological problems. Theorists 
such as Guidano and Liotti (1983), Sookman and Steketee (2007) and 
Mikulincer et a l (2003) have attempted to integrate psychological concepts 
from different approaches into an overarching model of obsessions and 
compulsions. Attachment insecurity appears to underpin most mental health 
problems. The impact on attachment insecurity on people’s sense of 
themselves and others is well documented. Therefore, the current evidence 
suggests that these theories are plausible but further evidence is necessary to 
show that it specifically applies to obsessive-compulsiveness. Further 
refinement of these theories and the development of these models into 
therapeutic frameworks for assessment, formulation and intervention are 
likely to be beneficial for clinicians and service users. Completing further 
research into the self-concepts which are related to other psychological 
problems is likely to lead to improve of our understanding for those 
problems and potentially lead to more effective interventions.
4.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, a person’s sense of self appears to be important in obsessive- 
compulsive phenomena. A self-ambivalent self-concept appears to be 
particularly strongly associated with high levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness. Furthermore, self-ambivalence partially mediates the 
relationship between attachment insecurity and levels of obsessive- 
compulsiveness, which suggests that attachment insecurity is related to 
obsessive-compulsiveness though self-ambivalence. Shame and self­
compassion have strong relationships with obsessive-compulsiveness. The
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strong relationships between these self-concept factors suggests that they 
share much in common. A more sophisticated model of obsessive- 
compulsiveness which incorporates self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, 
shame and self-compassion may help clinicians to work with this 
population. Interventions which facilitate change in people’s sense of self 
should be developed and evaluated. Such approaches could decrease levels 
of self-ambivalence, attachment insecurity, shame and self-compassion and 
lead to lower levels of relapse, drop out and residual problems.
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6.0 Appendices
6.1 Study information webpage
@ Participant Information Sheet 
Sense of Self and Obsessions and Compulsions SURREY
Introduction
My name is Joshua Nice and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of Surrey 
currently studying a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology.
I would like to invite you to take part In a research project. Before you decide you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. Please take the time to 
read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you vdsh.
What is the purpose of the study?
The purpose of this study is to investigate how obsessions and compulsions relate to different 
aspects of a person's thoughts and feelings. Obsessions are thoughts about a particular subject 
that you might find difficult to stop thinking about. Compulsions are acts that you feel compelled to 
complete. Tliis study will involve answering questions on tiiese concepts including questions about 
your relationships with other people, how you see yourself and your emotions, moods and feelings.
Why have I been invited to  take part in the study?
Because you are a member of the public or have seen this through an OCD related website. We are 
hoping to have participants who experience varying degrees of obsessions and compulsions, from 
obsessions and compulsions that people generally experience to those that can affect our dally 
lives.
Do I have to  take part?
No, you do not have to participate. If you are a student, there will be no adverse consequences on 
your studies, your university assessment or class of degree. If you decide not to participate you œ n 
withdraw a t any time without giving a reason. If you decide in the next month that you would like 
to withdraw your results please contact me on the details provided.
What will happen to me if I take part?
You will be asked to complete an online questionnaire which will take about 20-25 minutes but it 
may take some people longer than this to œmplete it.
What will I have to do?
If you would like to take part please complete the questionnaire by clicking yes I agree and 
continue a t the bottom of this page.
What are idie possible disadvantages or risks of taking part?
This study asks questions about how you understand yourself and your relationships with others 
and any obsessions and compulsions you may or may not experience. If you feet unhappy about 
answering such questions please discontinue your participation in this study. Please contact us if 
you would like us to remove any questions you have answered from our data.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
It is unlikely that you will personally benefit from the results of this study. It is hoped that a 
greater understanding of obsessions and compulsions vdll be gained. This further understanding will 
be used to consider new ways of helping people whose obsessions and compulsions affect their 
daily lives.
What if there is a problem?
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course 
of the study will be addressed; please contact Joshua Nice, Department of Psychology, Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology, University of Surrey, GU2 7XH or Dr Laura Simonds, Department of Psychology,
University of Surrey, GU2 7XH.
Will my taking pait in the study be kept confidential?
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports from the 
research will not knov^ r who has contributed to it.
Data will be stored securely in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
Contact deteils of researcher and, where appropriate supervisor?
Researcher: Joshua Nice: 
e-mail l.nice@surrev.ac.uk
Supervised by: Dr Laura Simonds: 
e-mail I .simonds@surrey.ac. uk 
phone: 01483 685936
Please feel free to contact the above named people for any questions you may have before or after 
completing the study
Who has reviewed the project?
The study has been reviewed and received a favourable opinion from the University of Surrey 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee.
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6.2 Consent form webpage 
Consent form
Sense of Self and Obsessions and Compulsions
I voluntarily agree to take part in the study.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full explanation by 
the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the study, and of what I will 
be expected to do. I have been advised about any discomfort and possible iil-effects on my health 
and well-being which may result. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects 
of the study and have understood the advice and information given as a result.
I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during the study and to co-operate fully with the 
investigators. I shall Inform them immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind in my health 
or well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to justify my 
decision and without prejudice.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to comply with the 
instructions and restrictions of the study.
Do you agree to go on? 
iconssnt=ll..r: "Yes
lcon s8n t= 2i
jyobj
Year of birth
j in itia!!
Please enter your initials
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6.3 Demographic information
Please complete the following questionnaires. Please read the instructions for each set and answer 
as accurately as possible. Please try and complete all the questions. Thank you.
: gender;
Gender:
5gender= l| Female 
^#^Male
iagej
Age:
years
■ethnidtyr
What ethnicity do you consider yourself to be? 
White British
White Irish
|fithn!{^=3f ;ethnid^_3_^^
0  White O therP^
White and Black Carribbean 
- - f t W h i t e  and Black African 
white and Asian
;€thnidty=7; ;ethnicity_7_other;
V  Mixed Other I
Sethniaty=81 Indian
iethnidty=9i .
' " ' * *  Pakistani
iethnidty=10i , . . .Bangladeshi
le th n id ty = ll; :ethnidty_ll_oti>er[
W Asian Other
Black or Black British Caribbean 
Black or Black British African
îethnidty=14î jethnidty_14_o!Jier;
(J Black or Black British Other [
je th n id ty -lS ;
tethnidty=16î îethnicîtY_16_otherî
W other f ............
192
Year 1 6154080
I e d u c a t io n :
What is your iilghest level of education? 
fijo formal qualifications
GCSEs/O-Levels/NVQ/Equlvaient 
i  A-Leve!s/Equivafent
"'v V"" ”  Undergraduate Degree
!education=5; _
Postgraduate Degree
i S tu d e n t :
Are you a student? 
i student” I i
:Student=2;
- 0 - " °
jpsystudentj
Are you a psydiology student?
• psystudent” ! ;
— —  Yes
!psystudent=2:—— -----  No
idagmhpi
Do you have a diagnosis of a mental health problem?
idiagrnhp-lj
|diagmhp=2;
: d i a g o c d :
Do you have a diagnosis of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD)?
|d l a g o c d = i :
; d ia g o c d = 2 ;
Yes
No
;COnOCd;
Do you consider yourself to have OCD?
Yes
; c o n o c d = 2 |
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6.4 Measures
6.4.1 Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision
The following statements refer to thoughts and behaviours which may occur 
to everyone in everyday life. For each statement, choose the reply which 
best seems to fit you and the degree of disturbance which such thoughts or 
behaviours may create.
Not at A little Quite a A lot Very 
_______________________ aU______________ lot____________ much
1 1 feel my hands are 0 1 2 3 4
dirty when 1 touch
money.
2 1 think even slight 0 1 2 3 4
contact with bodily
secretions
(perspiration, saliva 
urine, etc.) may 
contaminate my 
clothes or somehow 
harm me.
3 1 find it difficult to 0 1 2 3 4
touch an object when 1
know it has been 
touched by strangers 
or by certain people.
4 1 find it difficult to 0 1 2 3 4
touch garbage or dirty
things.
5 1 avoid using public 0 1 2 3 4
toilets because 1 am
afi-aid of disease and 
contamination.
6 1 avoid using public 0 1 2 3 4
telephones because I
am afi-aid of contagion 
and disease.
7 I wash my hands more 0 1 2 3 4
often and longer than
necessary.
8 I sometimes have to 0 1 2 3 4
wash or clean myself
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simply because I think 
I may be dirty or 
“contaminated”.
9 If I touch something I 0
think is
“contaminated”, I 
immediately have to 
wash or clean myself.
10 If an animal touches 0 
me, I feel dirty and 
immediately have to
wash myself or change 
my clothing.
11 I feel obliged to 0
follow a particular
order in dressing, 
undressing, and 
washing myself.
12 Before going to sleep, 0 
I have to do certain
things in a certain 
order.
13 Before going to bed, I 0
have to hang up or
fold my clothes in a 
special way.
14 I have to do things 0
several times before I 
think they are properly 
done.
15 I tend to keep on 0
checking things more
often than necessary.
16 I check and recheck 0
gas and water taps and
light switches after 
turning them off.
17 I return home to check 0 1 2 3 4
doors, windows,
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drawers, etc., to make 
sure they are properly 
shut.
18 I keep on checking 
forms, documents, 
checks, etc., in detail 
to make sure I have 
filled them in 
correctly.
19 I keep on going back 
to see that matches, 
cigarettes, etc, are 
properly extinguished.
20 When I handle money, 
I count and recount it 
several times.
21 I check letters 
carefully many times 
before posting them.
22 Sometimes I am not 
sure I have done 
things which in fact I 
knew I have done.
23 When I read, I have 
the impression I have 
missed something 
important and must go 
back and reread the 
passage at least two or 
three times.
24 I imagine catastrophic 
consequences as a 
result of absent- 
mindedness or minor 
errors which I make.
25 I think or worry at 0
length about having 
hurt someone without
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knowing it.
26 When I hear about a 0 
disaster, I think it is 
somehow my fault.
27 I sometimes worry at 0
length for no reason
that I have hurt myself 
or have some disease.
28 I get upset and 0
worried at the sight of 
knives, daggers, and
other pointed objects.
29 When I hear about a 0
suicide or a crime, I
am upset for a long 
time and find it 
difficult to stop 
thinking about it.
30 I invent useless 0
worries about germs
and disease.
31 When I look down 0
from a bridge or a
very high window, I 
feel an impulse to 
throw myself into 
space.
32 When I see a train 0
approaching, I 
sometimes think I
could throw myself 
under its wheels.
33 At certain moments, I 0
am tempted to tear off
my clothes in public.
34 While driving, I 
sometimes feel an 
impulse to drive the 
car into someone or
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something.
35 Seeing weapons 0 1 2 3 4
excites me and makes
me think violent 
thoughts.
36 I sometimes feel the 0 1 2 3 4
need to break or
damage things for no 
reason.
37 I sometimes have an 0 1 2 3 4
impulse to steal other
people’s belongings, 
even if they are of no 
use to me.
38 I am sometimes 0 1 2 3 4
almost irresistibly
tempted to steal 
something from the 
supermarket.
39 I sometimes have an 0 1 2 3 4
impulse to hurt
defenceless children 
or animals.
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6.4.2 Self-ambivalence Measure
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the scale beside 
each statement.
Not at Agree a Agree Agree a Agree 
all little moderately lot totally
1 I feel tom 0 1 2 3 4
between different
parts of my 
personality
2 I tend to move 0 1 2 3 4
from one extreme
to the other in 
how I think about 
myself
3 I question the 0 1 2 3 4
extent to which
others want to be 
close to me
4 I have mixed 0 1 2 3 4
feelings about
my self-worth
5 I feel that I am 0 1 2 3 4
full of
contradictions
6 I think about my 0 1 2 3 4
worth as a person
7 I am constantly 0 1 2 3 4
aware of how
others perceive 
me
8 I doubt whether 0 1 2 3 4
others really like
me
9 I fear I am 0 1 2 3 4
capable of doing
something
terrible
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10 I constantly 0 1 2 3 4
worry about
whether I will 
make anything of 
my life
11 I am secure in 0 1 2 3 4
my sense of self-
worth (reversed)
12 I think about how 0 1 2 3 4
I can improve
myself
13 When I am with 0 1 2 3 4
others, I think
about whether I 
look my best
14 I am mindful 0 1 2 3 4
about how I
come across to 
others
15 I am constantly 0 1 2 3 4
worried about
whether I am a 
good or bad 
person
16 I question 0 1 2 3 4
whether I am a
moral person
17 I tend to think of 0 1 2 3 4
myself in terms
of categories 
such as “good” or 
“bad”
18 I question 0 1 2 3 4
whether I am
morally a good or 
bad person
19 I am constantly 
concerned about
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whether I am a 
“decent” human 
being
20 If I inadvertently 0 1 2 3 4
allow harm to
come to others, 
this proves I am 
untrustworthy
21 Essentially 0 1 2 3 4
people like you
or they don’t; 
there is no 
middle ground
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6.4.3 Experience of Close Relationships Scale (ECR-R)
The statements below concern how you feel in emotionally intimate 
relationships. We are interested in how you generally experience 
relationships, not just in what is happening in a current relationship. If you
have not been in an intimate relationship, please answer the questions in 
relation to how you think you would feel. Respond to each statement by 
choosing the number to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
statement.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree
1 I'm afraid that I will lose my 
partner's love.
2 I often worry that my partner will 
not want to stay with me.
3 I often worry that my partner 
doesn't really love me.
4 I worry that romantic partners 
won’t care about me as much as I 
care about them.
5 I often wish that my partner's 
feelings for me were as strong as 
my feelings for him or her.
6 I worry a lot about my 
relationships.
7 When my partner is out of sight, I 
worry that he or she might become 
interested in someone else.
8 When I show my feelings for 
romantic partners. I'm afraid they 
will not feel the same about me.
9 I rarely worry about my partner 
leaving me. (reversed)
10 My romantic partner makes me 
doubt myself.
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
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11 I do not often worry about being 
abandoned.
(reversed)
12 I find that my partner(s) don't want 
to get as close as I would like.
13 Sometimes romantic partners 
change their feelings about me for 
no apparent reason.
14 My desire to be very close 
sometimes scares people away.
15 I'm afraid that once a romantic 
partner gets to know me, he or she 
won't like who I really am.
16 It makes me mad that I don't get 
the affection and support I need 
from my partner.
17 I worry that I won't measure up to 
other people.
18 My partner only seems to notice 
me when I’m angry.
19 I prefer not to show a partner how 
I feel deep down.
20 I feel comfortable sharing my 
private thoughts and feelings with 
my partner.
21 I find it difficult to allow myself to 
depend on romantic partners.
22 I am very comfortable being close 
to romantic partners.
23 I don't feel comfortable opening 
up to romantic partners.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
24 I prefer not to be too close to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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romantic partners.
25 I get uncomfortable when a 
romantic partner wants to be very 
close.
26 I find it relatively easy to get close 
to my partner.
27 If s not difficult for me to get close 
to my partner.
28 I usually discuss my problems and 
concerns with my partner.
29 It helps to turn to my romantic 
partner in times of need.
30 I tell my partner just about 
everything.
31 I talk things over with my partner.
32 I am nervous when partners get 
too close to me.
33 I feel comfortable depending on 
romantic partners.
34 I find it easy to depend on 
romantic partners.
35 If s easy for me to be affectionate 
with my partner.
3 6 My partner really understands me 
and my needs.
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
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6.4.4 Experience of Shame Scale
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the scale beside 
each statement.
Not at A little Moderately Very much
______________________aU____________________________________
Have you felt 1 2  3 4
ashamed of any of 
your personal 
habits?
Have you worried 1 2  3 4
about what other
people think of any
of your personal
habits?
Have you tried to 1 2  3 4
cover up or conceal 
any of your 
personal habits?
Have you felt 1 2 3 4
ashamed of your 
manner with 
others?
Have you worried 1 2  3 4
about what other
people think of
your manner with
others?
Have you avoided 
people because of 
your manner?
Have you felt 
ashamed of the sort 
of person you are?
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Have you worried 1 2  3 4
about what other
people think of the 
sort of person you 
are?
9 Have you tried to 
conceal from others 
the sort of person 
you are?
10 Have you felt 
ashamed of your 
ability to do things?
11 Have you worried 
about what other 
people think of 
your ability to do 
things?
12 Have you avoided 
people because of 
your inability to do 
things?
13 Do you feel 
ashamed when you 
do something 
wrong?
14 Have you worried 
about what other 
people think of you 
when you do 
something wrong?
15 Have you tried to 
cover up or conceal 
things you felt 
ashamed of having 
done?
16 Have you felt 
ashamed when you 
said something 
stupid?
17 Have you worried 1 2 3 4
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about what other 
people think of you 
when you said 
something stupid
18 Have you avoided 
contact with 
anyone who knew 
you said something 
stupid?
19 Have you felt 
ashamed when you 
failed in a 
competitive 
situation?
20 Have you worried 
about what other 
people think of you 
when you failed in 
a competitive 
situation?
21 Have you avoided 
people who have 
seen you fail?
22 Have you felt 
ashamed of your 
body or any part of 
it?
23 Have you worried 
about what other 
people think of 
your appearance?
24 Have you avoided 
looking at yourself 
in the mirror?
25 Have you wanted 
to hide or conceal 
your body or any 
part of it?
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6.4.5 Self-compassion Scale (SCS)
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Beside each item, 
indicate how often you behave in the stated manner.
Almost Almost
never always
1 Fm disapproving 1 2 3 4 5
and judgmental
about my own 
flaws and 
inadequacies.
2 When Fm feeling 1 2 3 4 5
down I tend to
obsess and fixate 
on everything 
that’s wrong.
3 When things are 1 2 3 4 5
going badly for
me, I see the 
difficulties as part 
of life that 
everyone goes 
through.
4 When I think 1 2 3 4 5
about my
inadequacies, it 
tends to make me 
feel more separate 
and cut off from 
the rest of the 
world.
5 I try to be loving 1 2 3 4 5
towards myself
when Fm feeling 
emotional pain.
6 When I fail at 1 2 3 4 5
something
important to me I 
become consumed 
by feelings of 
inadequacy.
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7 When I'm down 
and out, I remind 
myself that there 
are lots of other 
people in the 
world feeling like 
I am.
8 When times are 
really difficult, I 
tend to be tough 
on myself.
9 When something 
upsets me I try to 
keep my emotions 
in balance.
10 When I feel 
inadequate in 
some way, I try to 
remind myself 
that feelings of 
inadequacy are 
shared by most 
people.
11 I’m intolerant and 
impatient towards 
those aspects of 
my personality I 
don't like.
12 When I’m going 
through a very 
hard time, I give 
myself the caring 
and tenderness I 
need.
13 When I’m feeling 
down, I tend to 
feel like most 
other people are 
probably happier 
than I am.
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14 When something 
painful happens I 
try to take a 
balanced view of 
the situation.
15 I try to see my 
failings as part of 
the human 
condition.
16 When I see 
aspects of myself 
that I don’t like, I 
get down on 
myself.
17 When I fail at 
something 
important to me I 
try to keep things 
in perspective.
18 When I’m really 
struggling, I tend 
to feel like other 
people must be 
having an easier 
time of IT
19 I’m kind to 
myself when I’m 
experiencing 
suffering.
20 When something 
upsets me I get 
carried away with 
my feelings.
21 I can be a bit 
cold-hearted 
towards myself 
when I'm 
experiencing 
suffering.
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22 When I'm feeling 1 2 3 4 5
down I try to
approach my 
feelings with 
curiosity and 
openness.
23 I’m tolerant of my 1 2 3 4 5
own flaws and
inadequacies.
24 When something 1 2 3 4 5
painful happens I
tend to blow the 
incident out of 
proportion.
25 When I fail at 1 2 3 4 5
something that's
important to me, I 
tend to feel alone 
in my failure.
26 I try to be 1 2 3 4 5
understanding and
patient towards 
those aspects of 
my personality I 
don't like.
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6.4.6 Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21)
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Beside each item, 
indicate how often you behave in the stated manner.
Did 
not 
apply 
to me 
at all
Applied 
to me to 
some 
degree, 
or some 
of the 
time
Applied to me 
to a 
considerable 
degree, or a 
good part of 
the time
Applied 
to me 
very 
much, or 
most of 
the time
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
1 I found it hard to 
wind down
2 I was aware of 
dryness of my 
mouth
3 I couldn't seem to 
experience any 
positive feeling at 
all
4 I experienced 
breathing 
difficulty (eg, 
excessively rapid 
breathing, 
breathlessness in 
the absence of 
physical exertion)
5 I found it difficult 
to work up the 
initiative to do 
things
6 I tended to over­
react to situations
7 I experienced 
trembling (eg, in 
the hands)
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8 I felt that I was 0 1 2 3
using a lot of
nervous energy
9 I was worried 0 1 2 3
about situations in
which I might 
panic and make a 
fool of myself
10 I felt that I had 0 1 2 3
nothing to look
forward to
11 I found myself 0 1 2 3
getting agitated
12 I found it difficult 0 1 2 3
to relax
13 I felt down- 0 1 2 3
hearted and blue
14 I was intolerant of 0 1 2 3
anything that kept
me from getting 
on with what I 
was doing
15 I felt I was close 0 1 2 3
to panic
16 I was unable to 0 1 2 3
become
enthusiastic about 
anything
17 I felt I wasn't 0 1 2 3
worth much as a
person
18 I felt that I was 0 1 2 3
rather touchy
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19 I was aware of the 0 1 2 3
action of my heart
in the absence of 
physical exertion 
(eg, sense of heart 
rate increase, 
heart missing a 
beat)
20 I felt scared 0 1 2 3
without any good
reason
21 I felt that life was 0 1 2 3
meaningless
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6.5 Debrief webpage
0 Thank you for completing this study. u\w.MrYOF
We really appreciate you taking the time to %  SURREY
participate.
If you have any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during 
the course of the study this will be addressed. In this case please contact Joshua Nice,
Department of Psychology, Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, University of Surrey, GU2 7XH or Dr 
Laura Simonds, Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, GU2 7XH.
Below are the contact details of a range of charities and support groups.
General /  Health /  Mental Health
Samaritans 08457 90 90 90 (UK) Website: www.Samaritans.org
Mird Website: vvww.mind.ora.uk 0300 123 3393
NHS Direct Website: www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk 0845 4647
SupportLine Website: www.suDDortline.orq.uk 01708 755 200
Rethink: 0300 5000 927 Website: www.rethink.org
Depression Alliance: Website: www.deDressionalliance.org
CAUi: CALM is The Campaign against Living Miserably, for men aged 15-35. Website: 
www.thecaimzone.net
Sane:0845 767 8000 (daily, 6pm-llpm) email; sanemaii@org.uk Website: www.sane.org.uk 
The Mental Health Foundation: Website: www.mentalhealth.orq.uk 
YoungMinds: 0808 802 5544 Website: www.vounqminds.orq.uk
Obsessions and compulsions 
CCD (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) Action: 0845 390 6232 Website: www.ocdaction.orq.uk 
OCD UK: 0845 120 3778 Website: www.ocduk.org 
CCD Today: Website: www.ocdtodavuk.om 
Stuck in a dcKîrway: Website: www.stuckinadoorwav.org
Your code: t[ssi script]» i[ssi script]»
Retain this code and quote it if you wish to withdraw your results (this can only occur one month 
after you have submitted your answers), this code wiil be kept separately from your data.
@ Thank you for your interest ^  Su M eY
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6.6 Ethics committee documents
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Dr Adrian Coyle
C W n Faculty ^  and tWrnn Sciences E&iks
IWvereity of Surrey
Joshua Nice
Taîaee Cliuical fsychologW 
School of
Un venit) of SwTC)'
FKukyof
Art* «W Human SdemcK
WAaphmMm 
Dïrecby HunwnKaouR*:
F:
wmMWtyac.uk
9* July 2012
Re&mice;?77.P$Y.12
Title of Project: Seose of Self and Obsessmus and CompukioBs 
ThankyoulbryoorsuWMiimofthetdwveprc^ xml.
The Facul^ o f  Arts and Human SciencM E&ics Cmunittee bas now given a J&vowaWc 
i^cal opinkm.
Ifthere ^  am sicmllcan. changes to your put^xml wfûcb requin: further scruA^'. pleas 
contact th., Fucuit) Etlnc  ^Committee before proceeding wiA your PrcgecL
Ymtrs sincerely
T If
Chair
216
Year 1 6154080
Faulty  of Arts and Human Sciences 
EÊics Committee
Chair's Action
Ref:
Name of Student 
Tide of Project
Supervisor 
Date of submission: 
Date of re-submission:
777fSY-12 
JOSHUA NICE
Sense of Self and Obsessions and 
Compulsions
DR LAURA SIMONDS
6™ JUNE 2012
The above Project has been submitted to the FANS Ediics Committee.
A favourable ediical opinion has now been given.
Wo- \  w y Signed: \ J
Dr Adrian Coyle 
Chair
Dated:
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Research log
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions X
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information 
technology and
literature search tools
X
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research 
methods
X
4 Formulating specific research questions X
5 Writing brief research proposals X
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols X
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, 
including issues of
diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
X
8 Obtaining approval fi*om a research ethics committee X
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research X
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research X
11 Collecting data fi*om research participants X
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions X
13 Writing patient information and consent forms X
14 Devising and administering questionnaires X
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings X
16 Setting up a data file X
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS X
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses X
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis X
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis X
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21 Summarising results in figures and tables X
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews X
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative 
methods
X
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses X
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data analysis X
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts X
27 Producing a written report on a research project X
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses X
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals or edited book
X
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice X
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Qualitative research project abstract
The research question this study explored was how people make sense of 
their experiences of listening to live music, examined through the lens of 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Four participants (one 
female and three males), aged between 20 and 35 were selected purposively 
to explore how adults make sense of the experience of listening to live 
music in relation to issues of emotional modulation, influence of subculture 
and effects of shared experience. Data was collected through the use of a 
semi-structured interview and later analysed using IPA. An IP A approach 
was chosen based on the epistemological position of the research question 
such that this study was specifically interested in how experiences are 
understood and made sense of. Three superordinate themes emerged fi*om 
the data, which concerned three types of experience, 1) the personal 
experience of listening to live music; 2) the interpersonal experience in 
terms of sharing the experience with friends and family; 3) the shared 
experience of being part of a crowd and how this relates to social identity. 
These findings provide further evidence for the nature of music subculture 
and the effects of listening to live music on mood.
2 2 0
